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Abstract 
 
Robert L. Richardson, Jr. 
Neoconservatism: Origins and Evolution, 1945 – 1985 
(Under the direction of Michael H. Hunt) 
 
 
This dissertation examines the origins and evolution of neoconservatism as a philosophical 
and political movement in America from 1945 to 1980.  I maintain that as the exigencies and 
anxieties of the Cold War fostered new intellectual and professional connections between 
academia, government and business, three disparate intellectual currents were brought into 
contact: the German philosophical tradition of anti-modernism, the strategic-analytical 
tradition associated with the RAND Corporation, and the early Cold War anti-Communist 
tradition identified with figures such as Reinhold Niebuhr.  Driven by similar aims and 
concerns, these three intellectual currents eventually coalesced into neoconservatism.  As a 
political movement, neoconservatism sought, from the 1950s on, to re-orient American 
policy away from containment and coexistence and toward confrontation and rollback 
through activism in academia, bureaucratic and electoral politics.  Although the 
neoconservatives were only partially successful in promoting their transformative project, 
their accomplishments are historically significant.  More specifically, they managed to 
interject their views and ideas into American political and strategic thought, discredit détente 
and arms control, and shift U.S. foreign policy toward a more confrontational stance vis-à-vis 
the Soviet Union.  Simultaneously, the neoconservatives institutionalized nuclear war-
iii 
fighting (the idea that it is possible to fight and win a nuclear war) in U.S. strategic doctrine.  
In re-orienting U.S. policy in the 1970s, the neoconservatives also laid the foundations for 
the policies of the first Reagan Administration.  This dissertation challenges the prevailing 
conceptions about neoconservatism in three ways.  First, it demonstrates that 
neoconservatism was not primarily a sociological and literary phenomenon centered on the 
work of the so-called “New York intellectuals.”  Second, it demonstrates that the 
philosophical foundation of neoconservatism was not socialism, but German philosophy.  
Third, that neoconservatism’s primary policy focus was not Israeli interests and security, but 
the political and strategic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
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To Beth 
 
Nobody knows 
Nobody sees 
‘til the light of life stops burning 
‘til another soul goes free 
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 Introduction 
 
On January 15, 2004, French Defense Minister Michelle Alliot-Marie visited the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington to deliver a speech with the 
conciliatory-sounding title, “Renewing the Trans-Atlantic Security Partnership.”  Minister 
Alliot-Marie began, however, by expressing her belief that the deterioration of Franco-
American relations over the past few years was primarily due to the rise of “certain radical 
neoconservative ideas” in the United States.  Taken aback at this remark, some of the guests 
and journalists turned to look at Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz for a reaction.  
Wolfowitz, whom many regarded as the most powerful neoconservative figure in the Bush 
Administration, remained impassive.  Nor was there any reaction from Defense Secretary 
Rumsfeld, or any of the other American officials present as Minister Alliot-Marie followed 
up her opening remark by flatly asserting that U.S. foreign policy seemed to be aimed at 
nothing less than the political, economic and cultural domination of the world.1 
What are Americans to make of Madame Ministre’s characterizations of U.S. foreign 
policy and policy-makers?  Some may be inclined, as one Bush Administration official did 
privately, to dismiss Alliot-Marie as a “typical Left-Bank intellectual,” implying that her 
remarks were simply the result of visceral anti-Americanism.  If, however, we assume that 
such a prominent official of a long-standing European ally would not make such remarks 
lightly, then we must entertain several questions: What precisely is neoconservatism?  Who 
                                                 
1
 Barry Schweid, “French Minister Blasts Certain U.S. Ideas,” Associated Press, January 17, 2004 [online] 
http://nucnews.net/nucnews/2004nn/0401nn/040117nn.htm#451 
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are the neoconservatives and what do they believe?  Where and how did they get their ideas?  
What does the movement seek to accomplish? 
If we look to the handful of historical works—John Ehrman’s The Rise of 
Neoconservatism, Mark Gerson’s The Neoconservative Vision and Peter Steinfel’s The 
Neoconservatives, we find that none of them ventures a precise definition of 
neoconservatism.  They variously describe neoconservatism as a “mood” or a “vision”—or 
both.  Such descriptions are rather too nebulous to be helpful.  Was it an intellectual 
movement?  A set of political preferences?  A philosophical school of thought?  All three?  
All three authors go only part of the way toward fleshing out the characteristics of the 
movement. 2   
Similarly, none of the standard accounts offers a very detailed account of 
neoconservatism’ origins.  Steinfels argues that that neoconservatism emerged from the 
classic anti-Communism of the Truman era.  This characterization, while somewhat accurate, 
offers very little in the way of distinguishing neoconservatism from this alleged forerunner.  
Gerson and Ehrman go somewhat further than Steinfels and detect a European philosophical 
accent within neoconservative thought.  Neither author, however, pursues this European 
connection, nor pinpoints the exact philosophical impulse from which neoconservatism 
emerged.  
The standard accounts also lack of a detailed explanation of what constitutes the 
neoconservative “view” or “vision” of foreign affairs.  While Ehrman identifies the 
                                                 
2
 John Ehrman, The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs, 1945-1994 (New Haven: Yale 
University, 1995); Mark Gerson, The Neoconservative Vision: From the Cold War to the Culture Wars 
(Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1997); Peter Steinfels, The Neoconservatives: The Men Who Are Changing 
America’s Politics (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979).  Other more recent works that focus on the 
neoconservatives’ penchant for military adventure are: Andrew J. Bacevich, The New American Militarism: 
How Americans are Seduced by War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Ira Chernus, Monsters to 
Destroy: The Neoconservative War on Terror and Sin (Herndon, VA: Paradigm Publishers, 2006). 
3 
neoconservatives’ view with that of Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, it is difficult to discern 
any substantive link between Moynihan (with his two-year tenure as U.N. ambassador and 
subsequent opposition to Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy) and figures such as Richard Perle 
and Paul Wolfowitz.  Similarly, Gerson and Steinfels cite only literary figures such as Irving 
Kristol and Norman Podhoretz in their discussions and, while these men had definite 
opinions on foreign policy, they are more notable for their promotion of neoconservative 
positions than for their formulation and implementation of those positions. 
What, then, do I have to say about neoconservatism’s origins, characteristics and 
historical trajectory?  I maintain that neoconservatism is a relatively small philosophical and 
political movement of European origins that, from 1945 on, sought to re-orient American 
policy away from containment and coexistence and toward confrontation and rollback.  To 
elaborate on this thesis, I maintain that, as the exigencies and anxieties of the Cold War 
fostered new intellectual and professional connections between academia, government and 
business, three disparate intellectual currents were brought into contact: the German 
philosophical tradition of anti-modernism, the strategic-analytical tradition associated with 
the RAND Corporation, and the early Cold War anti-Communist tradition identified with 
figures such as Reinhold Niebuhr.  Driven by similar aims and concerns, these three 
intellectual currents eventually converged into neoconservatism.3  
                                                 
3
 The literature on rollback is one of the smaller but more interesting subsets of Cold War studies.  See: Robert 
J. Art, A Grand Strategy for America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); Jeffrey Burds, The Early Cold 
War in Soviet West Ukraine, 1944-1948 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 2001); Sarah-Jane Corke, U.S. 
Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy: Truman, Secret Warfare and the CIA, 1945-53 (London: Routledge, 
2007); Nicholas Ganson, The Soviet Famine of 1946-47 in Global and Historical Perspective (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Peter Grose, Operation Rollback: America’s Secret War Behind the Iron Curtain 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2001); Gregory Mitrovich, Undermining the Kremlin: America’s Strategy 
to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947-1956 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000); Arnold Offner, Another Such 
Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945-1953 (Stanford: Sanford University Press, 2002). 
4 
As these intellectual currents began to coalesce into neoconservatism, a singular set 
of characteristics began to emerge that are neoconservatism’s defining features.  The first of 
these characteristics is the emphasis on the importance of ideas.  The neoconservatives 
believe that ideas—as opposed to economics, politics or religion—are the primary agents of 
historical change.  As such, ideas can be wielded like weapons to destroy or promote evil and 
injustice in the world.  As we shall see, this view derives from anti-modernism, which 
incorporates the Platonic view of certain ideas as universal and timeless; impervious to 
cultural, temporal or geographic context. 
The second defining characteristic of neoconservatism is its millenarianism.  
Millenarianism, or the belief that humanity stands on the brink of some major transformation, 
has been manifested in neoconservatism as strong, almost apocalyptic sense of crisis.  During 
the Cold War, this sense of crisis was driven by the belief that liberal democracy and 
Communism were engaged in a mortal conflict from which only one would emerge.  This 
characteristic most likely also emerges from neoconservatism’s anti-modernist origins.  Born 
amid the chaos and upheaval of Weimar Germany, anti-modernism, as we shall see, was 
itself a response to social and political crisis.  In the latter half of the twentieth century, 
neoconservative millenarianism was reinforced by the new dangers of Communist subversion 
and nuclear war. 
Transformation is the third defining characteristic of neoconservatism.  The 
neoconservatives assert that conflict is the primary—and in most cases the only—means of 
bringing about rapid, substantial and permanent social and political change.  Although the 
neoconservatives believe that ideas are the primary agents of change, they see conflict as the 
means whereby ideas are interjected into social and political contexts.  Originating in the 
5 
early neoconservatives’ experience with the Hegelian and Marxist dialectic, transformation 
was the operational aspect of the neoconservative struggle against evil in the world.  
To wage their crusade against evil, the neoconservatives sought to transform 
American political and strategic thought and policy.  Driven by an urgent, millenarian sense 
of crisis, they rejected the basic assumption upon which U.S. foreign and security policy 
rested after 1945: that Soviet power and ambitions could be contained and deterred.  Rather, 
they believed that the Soviet Union was a militant, incorrigible state bent on the destruction 
of the United States and the conquest of the world.  They also believed that only an intense 
and sustained effort, aimed at rolling back and ultimately destroying Soviet Communism 
would allow Western civilization to survive.  Although their arenas and tactics changed over 
time, the neoconservatives’ basic strategy of effecting change through the power of ideas 
remained constant. 
Although the neoconservatives were only partially successful in promoting their 
transformative project, their accomplishments are historically significant.  Insofar as they did 
manage to interject their views and ideas into American political and strategic thought, the 
neoconservatives’ intellectual energy helped discredit détente and arms control, and shift 
U.S. foreign policy toward a more confrontational stance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.  
Simultaneously, the neoconservatives institutionalized nuclear war-fighting (the idea that it is 
possible to fight and win a nuclear war) in U.S. strategic doctrine.  In re-orienting U.S. policy 
in the 1970s, they also laid the foundations for the policies of the first Reagan 
Administration.4 
                                                 
4
 Although there are no other studies of the precise nature of neoconservative ideas on U.S. foreign and security 
policy and how this influence was exerted, there does seem to be a general awareness that neoconservative 
thought was the major intellectual fount of the first Reagan Administration’s foreign and security policy.  See 
Frances Fitzgerald, Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War (New York: 
6 
From a longer-term perspective, neoconservative thought lent a new impetus to that 
peculiar meliorist/militarist impulse that has long resided in American political thought.  The 
neoconservative sense of crisis, along with their reification of military power, reinforced the 
tendency to see military solution to every international problem.  At the very least, the 
neoconservative insistence for U.S. power to be employed in the service of justice has 
forever altered the intellectual topography upon which every subsequent presidential 
administration would operate.  Future presidents who may believe that the United States has 
a moral obligation to use its power to destroy evil in the world can draw upon a powerful 
precedent.  Conversely, those who do not believe that the United States has any such moral 
obligation will find it much more difficult to answer why America stands aside in the face of 
tyranny and aggression.5 
To more fully explicate the origins, nature and evolution of neoconservatism, I will 
proceed as follows.  The first chapter is a biographical treatment of Leo Strauss, a German-
born professor of political philosophy.  This chapter sets the stage by examining the 
characteristics and development of the philosophical component of neoconservatism, anti-
modernism, through the lens of Strauss’s life and career.  The focus here will be on anti-
modernism’s origins in the context of inter-war Europe, Strauss’s subsequent career in the 
United States and the effects of the burgeoning Cold War on anti-modernist philosophy.     
                                                                                                                                                       
Simon & Schuster, 2000); Stefan A. Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neoconservatives and 
the Global Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
 
5
 For more on the origins and development of American militarism, see: Richard Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The 
Federalists and the Origins of the American Military Establishment, 1783-1802 (New York: Free Press, 1975) 
and Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy and the End of the Republic (New York: 
Metropolitan Books, 2004).  For a Straussian perspective on American militarism, see Karl-Friedrich Walling, 
Republican Empire: Alexander Hamilton On War and Free Government  (Lawrence, KS: University Press of 
Kansas, 1999).   
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The second chapter explores the earliest anti-modernist reaction to the Cold War and 
the initial attempts to transform American society.  In the early days of the Cold War, the 
anti-modernist scholars began to argue that America would first have to eradicate the moral 
relativism that pervaded U.S. society before it would possess the moral clarity and courage 
necessary to undertake a successful crusade against Communism.  In order to effect this 
transformation of American society, these early neoconservatives launched an intense 
polemical “war of ideas” within academia against political philosophies of the Left and 
Right.  Although they met with some success early on, the massive social and political 
changes of the 1960s overwhelmed them and effectively put an end to their transformative 
project.  
Chapters Three and Four are biographical treatments of the nuclear strategist Albert 
Wohlstetter and Dorothy Fosdick, the long-time chief of staff to Senator Henry M. “Scoop” 
Jackson.  An examination of their careers is crucial to understanding neoconservatism’s 
evolution.  Educated in the anti-modernist tradition, Wohlstetter and Fosdick brought an anti-
modernist ethos to their respective fields.  In so doing, they precipitated the melding of anti-
modernist philosophy with other intellectual currents and the introduction of 
neoconservatism into the policymaking realm.   
Chapters Five, Six and Seven, are studies of the neoconservatives in action from 1968 
to 1976.  Chapters Five and Six examines the neoconservative efforts to de-rail détente and 
arms control and re-orient U.S. foreign and security policy.  I will argue in these chapters that 
the neoconservative campaigns against the Nixon and Ford Administrations’ foreign policy 
played an important role in enlarging and consolidating the movement.  I will also contend 
8 
that it was during this period that the neoconservatives were able to institutionalize their 
signature strategic concept of nuclear war-fighting.  
Chapter Seven treats the more public aspects of the neoconservative movement from 
1972 to 1980.  This chapter focuses on Jackson’s 1972 and 1976 campaigns for the 
Democratic presidential nomination.  It is my contention here that the neoconservative efforts 
to create a successful political narrative helped prepare the ground for Ronald Reagan’s 
successful 1980 presidential campaign.   
 The structure and scope of this work has been, like all historical works, determined 
partly by the design of the author, partly by the vagaries of the story and partly by the 
availability of sources.  While the first two factors are manageable, the last is sometimes not.  
This work has suffered some undesired constraint in its scope by the restriction of sources 
that were once available or about to be made available but were suddenly, and often 
inexplicably, withdrawn.  Certain documents from the Nixon and Ford Administrations, for 
instance, were withdrawn without notice from National Archives between 2001 and 2004.  
The name file of Senator Henry M. Jackson from the Reagan Administration has been 
withheld by the Reagan Presidential Library, despite FOIA requests from myself and others.  
Certain folders from the personal papers of Mikhail Karpovich were restricted by Harvard 
University in 2004, and the Albert Wohlstetter Papers have only recently (2007) been 
deposited at the Hoover Institution, despite an announcement of deposit in early 2003.  Even 
now, however, only 20 per cent of the Wohlstetter Papers are available, with boxes 1-61, 
201-354, 385-754, 815-821 and 838-857 remaining closed.  Although the reasons for this 
secrecy are not entirely clear, the overall impact on the scope of my project has been 
9 
relatively small.  More specifically, instead of considering the evolution of neoconservatism 
through 1985, my analysis concludes in 1980. 
Before beginning in earnest, however, I would like to briefly consider some of the 
more prominent misconceptions about neoconservatism in order to disassociate this work 
from them.  Over the last few years, as the neoconservatives have risen to unprecedented 
preeminence in the second Bush Administration, a great deal of misinformation—and in 
some cases, outright disinformation—has been purveyed about neoconservatism and its 
origins.  While most of this ink has been spilt for racist or partisan political reasons, some of 
these misconceptions about neoconservatism have proven quite resilient and merit some brief 
attention. 
First, there are the troubling and absurd claims that neoconservatism is a “Jewish 
movement,” a “cabal” and/or some sort of nefarious “conspiracy” aimed at advancing the 
interests of Israel.  Such claims about neoconservatism, while a staple of the yellow press 
over the last two decades, have much more to do with ignorance and/or anti-Semitism than 
with history.  While there are Jewish neoconservatives, their presence is largely reflective of 
the fact that the majority of the anti-modernist academics that fled Germany for America in 
the 1930s were Jewish.  Once in America, they, like their students, tended to gravitate toward 
universities without Jewish quotas.  As we shall see, neoconservatism has much more in 
common with Greek and German political thought and American anti-Communism than with 
Jewish theology or Israeli national interests. 
The second main misconception about neoconservatism is that it is a form of 
conservatism.  There are, however, significant differences between conservatism and 
neoconservatism.  Traditional American conservatism has always purported to be non-
10 
ideological, supportive of limited government and venerative of tradition.  In regard to 
foreign policy, American conservatives have usually tended to view international activism 
skeptically.  Conversely, neoconservatism is self-consciously ideological, and tends to view 
tradition as irrelevant.  Indeed, the neoconservative emphasis on transformation is usually 
focused on the destruction of anachronistic customs and ideas.  Moreover, the 
neoconservatives view a large, powerful central government as essential to bringing about 
change at home and abroad. 
A third popular misconception conflates neoconservatism with Wilsonianism.  
Although both the Wilsonian tradition and neoconservatism favor activism abroad, 
Wilsonianism seeks to promote freedom and self-determination, usually through the agency 
of international institutions.   The neoconservatives, however, do not share this faith in the 
wisdom of the masses or international institutions.  Neoconservative activism is grounded in 
the perception that Western civilization has been, since classical times, under assault from 
various dark forces and that they, as a political and intellectual elite, are morally obligated to 
defend it.  Self-determination, if it happens to result from neoconservative activism, is but a 
happenstance rather than a conscious objective.  This conception of history as an endless, 
Nietzschean struggle has little in common with Wilsonianism or the general optimism that 
characterizes most American political thought.  It has much in common with the fears and 
uncertainties that surrounded neoconservatism’s origins in Weimar Germany.  It is to those 
origins that we now turn. 
 Chapter 1 
Confronting Modernity: Leo Strauss and the Origins and Effects of Anti-Modernist 
Philosophy 
 
  The ultimate triumph of modernity, Leo Strauss used to tell his students, would mean 
the end of all that is genuine, noble and great about civilization and the advent of a world in 
which there is “complete leveling and uniformity.”  “Regardless whether it is brought by iron 
compulsion or by soapy advertisement . . . it means unity of the human race on the lowest 
level, complete emptiness of life, of self-respect.  Routine without rhyme or reason; no 
leisure, no concentration, no elevation, no withdrawal . . . no individuals and no peoples, only 
lonely crowds.”6 
This grim vision of the future, a future in which humanity has lost all awareness of 
the Good, the Beautiful and the True, is characteristic of Strauss’s philosophy.  A German-
born professor of political philosophy, Strauss was a prolific author and tireless teacher.  In 
Europe between the world wars, he was also one of the seminal figures in the development of 
anti-modernist political philosophy.  In the 1930s, Strauss, along with Hans Jonas, Theodor 
Adorno, Hannah Arendt, Herbert Marcuse, Max Horkheimer, Karl Löwith, Kurt Riezler, 
Jacob Klein, Kurt von Fritz, and Ernst Kapp, fled Nazi Germany for the United States.  In so 
doing, Strauss and his fellow émigrés transplanted anti-modernism to America.  
                                                 
6
 Leo Strauss, “Existentialism,” lecture notes, 1960, box 7, folder 6, Leo Strauss Papers, Special Collections, 
Joseph Regenstein Library, University of Chicago, Chicago. [Hereafter, “Strauss Papers”]. 
 12 
A singular view, anti-modernism is the philosophical foundation of neoconservatism.  
Derived from both the modern German and ancient Greek philosophical traditions, anti-
modernism is characterized by three main precepts—idealism, moral clarity and 
transformation—each of which encodes a philosophical argument about human 
consciousness.  The first of these, idealism, is the belief that there is an objective reality 
comprised of timeless, universal values, such as Good Evil and Justice, while moral clarity is 
the belief that humans possess the capacity to perceive the values of objective reality.  
Transformation is the belief that that rapid, substantial changes in human consciousness can 
occur that empower or preclude moral clarity, and that these changes manifest themselves in 
reality.   
In anti-modernist thought, these precepts also interlock to constitute a narrative about 
the evolution of human consciousness that purports to explain the origins and effects of 
modernity.  Briefly, this narrative proceeds from the position that humans were at one time 
endowed with nearly absolute moral clarity.  Men were aware of, and cherished, the Ideas of 
the Good, the Just and the Noble.  All aspects of human life reflected this awareness, 
including the highest filed of endeavor—politics.  Over time, however, the baser passions 
began to erode moral clarity until the seventeenth century, when the idea of relativism 
appeared.  Thus, relativism (that values are not timeless and universal but are dependent on 
context) was held by the anti-modernists to be the defining feature of modernity.7 
Over the centuries, modernity became ever stronger and more pervasive.  In so doing, 
modernity, the anti-modernists contend, precipitated the appearance of a series of 
progressively more nihilistic political systems: liberalism, fascism and Communism.  The 
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appearance of each system signaled a new stage in the progressive loss of moral clarity and 
human degeneracy.  Increasingly removed from objective truth, and increasingly hedonistic 
and materialistic, human society became was rapidly approaching the point where it would 
no longer be able to distinguish Good from Evil, the Noble from the Base, and Justice from 
the Injustice.  
What then are we to make of anti-modernism?  Why and how did it arise?  How did it 
come to underpin neoconservatism?  The life and career of Leo Strauss suggests answers.  
No other theorist, for example, can match the explicit starkness in Strauss’s explications of 
modernity.  Strauss’s forceful and expansive body of work helped transport anti-modernism 
from Weimar Germany to the classrooms of America.  Excepting the work of Hannah 
Arendt, Strauss conveys most sharply the sense of urgency and crisis that so typifies anti-
modernist thought and that so appealed to many young converts in the early days of the Cold 
War. 
 
Beginnings: The Making of an Anti-modernist 
Leo Strauss (1899-1973), was born in 1899 in Kirchain, Germany to observant, but 
not strict Orthodox Jewish merchants.  Although the small village of Kirchain was far from 
the political center of Berlin, and the elder Strauss, Hugo, was a grain merchant with little 
interest in politics, young Leo came face to face with some rather harsh political realities as a 
child of five or six.  Russian Jews fleeing Tsarist pogroms passed through his village and his 
father gave temporary refuge to some in the family home.  This experience evidently made a 
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very strong impression on Strauss.  It was, he recounted years later, a strong lesson in the 
translation of ideas into politics.8 
In an effort to understand the power of the ideas that underpinned the officially-
sanctioned anti-Semitism of imperial Russia, Strauss, at the age of fourteen, began to 
“furtively” read Nietzsche.  The great philosopher’s unabashed exploration of human 
inequality intrigued Strauss, and as he engaged more deeply with Nietzsche, Strauss became 
enthralled by the power of his thought.  He was, he recalled later, “dominated” and 
“bewitched” by Nietzsche.  It is probably no exaggeration to conclude that with his encounter 
with Nietzsche’s work, Strauss had found his calling.  Moreover, throughout his career his 
philosophical vocabulary was characterized by many of the same themes that had concerned 
Nietzsche: the power of ideas, the alienation from bourgeois values, the effects of modernity 
and the human potential for spiritual and political transformation. 
Strauss’s political and philosophical coming of age was not, however, limited to the 
theoretical.  In 1917, at the age of seventeen, he joined a Zionist youth group called “The 
Jewish Blue and White Travel League,” (Der Jüdischer Wanderbund Blau-Weiss).  Modeled 
on the neo-pagan, anti-Semitic German youth group, “The Migratory Birds,” (Die 
Wandervogel),  the League, like many other such groups, mixed religious mysticism and 
political activism.  Politically, the group was situated on the radical fringes of German 
Zionism and sought to rally German Jews to the idea of a military conquest of Palestine.  The 
group rejected the orthodox position that only the Messiah may re-establish Israel and 
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espoused the view that “the Jews should return to their land [in Palestine] with their heads 
up, but not by virtue of a divine act but rather of political and military action—fighting.”9   
In 1917 Strauss also began his academic career.  He began attending the University of 
Marburg, where he came under the direction of Ernst Cassirer.  One of the most prominent 
philosophers in Europe, Cassirer was the founder of the “Marburg school” of philosophy that 
sought to develop an empiricist philosophical epistemology modeled on the scientific 
method.  Strauss’s career at Marburg, however, was interrupted by military conscription in 
February 1918.  Although he attempted to avoid service in the army by feigning appendicitis 
at his induction, the military doctors were not deceived and he was sent to Belgium as a 
French interpreter.  Discharged from the German Army in November 1918, Strauss followed 
Cassirer to Hamburg, enrolled in the University of Hamburg and, in early 1919, began work 
on his dissertation.   
Strauss’s dissertation was entitled, “The Problem of Knowledge in the Philosophical 
Doctrine of F. H. Jacobi.”  The work considered the thought of the Dutch philosopher, 
Benedict (Baruch) Spinoza (1632-1677) in the light of the criticism leveled at him by the 
reactionary philosopher, Friedrich H. Jacobi.  Generally regarded as one of the great 
rationalist forerunners of the Enlightenment, Spinoza was, and remains, a controversial 
figure.  Alienated from Judaism, expelled from the synagogue and excommunicated by the 
Amsterdam synod in 1656 for his contention that Reason refutes the supernatural 
components of religion (such as prophecy and miracles), Spinoza’s reputation was later 
rehabilitated by the Enlightenment rationalists of the eighteenth century.  Jacobi, famous for 
coining the term “nihilism,” was a vehement opponent of the Enlightenment who argued that 
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Spinoza’s thought was the precursor to the atheism and relativism he perceived in 
Enlightenment philosophy.10   
The subject matter of Strauss’s dissertation mirrored his own religious and political 
doubts during this time.  He was by 1921 “a young Jew in the grip of the theologico-political 
predicament.”  This play on words by Strauss—he refers to the title of Spinoza’s primary 
work, The Theologico-Political Treatise—refers to this internal conflict.  Like Spinoza, he 
imagined himself caught between his loyalty to Judaism and an intellectual and political 
obligation to the truth.  In Strauss’s particular case, Judaism was a major component of his 
identity, yet he harboured serious doubts about the truth of religious revelation.  This doubt 
was exacerbated by his personal attraction to Zionism.  Zionist thought at the time rejected 
the traditional orthodox position that only the Messiah could re-establish Israel and any 
attempt to do so through human agency was blasphemous.  Although he strongly believed 
that “trust in God instead of trust in one’s own power and ‘hardware’” (weaponry), would 
“effeminate” the Jews, and preclude the realization of a Jewish homeland, he retained 
misgivings.  It was no easy decision to turn his back on one of the most sacred tenets of 
Orthodox Judaism.  As a result, he, unlike Spinoza, did not choose a path and press boldly 
forth, but remained mired in uncertainty.  While still at this intellectual impasse, Strauss 
encountered anti-modernism.11   
A singular impulse within German philosophy, anti-modernism is a philosophical 
school that rejects the various intellectual, social, cultural, and/or political trends and events 
that have been defined as “modernity.”  Frequently appearing in conjunction with anxieties 
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over rapid social and political change, anti-modernism has, paradoxically, also been 
associated with calls for transformative change.  The eighteenth century German 
philosophers, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and Friedrich Schiller, for instance, identified 
modernity with the social and political upheavals of the French Revolution and the 
Napoleonic empire.  In reaction, both men believed that German society could be redeemed 
and transformed through the power of ideas as expressed through the philosophical 
movement of Weimar Classicism. 
The critique of modernity that emerged in the wake of World War I also appeared 
against the backdrop of great change and generalized anxiety.  The national resentment 
fostered by the punitive Treaty of Versailles engendered fear in many quarters about 
Germany’s political and economic future.  There was also significant public concern over 
“degenerate” new forms in art and literature and new, more liberal social and sexual mores.  
By the early 1920s, these anxieties had begotten a significant political and philosophical 
reaction against modernity.  Intellectuals such as Eduard Stadtler, Ernst Jünger, Moeller van 
den Bruck Carl Schmitt, Karl Haushofer, Oswald Spengler, Savitri Devi, Gershom Scholem, 
and Stefan George formulated critiques of modernity, which they defined in various ways.  
Writing and speaking from political “clubs,” journals, and sympathetic organs like Hans 
Zeher’s weekly, Action! (Die Tat), or in Haushofer’s case, over the radio, the anti-
modernists, or “neoconservatives” as some styled themselves, inveighed against “bourgeois . 
. . animal existence,” “the decline of the West,” “German spiritual exhaustion,” “democratic 
dictatorship,” “the dangerous vapours of socialism” and the “senseless plague of social 
leveling.” 
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Interlaced with these critiques of modernity were calls for the transformation of 
society and the state that recalled the older Weimar classicist tradition’s focus on ideas but 
were more overtly political.  Refusing to identify themselves with those conservatives among 
the military, business and the Junkers that wished to restore the pre-war Wilhelmine Reich, 
the anti-modernists sought models for a new civilization in the dimly lit subterranean 
traditions of the past.  Spengler, for instance, looked to the “high civilizations” of Babylonia, 
Egypt and ancient China.  Scholem explored the recesses of Jewish mysticism in the ancient 
texts of the Kaballah.  Jünger and Haushofer sought an escape from modernity in the half-
mythical warrior cultures of the ancient Germanic tribes and feudal Japan.12 
It was in this milieu that that Strauss met the man whose thought, along with that 
Nietzsche, was to be one of the great influences of his life: Martin Heidegger.  Arriving at the 
University of Freiburg in 1922, Strauss’s intention had been to study under Edmund Husserl, 
the founder of the twentieth century philosophical school of Phenomenology.  Shortly after 
arriving at Freiburg, however, Strauss encountered Heidegger, then Husserl’s protégé.  A 
forceful, charismatic figure who always taught his classes dressed  
entirely in black, Heidegger immediately made a deep impression on Strauss.  Strauss was 
also quite impressed by the circle of brilliant young students that surrounded Heidegger, such 
as Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Gerhard Kruger, Herbert Marcuse,  
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Hans-Georg Gadamer and Hans Jonas.13    
Heidegger at the time was engaged in formulating a complex critique of modernity.  
Although he variously associated modernity with materialism, bourgeois religious values, 
mass culture, consumerism and technological determinism, Strauss considered Heidegger’s 
concept of an “escape from the hermeneutic” to be at the core of his concept of modernity.  
According to Strauss, this “hermeneutic” held that at one time, human beings were free to 
interpret reality in a totally subjective, “authentic” manner.  Beginning with classical Greek 
philosophy, the idea arose that reality existed independently of human action.  Reinforced by 
the work of Christian philosophers such as St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, the idea 
of an independent, external reality had metastasized into a state of affairs in which few 
individuals could perceive subjective reality.  Reality thus became, for the majority of 
humans, a series of interpretations proffered by others from the moment of birth through 
tradition, custom and the structure of language itself.   
For Heidegger, the path back to a totally subjective mode of thought led through 
classical and neo-Aristotelian philosophy.  Employing an analytical technique that he called 
“deconstruction” (destruktion), Heidegger began the process of discovering a mode of 
thought free of all external mediations.  This task, he claimed, involved a transformation of 
consciousness through the deconstruction of classical Greek thought.  Moreover, Heidegger 
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argued, could only begin in Germany because of the “special inner kinship between the 
German language and the language and thought of the ancient Greeks.”14 
The most immediate effect of his encounter with Heidegger was that Strauss began to 
formulate his own critique of modernity.  His initial formulation, however, was much closer 
to Heidegger’s student—and secret lover—Hannah Arendt than to that of Heidegger himself.  
While Heidegger associated modernity with a turn toward idealism, Strauss took an opposite 
tack.  Whether a result of an intellectual convergence and/or his considerable romantic 
attraction to Arendt, Strauss also began to associate the advent of modernity with humanity’s 
turn from idealism and the timeless objectivity of classical thought.  Like Arendt, Strauss 
conceived of the crisis of modernity as a universal crisis of human consciousness—a crisis of 
moral clarity—that manifested itself in all human endeavors, particularly politics.   
Strauss also seems to have begun to adopt and modify Arendt’s conception of 
transformation.   In Arendt’s view, any “escape from modernity” would involve the 
appearance of new political forms and ways of thinking about them.  Strauss accepted this 
view, but doubted that any new political form could ever appear that would not be 
“contaminated” by religion.  While classical Greek philosophy represented, in his view, the 
most viable basis for a new polis, it too required faith, and an acceptance of metaphysical 
realm beyond human reason in which “things do not change.”  As Heidegger had pointed out, 
the metaphysical aspects of Plato were so integral to Platonic thought that they could not be 
separated from the system.  Thus, he was left with Heidegger’s conclusion that there was no 
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objective, universal reality beyond that perceived by the individual.  Unable to accept 
religious faith, yet unable to discern an escape from modernity through Reason alone, Strauss 
found himself still trapped within his familiar “theologico-political predicament.”15  
 
The Break with Judaism and the Ongoing Development of Anti-Modernism 
Upon taking his first academic position at the Free Jewish Academy (Freies 
Jüdisches Lehrhaus) of Frankfurt in 1923, Strauss resolved to free himself from the personal 
and professional impasse of this “theologico-political predicament.”  Turning his back on 
Judaism, he returned to his career as a Zionist theorist and began to address Zionist youth 
groups and to write pro-Zionist articles.  In these speeches and articles, he adopted an 
increasingly combative tone towards Orthodox Judaism, characterizing it at one point in 
Satanic terms as “the old Evil Enemy” (die alt böse Feind).  He continued activities in this 
vein even after accepting a position at the prestigious orthodox institution, the Academy for 
the Science of Judaism (Akademie für Wissenschaft des Judentums) in Berlin in 1925.    
Strauss’s break with religion is also evident in his philosophical work of this period.  
In 1928 he completed his first book, Spinoza’s Critique of Religion as the Foundation of His 
Bible-Science: Investigations into Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treatise.  In Spinoza’s 
Critique, Strauss posits the theory that Spinoza, as well as other seventeenth century critics of 
religion such as Uriel Da Costa, Isaac De La Peyrère, and Thomas Hobbes, were 
representatives of a tradition that could be traced back to the philosophy of Epicurus in the 
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third century B.C.  All of these thinkers, Strauss argued, had believed that individuals and 
societies were much more peaceful and progressive without the “illusory hopes” of 
religion.16   
In 1928, Strauss published an article that brought his career as a Zionist political 
theorist to an abrupt end.  In a review of Sigmund Freud’s “The Future of an Illusion,” (Die 
Zukunft einer Illusion), he argued for an atheistic, political Zionism as the only means of 
overcoming the “deliberate [political] indecisiveness” that was engendered by religious piety.  
The article, however, was greeted by a short but intense backlash.  Not only did many secular 
Jewish readers consider Strauss’s work distasteful, but many of his fellow political Zionists 
were also unhappy with his article.  German political Zionists had by now reached a sort of 
rapprochement with various religious leaders over the goal of establishing a Jewish state in 
Palestine.  Views such as those expressed by Strauss in his article, however, risked damaging 
this tenuous alliance, and he was ostracized from political Zionist circles.  Although he 
continued to speak to Zionist youth groups, his burgeoning career as a prominent Zionist 
political theorist was, for all practical purposes, over.17 
Returning to his research, Strauss began a study of the life and thought of the 
medieval rabbi, Moses Maimonides (1135-1204).  Maimonides, a Spaniard who served as the 
court physician and philosopher to the Sultan of Egypt from 1165-1204, was of particular 
interest to Strauss because he claimed to have discovered a means of reconciling classical 
philosophy and the Bible.  A typically anti-modernist project insofar as the objective was to 
recover the hidden knowledge of ancient traditions, Strauss’s research did not yield its 
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hoped-for treasure.  Rather than a reconciliation of philosophy and religion, Strauss claims to 
have discovered the secret of esoteric writing.   
A singular concept, esoteric writing is, according to Strauss, a device whereby 
Maimonides and other, earlier philosophers concealed profound truths among edifying but 
relatively innocuous statements, the juxtaposition of words, alpha-numeric codes, allegory, 
poetic imagery, seemingly obvious contradictions and/or omissions.  Since the death of 
Socrates, Strauss reasoned, philosophers had often suffered for views that secular or religious 
authorities had considered seditious or heretical.  Through esoteric writing, however, 
philosophers could hand down their knowledge to their successors without overtly revealing 
certain “dangerous” truths, such as the falsity of religion.  When “packaged” within teachings 
that “are not properly true,” the exoteric face of philosophy contributed to the social order by 
reinforcing the morality of the “vulgar” masses.  Thus, religion could remain securely in 
place, serving to reinforce the needs of the state by advocating certain types of behaviour for 
the masses.  Behind the scenes, however, the philosophers would remain dedicated to the 
cause of Reason.18   
The discovery of esoteric writing seems to have served two purposes for Strauss.  
Most immediately, it may have been a way of soothing the psychological blow of having 
other Jews—other Zionists no less—so overwhelmingly reject his critique of religion.  If the 
rebuff of his first professional works had given him something of a persecution complex, he 
would have quite naturally sought a means of justifying his work.  Thus, instead of seeing 
himself as an obscure, junior academic who had been so foolish as to publicly denounce one 
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of the world’s great religions in the charged political atmosphere of 1928 Berlin, he was able 
to see himself as one of a long line of philosophers persecuted for speaking the truth.  Indeed, 
as we shall see in the next chapter, Strauss was to resurrect the image of the persecuted 
philosopher more than once in his career.  
Philosophically, esoteric writing also suggested a way out of Heidegger’s conundrum 
involving Plato’s metaphysics.  Heidegger had maintained that the Platonic system’s 
dependence on faith in an intelligent higher power (as symbolized by the gods) disqualified it 
as political philosophy.  If, however, the metaphysical elements were merely the exoteric 
outer garb of Platonic thought, the whole system need not be discarded.  Indeed, Strauss had 
also come to believe that the classical philosophers had not chosen to conceal their thought 
behind metaphysical elements willy-nilly.  Metaphysics was not simply a useless study of 
“things that do not change,” but an esoteric doctrine in itself.  For Strauss, the metaphysics of 
the pre-modern philosophers symbolized the universal and unchanging attributes of human 
consciousness.  The classical philosophers, aware that not all humans possessed similar 
capacities for Reason, had simply seen fit to encode their truths in the politically useful 
imagery of religion.19 
 The discovery of esoteric writing also prompted Strauss to wonder why modernity 
had come to represent such a threat to philosophy.  If the esoteric tradition had allowed 
philosophical truths to survive over millennia in the very bosom of various hostile religions 
and political systems, why should the “fact” of the esoteric tradition itself now be forgotten?  
Yet now in the present age it seemed to be precisely the case that the practice of philosophy, 
as well as its truths, seemed on the verge of being lost forever.  The threat was clearly 
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qualitatively different.  But how?  What was different?  When did the threat arise?  How 
could it be combated?   
Musing on these questions, Strauss arrived at the conclusion that the idea of 
historicism was responsible for obscuring the memory of the esoteric tradition.  Historicism 
(belief that an idea cannot reasonably claim to be valid beyond its particular historical time), 
was readily recognizable to Strauss in the work of Heidegger, Nietzsche and before him, 
Hegel.  He had, however, also become convinced that historicism pre-dated Hegel, and was 
probably a product of the Enlightenment.  The Enlightenment itself appeared, he suspected, 
as a result of an earlier attack on the classical notions of universalism (that ideas are 
changeless across cultures and places) and essentialism (that there are characteristics or 
properties that any thing of a given sort must have).   
Believing that he had identified the “mechanisms” of modernity, Strauss turned to 
seeking the origins of relativism, historicism and nominalism.  He concluded that ideas so 
exquisitely inimical to philosophy had not arisen by sheer accident.  To Strauss these ideas 
seemed the result of conscious, malicious intent by someone well versed in philosophy.  He 
set about identifying this unknown malefactor.20 
Strauss’s efforts to identify the unknown author(s) of modernity were rewarded in 
1931.  He had become acquainted with the work of the German legal scholar, Carl Schmitt.  
Schmitt, a friend of Herman Goering, was preparing to publish a book entitled, The Concept 
of the Political (Der Begriff des Politischen).  In this work, Schmitt argued that conflict, 
particularly violent conflict, is the essence of politics.  Liberal democracy, insofar as it strives 
to suppress armed conflict through tolerance, accommodation and negotiation, denies the 
natural human proclivity for war, and in do doing denies that which is the very essence of 
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politics and of human nature.  This denial of reality by liberalism had not, in Schmitt’s view, 
removed the proclivity for conflict from human nature—indeed, it could not be removed—
but it had obscured it.  This obfuscation had, in turn, resulted in a lack of understanding of 
political things and would inevitably result in a completely unified, pacified world in which 
neither morality nor any of the nobler human qualities could ever be reaffirmed.  In such a 
world, Schmitt maintained, all “serious” human endeavors would be reduced to 
“entertainment.”  Only by returning to a Hobbesian “state of nature” could human beings be 
free to act according to their true nature.21    
Taken with Schmitt’s thought, Strauss wrote a complimentary review of The Concept 
of the Political almost as soon as the book appeared in 1932.  In this review, Strauss agreed 
with Schmitt’s thesis that the modern phenomenon of liberalism obscured the political in a 
way inimical to human life.  Strauss, however, took issue with Schmitt’s contention that only 
a return to a Hobbesian “state of nature” could restore an awareness of the concept of the 
political.  As Strauss observed, Hobbes had denied that humans were naturally social and 
political.  Therefore, a return to a Hobbesian state of nature, or war of all against all, would 
not restore human awareness of the political but reduce men to the level of beasts.  In such a 
world, Strauss maintained, none of the noble qualities that Schmitt extolled, such as courage, 
honor, and loyalty would be possible.  Indeed, Strauss began to suspect not only that had 
Schmitt erred in looking to Hobbes’s conception of nature for human salvation.  Hobbes’s 
conception of nature and human nature was in fact the intellectual foundation of modernity.  
Although he did not develop this idea in his review of Schmitt, he hinted at his next course of 
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action in the next-to-last line with the assertion that “a radical critique of liberalism is only 
possible through an adequate understanding of Hobbes.” 22   
Before Strauss could undertake any serious study of Hobbes, he encountered Hannah 
Arendt in Berlin in early 1932.  Arendt, who had completed her dissertation in 1929, was 
doing research in the Prussian Library, as was Strauss.  Meeting in the library over several 
weeks, Strauss and Arendt engaged in frequent political discussions.  In the course of these 
talks Strauss often expressed admiration for the various right-wing political parties that were 
increasingly visible in the Weimar government.  Eventually, he mustered the courage to 
declare his romantic admiration for Arendt.  Although she was married to the professional 
Zionist, Gunther Stern, Strauss was emboldened by Stern’s absence from Germany.  Arendt, 
however, not only spurned his advances, but also roundly criticized his political views by 
pointing out how ironic it was that he would support political parties that would have “no 
room for a Jew like him.” 23 
Hard on the heels of his rejection by Arendt, Strauss was confronted with the 
possibility of dismissal from the Akademie.  Financial problems at the institution were 
making his position increasingly tenuous, and in 1931 he applied for a Rockefeller 
Foundation Fellowship.  Schmitt himself supplied a letter of recommendation for the 
fellowship, as did his former advisor, Cassirer.  Awarded the Rockefeller Fellowship, Strauss 
spent the rest of 1932 in Paris completing the research for his book on Maimonides.24     
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In early 1933, Strauss resumed his research on the thought of Hobbes.  His work, 
however, was interrupted by two developments.  The first of these events was marriage.  
While in Paris he had become re-acquainted with a woman that he had previously met in 
Berlin, Marie Bernsohn, a widow with a twelve-year-old son, Thomas.  The relationship 
blossomed and they were married on June 20, 1933.  The second development confronting 
Strauss in the summer of 1933 was employment.  He was nearing the end of his Rockefeller 
Fellowship and, given the social and political climate in Germany, felt that he would be 
unable to secure employment there should he return.  Deciding to apply for a second 
Rockefeller, he wrote to Schmitt for another letter of recommendation.  Schmitt once again 
supplied one and Strauss was awarded a second fellowship for 1934.  He wrote to Schmitt 
telling him that he intended to use the fellowship to travel to England and continue his study 
of Hobbes.25     
Arriving in England in January 1934, the Strauss family took a flat in a boarding 
house that faced the British Museum.  While awaiting permission from the Duke of 
Devonshire to examine Hobbes’s papers in the library at Chatsworth, Strauss divided his time 
between research at the British Museum and English lessons.  Obtaining permission from the 
Duke to use the Chatsworth Library in February, Strauss undertook one of the most extensive 
examinations of Hobbes ever done.  At one point he even discovered some unknown 
materials that may have been Hobbes’s earliest writings. 
In his work on Hobbes, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Genesis, 
Strauss argued that modern philosophy had not simply lost sight of the ancient truths, but had 
consciously rejected them, beginning with the seventeenth century English philosopher, 
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Thomas Hobbes.  Hobbes, Strauss maintained, was quite aware of what the ancients had 
written.  The secretary to Sir Francis Bacon was a learned man who had in fact read the 
philosophers of classical antiquity in the original Greek and Latin and was the first to 
translate Thucydides into English.  Indeed, there appears to have been little doubt in Strauss’s 
mind that Hobbes, like Spinoza, was an initiate who had not only understood the esoteric 
nature of classical thought, but also realized that he was writing in direct contradiction to it.26 
According to Strauss, Hobbes understood the classical view of man’s relationship 
with Nature and accepted them.  He was, for example, aware that Nature was the seat of the 
Ideas, the “universal principles,” such as Justice and Good.  Hobbes also knew that while few 
men were capable of directly perceiving the Ideas, the timeless truths nevertheless played an 
important role in maintaining social order.  The myths and illusions fostered by religion—
such as Divine Right, Heaven and Hell—were crude reflections of Nature’s universal 
principles.  It was these myths and illusions, reinforced by the exoteric writings of the 
philosophers, that had maintained the social order for a millennium.   
Hobbes, Strauss maintained, consciously set out to modify this state of affairs.  
Shocked by the ferocious, uncompromising nature of the English Civil War, Hobbes came to 
believe that religion and tradition had lost their power to contain the passions of men.  As a 
result, he sought a more stable and lasting basis for political and social order.  Hobbes’s 
solution was to denounce the illusions of religion and posit his terrifying vision of Nature as 
a war of all against all.  Only the fear of violent death, Hobbes believed, could hold human 
passions in check and maintain an orderly society.  Hobbes thus presented men with a choice: 
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live in a totally free but lawless and violent “state of Nature,” or voluntarily forego absolute 
freedom and submit to the civil authority of the state.  In return for this submission, the state 
would provide security of one’s person and property. 
In Strauss’s view, all of Hobbes’s claims regarding human nature and politics derived 
from his rejection of the classical conception of Nature.  In order to raise the specter of his 
brutal, animalistic “state of Nature,” Hobbes consciously set out to destroy the idea of a 
world governed by Reason, in accordance with Natural Law.  To accomplish this 
transformation, he declared that there could be no benign state of Nature governed by Reason 
because all human decisions are, in the absence of civil law, reflections of our “Appetites and 
Aversions, Hopes and Feares.”  Reason would not necessarily lead men to Good because, 
Hobbes maintained, there simply was no Good or Evil independent of human action.  
Moreover, Hobbes argued, Reason does not govern human passions and impulses, but serves 
them by suggesting possibilities for the realization of individual desires. 
Hobbes’s redefinition of Good and Evil had, in Strauss’s view, “laid the foundation of 
modern relativism.”  The demotion of the objective Platonic Ideas of Good and Evil to the 
status of mere adjectives—good and bad—meant that they would henceforward mean only 
what humans want or need them to mean.  This redefinition, in turn, wrought a “sea-change 
in the human imagination” that culminated in “a new moral attitude.”  Politically, this 
transformation manifested itself as the abandonment of Natural Law in favor of natural right.  
Natural Law, which Strauss claimed exists prior to, and independent of human thought and 
will, imposes duties and obligations on men by virtue of their place in Nature’s hierarchy.  
Conversely, Strauss viewed natural right as a subjective claim that emerges from the human 
will, not as an inalienable right, as the Enlightenment philosophers held.  While Hobbes had, 
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to be sure, posited only one natural right, the right to life, this had been sufficient to set men 
on a path of successive, subjective claims of right which terminated in the denial of every 
natural restraint.27  
Upon the completion of The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Strauss suspended his 
research in order to find employment.  Strauss’s friend, Gershom Scholem, a prominent 
scholar of Jewish mysticism, had been engaged in securing a prestigious appointment for 
Strauss in religious studies at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.  Strauss’s antagonism 
toward Judaism, however, proved to be his undoing.  His earlier criticisms of religion, as 
well as his decision to include a copy of his anti-religious Philosophy and Law with his 
application, caused Hebrew University to reject him.  Strauss’s actions, Scholem told his 
former student Walter Benjamin, amounted to “the suicide of a capable mind.”28 
As 1936 dawned, Strauss’s luck appeared to have finally run out.  Unable to return to 
Germany and unable to secure work in an England preoccupied with the growing German 
threat across the Channel, Jerusalem had represented his last, best chance for obtaining a 
permanent position.  Now that it had vanished, Strauss was left almost entirely without 
prospects.  He had no income, and his family was subsisting on a grant from the board of 
Cambridge University.  With nowhere left to turn, Strauss decided to seek employment in the 
United States.  Leaving his wife and stepson behind in England, he set out for America.29 
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Strauss in America: The Evolution of Anti-Modernism and the Critique of Liberalism 
When Strauss and his fellow anti-modernists began to arrive in America in the 1930s, 
they found to their consternation that the field of political science dominated by empiricism.  
The dominant methodology within the natural and social sciences, empiricism emphasizes 
observation, statistical and quantitative data rather than the intuitive, theoretical reasoning 
favored by the anti-modernists.  Ironically, empiricism’s dominance was a product of an 
earlier wave of German political thought that had reached American shores in the late 
nineteenth century.  The fathers of modern political science in the United States, Woodrow 
Wilson, Theodore Woolsey, John Burgess, Charles E. Merriam, and Westel Willoughby, 
were trained and widely read in the historicist German “statecraft” (Staatswissenschaft) 
tradition of von Rotteck, von Treitschke, von Schmoller, Dilthey, von Stein, Sombart, and 
Weber.  Focusing on pragmatic, utilitarian knowledge, Staatswissenschaft insisted on a 
methodological distinction between facts and values, and rejected classical political 
philosophy’s concern with absolute, “foundational” knowledge.30   
From a practical perspective, the empiricists’ primacy within the academy affected 
the émigrés’ prospects for employment.  While some, such as Max Horkheimer and Theodor 
Adorno had arrived in America with a promise of employment in hand, others, such as 
Hannah Arendt, Franz Neumann and Herbert Marcuse, took jobs outside of academia or 
worked as temporary lecturers, as did Erich Voegelin and Arnold Brecht.  Strauss, for his 
part, found a temporary position in the History Department of Columbia University for the 
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fall of 1937.  To his dismay, however, he soon discovered that he was not expected to teach 
political philosophy, but rather the history of political philosophy.  His experience was not a 
happy one and only reinforced his conviction that American society was firmly in the grip of 
modernity.  The teaching of political philosophy was, in Strauss’s view, an exercise in the 
discernment of truth rather than a history lesson.  “To replace a doctrine which claims to be 
true by a survey of more or less brilliant errors,” he was later to say of his experience as an 
historian, was “an absurdity.” 
Strauss’s situation, however, soon improved, personally and professionally.  He was 
not only joined in America by his family later that year, but was also able to secure a less 
onerous job.  His friend Harold Laski, a noted Marxist political theorist at the London School 
of Economics, prevailed upon the director of the New School for Social Research, Alvin 
Johnson, to hire Strauss.  Johnson, the creator of the famous “University in Exile,” hired 
Strauss as a visiting lecturer of Political Science in the fall of 1938.  Although it was not a 
permanent position, his appointment lasted ten years.  During this time the small but 
exceedingly loyal school known as the “Straussians” began to emerge around Strauss and his 
teachings.31 
Once ensconced at the New School, Strauss was also able to turn his attention to the 
small but intense debate over the future of liberalism that was building within various 
intellectual quarters.  The severe social and economic problems of the interwar period, as 
well as the rise of fascism and the growing power of the Soviet Union had made many 
Americans pessimistic about liberalism’s prospects for survival.  Clarence Skinner of the 
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Tufts School of Religion probably spoke for many Americans when he observed in 1937 that 
“the Zeitgeist seems to be something other than liberalism.”  Some Americans, such the 
intellectuals that clustered around the political and literary quarterly, Partisan Review, such 
as Max and Yetta Shachtman, James Cannon, Philip Rahv, and James Burnham, saw 
socialism as the future.  Even the most optimistic observers of contemporary events, such as 
the philosopher John Dewey, were only slightly more sanguine.  Liberal democracy, Dewey 
argued, would “probably” survive the twentieth century, if the Western democracies were 
willing to commit to “intense effort” and “constant social experimentation.”32 
Strauss and the other anti-modernists offered a much grimmer assessment.  For them, 
liberalism was not so much in crisis as a symptom of the larger crisis of modernity.  As a 
form of modernity, liberalism was the ideological precursor to Communism and fascism—
the “the first wave of modernity,” in Strauss’s words—and would inevitably (according to 
Strauss, Voegelin, Horkheimer and Marcuse), or probably (according to Arendt, Jonas and 
Löwith), give way to more tyrannical regimes or, at best, anarchy.  Any experimentation with 
social welfare programs, economic reforms or tinkering around the edges of the American 
political system would, therefore, only delay the day of reckoning.   
Western civilization’s best hope, according to the anti-modernists, lay in the complete 
political and philosophical “transformation of Western society as a whole.”  Although they 
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differed in their foci and specific prescriptions for a new polis, almost all envisioned a nation 
purged of relativism and socially and politically organized according to Natural Law.  
Education, they believed, would be a crucial component of this transformation, particularly 
the initiation of future political leaders into anti-modernist thought through immersion in the 
“Great Books.”  According to Arendt, this journey “into the depths of the past” would allow 
successive generations to re-create the ancient polis “not in order to resuscitate it the way it 
was and to contribute to the renewal of extinct ages, but to help it survive in new crystallized 
forms and shapes.” 33 
The anti-modernist attack on liberalism was greatly aided by the financial resources 
and intellectual support of some social and religious conservatives.  The initial link between 
the émigrés and American religious conservatives was Waldemar Gurian, the founder of the 
journal, The Review of Politics.  Gurian, a Russian émigré who had converted from Judaism 
to Catholicism while studying under Carl Schmitt, had arrived in America in 1935 and 
secured a faculty position at Notre Dame in 1937.  His primary patron at Notre Dame and in 
the founding of the journal was Clarence Manion, the powerful Dean of the Notre Dame 
School of Law.  As anti-modernist writings began to appear in The Review, the intellectual 
affinity between Manion and the anti-modernists began to deepen.34    
By the 1940s, the assault on liberalism was joined by a handful of young scholars, 
such as Richard Weaver, John Hallowell, and Robert Nisbet.  Writing from an anti-modernist 
perspective, these men, like their anti-modernist elders, looked to the past for an escape from 
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modernity.  Weaver, a student of Voegelin’s at Louisiana State University and later a faculty 
member at Chicago, argued for a return to the “filial piety” that he believed had characterized 
“the last anti-materialist civilization in the Western World”—the antebellum South.  
Similarly, Hallowell, in his published dissertation, The Decline of Liberalism, excoriated 
liberalism and argued that Nazism had not simply supplanted liberalism in Germany but was 
its very consequence.  Voegelin wrote a complimentary review of the young Duke political 
scientist’s book, but offered the opinion that “the author does not go quite far enough in his 
description of the problem.”  Nisbet, for his part, added a sociological perspective to this 
emerging critique with an article that traced the roots of liberalism, fascism and 
Communism—“the politicization of the social world”—to the thought of Machiavelli, 
Hobbes and Rousseau.35   
These first anti-modernist critiques of liberalism were sufficiently intense to cause 
noticeable rumbling across the field.  In 1943, in an attempt to get some sense of the nature 
and causes of the discord that was brewing between “liberal” and “normative” political 
scientists, William Anderson, chairman of the Social Science Research Council, asked the 
Political Theory Panel of the APSA to conduct a research symposium aimed at identifying 
“major trends in the thought of the panel.”  In 1944, after combing through the mountain of 
correspondence generated by his solicitations, the chairman of the Panel, Francis G. Wilson 
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of the University of Illinois, reported to the association that a controversy existed in the field 
between “theorists of classical natural law and natural rights.”  Wilson, a member of the 
Intercollegiate Society of Individualists for the Advancement of Conservative Thought on 
American College Campuses (ISI) and the National Republican Coordinating Committee, 
also left no doubt as to which side he favored, finding that “the so-called detachment of 
social scientists is a product of philosophical ineptitude.”  Wilson closed his report with the 
recommendations that closer scrutiny be paid to the classical “texts of the great thinkers,” 
and that “there should be a frontal assault by political theorists and their graduate students on 
tracing the emergence of interpretations and values in American political society.”36 
Strauss’s main contribution to the anti-modernist critique of liberalism was a short, 
one-hundred-six page book entitled On Tyranny: An Interpretation of Xenophon’s Hiero.  
Although it purported to be an interpretation of an obscure, fragmentary work, Heiro, by the 
rascally Athenian general and philosopher, Xenophon, the work is really a lengthy and 
forceful anti-modern, anti-liberal polemic.  In On Tyranny Strauss makes the forceful and 
chilling assertion that liberalism bears a measure of responsibility for the birth, survival and 
aggressiveness of fascism and Communism.  According to Strauss, the Western democracies 
were unable to perceive the true nature of the radical regimes that arose in Germany and 
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Russia and, as a result, allowed them to survive when they might have strangled Communism 
and fascism in their cradles.37 
 While On Tyranny does not appear to have garnered much attention within 
academia, the book did make a significant impression on the young president of the 
University of Chicago, Robert Maynard Hutchins.  On Tyranny as well as Strauss’s fifteen 
book reviews and nine journal articles demonstrated a distinct classical orientation that 
greatly appealed to Hutchins, an ardent supporter of “conversations with the Great Books.”  
Hutchins had also strove mightily to displace the Dewey-esque pragmatism that had long 
held sway in the Political Science department, and Strauss’s presence would bolster his 
efforts.  Taking advantage of the opportunity afforded by the retirement of Charles Merriam, 
Hutchins invited Strauss to come to Chicago and interview for a position in the Political 
Science Department. 38   
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Strauss visited Chicago for the first time in the summer of 1948.  Armed with letters 
of recommendation from three of the leading lights of the London School of Economics, 
Michael Oakeshott, R.H. Tawney and Ernest Barker, Strauss arrived on campus six hours 
early.  Morgenthau, who was serving as acting chair of the department, took him to 
Hutchins’s office and introduced him.  A half-hour later, Strauss left as a full Professor of 
Political Science, and with a salary that, as Shils recalled, was “more than anyone else in the 
department was getting.”39 
 
Chicago: The Cold War and Anti-modernism’s Aristotelian Turn      
Strauss’s arrival at the University of Chicago signaled a new visibility for anti-
modernism.  Despite their prolific writing, the anti-modernists had toiled in relative 
obscurity.  As one of America’s foremost universities with a large and well-respected 
philosophy program, Chicago represented a much more prominent academic stage.  This fact 
was not lost on Strauss, who possessed an exceptional appetite and unique talent for self-
promotion.  Indeed, by the end of his first year, Strauss had acquired a number of admirers 
among his colleagues at Chicago.       
His most ardent followers, though, were his students.  Although Strauss was, 
according to his adopted daughter Jenny, a “small, unprepossessing and, truth be told, ugly 
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man . . . with none of the charisma that one associates with ‘great teachers,’" his ability to 
command the loyalty of his students was legendary.  An avid fan of the popular television 
show, “Gunsmoke,” Strauss would often discuss the various episodes with students as 
introductory segues to that day’s lecture.   He also seems to have had an understanding of 
stagecraft.  Edward Banfield, a student in the first class Strauss ever taught at Chicago in 
1949, recalls the first day of class: 
Strauss was manifestly uneasy.  He fiddled with an unlit cigarette; obviously 
he wanted very much to smoke.  (This I later learned, was not a matter of 
habit; he suffered from asthma, and medicated cigarettes, ten a day, had been 
prescribed to make his breathing easier).  But there was a sign on the wall: No 
Smoking.  What to do?  I ended the impasse by taking the sign down.  
 
After Banfield had resolved Strauss’s smoking dilemma, Strauss launched into a lengthy 
discussion of the differences and similarities between law, custom and justice, using the sign 
as a foil.  Later, Banfield and other students realized that the whole scene had been staged by 
Strauss as a device to focus their attention on the question at hand. 40 
Strauss also proved to be a loyal and valuable ally to Hutchins.  Shortly after 
Strauss’s arrival in Chicago, Hutchins’s “Great Books” program came under fire from some 
social and religious conservatives.  Uninformed and unsure about the neo-classical bent of 
the program, some conservatives pulled their children out of the university.  One such 
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concerned parent was the drugstore magnate, Charles Walgreen, who came to believe that his 
daughter was being indoctrinated with Communism and notions of “free love.”  Walgreen’s 
concerns prompted investigations by the Chicago Tribune and the Illinois State Legislature.  
Brushing aside the investigations, Hutchins focused on the parental faction.  Meeting with 
Walgreen, Hutchins not only managed to convince him that the charges of Communist 
subversion were unfounded, but also persuaded him to sponsor an annual lecture series—the 
Walgreen Lectures—that would extol and elevate the values of democracy and capitalism.  
Although there was little time to prepare, Strauss volunteered to deliver the entire inaugural 
lecture series in three parts over several days. 41   
Eventually published as Natural Right and History, the Walgreen lecture is one of 
Strauss’s most significant works and a pivotal text in the evolution of anti-modernism.  Its 
thesis, that transformation at home is a necessary precondition to Cold War victory, reflects 
concern with the politics of the present as opposed to the loftier theoretical concerns that had 
heretofore been the anti-modernists’ stock and trade.  The book, however, goes beyond the 
demand for transformation to prescribe precisely how America must change.  As such, it 
represents the first stage in anti-modernism’s evolution into a political movement. 
Despite its importance in the Straussian and anti-modernist corpus, Natural Right is a 
maddeningly complex work that simultaneously elaborates on and departs from Strauss’s 
earlier works.  As in On Tyranny, Strauss makes the case that relativism is responsible for a 
progressive moral blindness afflicting the West.  Unlike the earlier work, however, Strauss 
does not explicitly attack liberalism.  Rather, he focuses his fire on empiricism and 
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historicism in the first part of his lecture (and subsequent book).  According to Strauss, the 
long-time academic primacy of empiricism and historicism has resulted in generations of 
Americans being trained to think in relativist terms that he variously characterizes as 
“political hedonism,” “permissive egalitarianism” and “modern natural right.”  Indeed, he 
maintains that relativism has become so deeply embedded in American intellectual life that 
the nation has arrived at a crisis—“the crisis of modern natural right”—whereby all values 
have begun to appear as equal and society no longer recognizes any authoritative means of 
adjudicating between values. 42  
As a remedy for the progressive moral blindness that he has described, Strauss calls 
for a return to the ancient faith of “classical natural right” that he claims informs the 
Declaration of Independence.  Although this promotion of liberal democratic values seems 
straightforward enough, it is quite uncharacteristic of anti-modernist writing in general and of 
Strauss in particular.  A close reading reveals that Strauss’s newfound affinity for liberalism 
is more apparent than real, in that he intentionally obscures his argument.  In order to 
understand how and why, a brief examination of the intellectual and political context is in 
order.  Only against this backdrop is it possible to fully grasp Strauss’s argument and 
understand the import of the work.43 
The Walgreen lectures and Natural Right are not simply the products of a single 
idiosyncratic writer, but reflect an intellectual current within anti-modernism: the Aristotelian 
turn.  A reaction to the Cold War, the Aristotelian turn seems to have been inspired by 
Aristotle’s investigations into the relationship between a theoretical, perfect society and real-
world politics.  As such, the Aristotelian turn implied a focus on the practical application of 
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classical ideas and values against the threat of Communism.  For many of the anti-
modernists, this turn from the theoretical to a concern with the “state in action,” represented a 
return to the sort of “applied” philosophy that had characterized the work of the first Weimar 
anti-modernists, such as Jünger, Haushofer and Schmitt. 
From another perspective, the Aristotelian turn appears as an effort concerned with 
avoiding charges of disloyalty by aligning their work with the new political orthodoxy that 
was emerging in Europe and America.  Given the political climate in the United States in 
1949—the “Year of Shocks”—this fear is certainly understandable.  Foreign-accented 
criticisms of liberalism, laced with references to Marx, Nietzsche and Heidegger could have 
easily invited charges of “un-Americanism.”  Conversely, denunciations of methodological 
concepts were unlikely to stir strong feelings among non-specialists. 
Whether one ascribes the changes in the anti-modernists’ writings to the new 
Aristotelian focus or to fear and cynicism, it is clear that many of them abandoned the 
critique of liberalism by 1948.  They now began to produce analyses purportedly aimed at 
strengthening the national moral fabric and/or understanding America’s enemies.  Löwith, 
Jaspers and Jonas, for instance, began to write about the nature of political freedom, ethics 
and the obligations of citizenship.  Wittfogel examined the primordial militarism of ancient 
China for clues to the nature of modern Chinese authoritarianism. Arendt, meanwhile, 
explored the common origins of Nazism and Stalinism in European culture.44  
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The turn from the liberal critique was, of course, more genuine for some than for 
others.  Strauss, Horkheimer, Kapp, von Fritz, Ehrmann, Voegelin, and Riezler, do not 
appear to have so much abandoned the critique of liberalism as obscured it.  As a result, their 
works from the immediate post-war period are filled with jargon, misnomer and symbolism.  
Horkheimer seems to have gone so far as to omit an entire chapter from a book already slated 
for publication because it seemed to praise Marxism.  There is also some evidence that he 
suppressed the publication of fellow Frankfurt Institute member Erich Fromm’s 
groundbreaking survey, German Workers 1929 — A Survey, Its Methods and Results 
because of its Marxist overtones. 45  
For his part, Strauss appears to have adopted the esoteric writing technique that he 
claimed to have discovered in Maimonides.  Aside from serving as political camouflage, 
adoption of esoteric writing was in all likelihood deeply symbolic for him personally.  Only 
philosophers, he believed (as opposed to mere scholars), had the need and occasion to write 
esoterically in order to counsel rulers in times of great social and political upheaval.  Viewed 
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from this perspective, Walgreen ceases to be a mere exercise in scholarship, but a practical 
political act of the first order.   
Strauss also seems to have believed that esoteric writing could, in modern time, 
served a pedagogic function.  More specifically, Strauss held that the perceptual skills 
required to “decode” esoteric writing were invaluable for the practice of politics.  By 
developing the student’s eye for subtlety and fostering sensitivity to the slightest change or 
omission in the text, the writer was honing those intuitive abilities that characterize the most 
able politicians.  In short, the work provides instruction in politics that goes beyond the 
content of the text.    
In order to better understand this technique, as well as support my interpretation of 
Strauss’s meaning, a brief examination of some of the esoteric features of Natural Right is in 
order.  For example, a close reading reveals that Strauss substituted “modern natural right” 
and “classical natural right” as proxies for liberalism and Natural Law, respectively.  By 
placing quotes from, and references to the Declaration of Independence in close proximity to 
the phrase “classical natural right,” Strauss creates the impression that “classical natural 
right” is identical to the Lockean conception of natural rights (life, liberty and property) that 
is traditionally ascribed to the American Founders.  His subsequent characterization of Locke 
as a central figure in the emergence of modernity militates against this interpretation, 
however.   Conversely, Strauss associates “modern natural right” with the individual 
freedoms that inform the Lockean conception.  He then denounces Locke as a purveyor of 
modernity.46 
Using Strauss’s substitution device, it is possible to discern the familiar critique of 
liberalism.  Liberalism (disguised as modern natural right), he claims, is weakening the 
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national moral fabric.  Strauss’s conception of what this general claim means in the context 
of the Cold War is not difficult to imagine.  Americans, increasingly enslaved by materialism 
and individualism, are unable to conceive of any values, beyond their own desires and 
possessions, that they regard as non-negotiable and, presumably, for which they would be 
willing to fight to the death.  This paucity of shared, non-negotiable values opens the door to 
the possibility of subversion and tyranny at home.  In terms of foreign affairs, the lack of 
shared values deprives the country of the unity, determination and sense of purpose that 
Strauss sees as necessary for America to defeat Communism.  
As a remedy for this national moral torpor, Strauss calls for a return to the “ancient 
faith” of “classical natural right.”  Yet, as we are now aware, this return does not entail a re-
commitment to the Lockean values of the American Founders.  Rather, Strauss obliquely 
points the way to a solution: the transformation of the American regime.  Although Strauss 
does not elaborate on the idea of the regime in the Walgreen lectures or Natural Right, it is a 
concept that is central to his argument.  Therefore, some definition is warranted here.   
The concept of the regime (politea) is a complex idea drawn from Aristotle.  It does 
not, as in modern-day usage, refer strictly to a state’s form of government (politeuma), but to 
the essential being—the essence—of a given society or “city” (polis).  As such, the regime 
constitutes an organic whole that encompasses all aspects of the life of the city.  Viewed 
through the prism of the regime, the modern boundaries between culture, domestic politics 
and foreign affairs have no meaning.  In his monumental work, Politics, Aristotle speaks of 
the regime taking many forms.  The perfect form that exists only in the realm of ideas is the 
“best regime.”  Perfectly organized according to Natural Law, the best regime is ruled by 
philosopher-kings and is completely and utterly dedicated to the cause of Justice and Good.  
 50 
Insofar as the best regime cannot exist in the material world, however, Aristotle also posits 
an imperfect material manifestation of the best regime that he calls the “best practical 
regime.”  The best practical regime is a state ruled by an aristocratic elite who are guided 
behind the scenes, by the philosophers.47   
Strauss places the concept of the regime at the center of his argument by declaring it 
the locus of the sea-change in human consciousness effected by the founders of modernity.  
Indeed, he claims that the “revolutionists” of the Enlightenment recognized the import of the 
regime and, as a result, expended a great deal of time “distorting and denying” the very idea 
of a theoretical socio-political ideal, or the regime.  Thus, the regime would also be the locus 
of the transformative change that will allow an escape from modernity.48   
On a practical level, Strauss’s scathing attack on empiricism and historicism suggests 
that he envisioned undermining liberalism through the educational system.  While a frontal 
assault on liberalism would have required a political and social effort on a national scale—
something the anti-modernists clearly lacked the capacity to initiate—a campaign against 
empiricism and historicism could be launched from the writing desk and the classroom.  
Such a line of attack would also be consistent with the hierarchical view of society harbored 
by Strauss and many of his fellow anti-modernists.  By shaping the outlooks and opinions of 
the next generation of business, academic and political leaders, Strauss and his colleagues 
aspired to effect a “top-down” transformation of the American regime.   
Although it is hard to envision how, in and of itself, academic instruction in classical 
Greek philosophy could bring about a transformation of consciousness, I maintain that it is 
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not so much the content of classical philosophy that Strauss sought to promulgate as the 
ancient modes of thought.  The essentialist outlook, the claims of moral clarity through 
objectivity, the focus on duty at the expense of individuality, and the unquestioning 
obedience to authority—an authority held to be decreed by Nature herself—would seem to 
represent an ideal superstructure for the construction of a national ideology.  Such an explicit, 
uncompromising ideology would presumably instill the iron resolve and sense of common 
purpose that Strauss and his fellow travelers believed to be the necessary if America was to 
defeat Communism. 49 
The anti-modernists were, of course, not alone in their conviction that America would 
have to change if it was to survive the Cold War.  As the anti-Communist consensus began to 
solidify in the late 1940s, many all along the political spectrum became increasingly willing 
to tolerate a more militarized and/or less politically and intellectually diverse society or even 
a more authoritarian form of government.  Indeed, even Walter Lippmann, the founding 
editor of the liberal New Republic praised Natural Right as an antidote to “excessive 
progressivism.”  Few, however, could have conceived of the sort of sweeping regime-change 
envisioned by Strauss.  As we shall see in the next chapter, fewer still matched the 
determination of Strauss and the other anti-modernists to bring about this transformation.50   
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Chapter 2 
A War of Ideas: Anti-Modernism, the Cold War and the Transformation of the 
American Regime 
 
“You son-of-a-bitch!” Professor Willmoore Kendall shouted into the telephone to 
Alfred Whitney “A. Whit” Griswold, the President of Yale University, during a drunken late 
night call from Madrid.  “I know you hate my guts.  I know it!  Well, I’ll tell you what I’m 
going to do.  I’ll let you buy back my tenure for $50,000!”  Less than a week later, Kendall 
and Yale had agreed on $42,500.00, to be paid in five yearly installments, as the price of his 
tenure.  Less than a month later, in June 1961, Kendall received the first of his $8,500.00 
tenure buy-out checks from Yale.51   
Willmoore Kendall, ex-Trotskyite, ex-OSS officer, co-founder of the National 
Review had, to be sure, engendered the ill will of his colleagues for years with his abrasive 
personality and strident anti-Communism.  “Possessed” (in the words of his friend George 
Carey) “of a raging compulsion to expose error,” he regularly engaged students and faculty 
alike in exhausting, impromptu philosophical and political debates that usually concluded 
with Kendall reducing his opponent to shocked silence.  After he loudly and publicly began 
advocating a “preventative war” against the Soviet Union, the university administration 
insisted that Kendall take paid leave every other year.  Indeed, he had been on leave in 
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Spain—where he had been instrumental in getting Strauss’s Thoughts on Machiavelli 
translated and published in Spanish—when he had placed his fateful call to Griswold.52 
It was, however, Kendall’s loud and constant disparagement of empiricist social 
science that was at the root of his fatal conflict with the administration.  A friend and devotee 
of Leo Strauss, Kendall, like Strauss, regarded the empiricists’ distinction between facts and 
values as symptomatic of “modern Western man’s” increasingly rapid descent into the abyss 
of moral relativism.  Eventually, Kendall believed, the Western nations would no longer 
possess the moral clarity and courage to resist Communism.  From a contemporary political 
perspective, empiricist scholars were almost by definition engaged in an immoral and 
disloyal promotion of Soviet ambitions.  In a department that aspired to a nationally leading 
position in empiricist social science, such views, more than anything else, alienated 
Kendall’s faculty colleagues and culminated in the university’s extraordinary decision to 
accept his offer to purchase his tenure. 
The bitter contentiousness surrounding Willmoore Kendall’s career and departure 
from Yale is emblematic of the bitter and irreconcilable nature of the “war of ideas” that 
occurred within the field of American political science from the late 1930s to the mid-1960s.  
Precipitated by an intense and polemical critique of liberalism by the émigré scholars Leo 
Strauss, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Theodor Adorno, Jürgen 
Habermas, Herbert Marcuse, Max Horkheimer, Hannah Arendt and Eric Voegelin and their 
American adherents in the 1930s and early 1940s, the dispute initially pitted the anti-
modernists against empiricism, the dominant methodological school within political science. 
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The end of World War II seemed to bring the anti-modernist critique of liberalism to 
a halt.  As the Soviet-American rivalry intensified in the late 1940s, open attacks on 
liberalism risked the appearance of treason.  This pause, however, was more apparent than 
real.  The anti-modernists continued the critique of liberalism by attacking empiricism.  
Initially, the main thrust of the anti-modernist argument was that empiricism fostered a 
pernicious relativism that was undermining the national moral fabric.  Eventually, the anti-
modernist intensified their accusations and began to conflate empiricism with Communism.  
Amid the anxious political atmosphere of the 1950s, they met with some success as anti-
modernist accusations prompted Congressional hearings into the loyalty of various 
empiricists. 
The 1950s and 1960s saw a widening of the “war,” as two emergent philosophical 
and political views, the New Conservatives and the New Left, were drawn into the fray.  
Although they were almost complete opposites in their views, the New Conservatives and the 
New Left shared two similarities: both favored a populist, “grass-roots” participatory form of 
democracy, and both rejected the anti-Communist activist foreign policy of the Truman and 
Johnson Administrations.  Drawing the anti-modernists’ fire for precisely these reasons, first 
one, then the other faction engaged the anti-modernists in what amounted to a death struggle.  
The conflict would not end until the early 1970s, with the collapse of all three factions as 
well as the anti-modernist project of transformation. 
Although anti-modernism did not survive long past the early 1970s, the War of Ideas 
was, nonetheless, a significant moment in the evolution of neoconservatism for several 
reasons.  Most obviously, as the intellectual conflict spread beyond the walls of academia to 
the halls of Congress, the anti-modernist transition from philosophical school to political 
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movement that had begun in 1949 was accelerated.  This transitional period also saw the 
formation of the first alliances between nascent neoconservatives and religious conservatives.   
Most importantly, however, the War of Ideas brought about an increased focus on, 
and heightened awareness of foreign affairs among the anti-modernists and their students.  
Although Strauss, Voegelin, Horkheimer and their fellows had always viewed events through 
the prism of the Aristotelian regime, the collapse of the transformational project they had 
begun in 1949 seemed to turn their views increasingly outward.  Indeed, in the twilight of his 
career, Strauss was able to lend anti-modernism a new and final impetus as he initiated a 
Thucydidean turn that continues to inform neoconservatism to this day. 
 
Anti-Modernism, Empiricism and the Politicization of Philosophy  
The Aristotelian turn that the anti-modernists had initiated in the late 1940s was not 
long in gathering momentum.  By the dawn of the 1950s, it was evident that there were a 
sizeable number of both liberal and conservative scholars, in various academic fields, who 
viewed relativism as “spiritual disarmament.”  While there may have always been a latent 
antipathy toward empiricism within American academia, a great many of these men were 
probably influenced by the tenor of the times.  This is, of course, certainly understandable.  
Against the backdrop of the Nuremburg trials and the Stalinist system, relativism suddenly 
appeared much less a harmless methodological assumption than a monstrous moral 
abdication.53   
As if they sensed this new upwelling of support, the anti-modernists began to 
intensify their assault on empiricism.  Some began to wonder aloud whether empiricist 
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political science crossed the boundary between “loyal” and “non-loyal” inquiry.  Voegelin, 
for instance, asked if some political theorists were not “actively engaged, with the best of 
consciences, in the destruction of the civilization that we praise, like any Communist or 
National Socialist?”  Similarly, Strauss argued that by abandoning the search for what is 
“true and noble” in favor of the pursuit of utilitarian facts, the empiricist social scientist 
becomes, in effect, a potentially disloyal mercenary.  According to Strauss: 
The empirical social scientist lays himself open to the suspicion that his 
activity as a social scientist serves no other purpose than to increase his safety, 
his income, and his prestige, or that his competence as a social scientist is a 
skill that he is prepared to sell to the highest bidder.  Honest citizens will 
begin to wonder if such a man can be trusted, or whether he can be loyal, 
especially since he must maintain that it is as defensible to choose loyalty as 
one’s value as it is to reject it.54  
 
In 1952, the anti-modernists attempted to strike a more substantive blow at 
empiricism by convincing anti-Communist crusaders in the Congress that value-free social 
science was the equivalent of disloyalty.  The vehicle for the attack on empiricism was the 
Special Committee to Investigate Tax Exempt Foundations, headed by U.S. Representative 
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Eugene E. Cox (D-Georgia).  Chartered in 1952 to investigate Communist subversion of the 
major philanthropic foundations, Strauss’s supporters sought to alter the committee’s focus 
from an effort to uncover Communist infiltration, to an examination of how empiricism 
furthered Communist aims.  In a letter to Cox’s aide, Edward C. Kennelly, William T. 
Couch, the former president of the University of Chicago Press and a Strauss ally, urged the 
committee to look into the “ways of thinking” that had allowed “half of Europe and all of 
China to be captured by the Communists.”  “Communism as a conspiracy in the United 
States,” Couch wrote, “is a serious problem, but it is of minor importance in comparison with 
this problem.”55 
Kennelly and Cox, however, did not heed Couch’s suggestion and the Cox 
Committee focused on uncovering infiltration and subversion of the foundations by Soviet 
agents, rather than on the subversive nature of American social science.  Even so, the 
committee uncovered no Soviet agents at work in the foundations, and the hearings 
culminated with the incredible sight of Chairman Cox earnestly inquiring of John D. 
Rockefeller III if the family, the Rockefeller Foundation, or any of its directors had ever, to 
his knowledge “undertaken any action that might tend to undermine the capitalist system.”56 
The following year, as the House convened under a new Republican majority, the 
Special Committee was reconstituted under Rep. B. Carroll Reece (R-Tennessee), who 
altered the committee’s investigational focus along the lines suggested by Couch.  Indeed, 
one of the new investigators, George de Huszar (a doctoral student of Strauss’s and faculty 
member at the University of Chicago), wrote to Couch to assure him that he and fellow 
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investigator Karl Ettinger (a former of colleague and friend of Strauss’s at the New School), 
would not simply “chase a few second-level Communists, but would try to appraise the 
whole problem of American intellectual life.”  Reece, vowing to uncover the “diabolical” 
Communist conspiracy in what he termed “socialist science,” managed to make rather more 
headway than the predecessor Cox Committee.  Focusing on specific social science research 
projects funded by the foundations, Reece delved into the ways in which “our basic moral, 
social, economic, and governmental principles can be vitally affected” by social science 
research methodologies.   
Two of the more egregious examples in the eyes of the Special Committee involved 
projects supported by the Carnegie and Rockefeller Foundations: Gunnar Myrdal’s 
groundbreaking economic study, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern 
Democracy; and Alfred C. Kinsey’s Rockefeller-supported research into human sexuality.  
Reece argued that by supporting these and similar projects, the foundations and the 
researchers were engaged in a “conscious plan” to exercise “thought control,” influence 
American society “in the direction of some form of collectivism,” and promote “a generally 
‘leftist’ approach to international problems.”  “Empirical methods,” the Committee 
concluded, had, for some time, “promoted a general deterioration of moral standards” in 
America which weakened the nation and created an atmosphere more conducive to the 
promotion of socialist ideas.57 
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Despite its “incredible and ominous” findings, the Reece Committee was forced to 
adjourn in August 1954.  Congressman Reece blamed a combination of factors for the 
Special Committee’s demise.  The McCarthy dreadnought had, at long last, begun to run 
aground in the Senate, and the “liberal press” now felt free, according to Reece, “to throw its 
editorial power against the Committee.”  There was also the “antics” of fellow committee 
member Rep. Wayne A. Hays (D-OH), who constantly disrupted the proceedings to 
denounce the “crackpot views” driving the investigations.58   
The most significant factor in ending the hearings, however, appears to have been the 
pressure exerted by the Eisenhower Administration.  In February 1954, in what appears to 
have been a shot across the bow, the president fired Clarence Manion from his post as 
Chairman of the President’s Commission on Intergovernmental Relations without 
explanation.  Manion, the former Dean of the Notre Dame Law School, had been an ardent 
and vocal supporter of both Reece and McCarthy.  Although it is unclear whether the House 
leadership took its action at the president’s behest or simply took the hint, Manion’s firing 
was immediately followed by the rescinding of the Special Committee’s funding a full five 
months ahead of the original appropriation.59   
Although the foundation hearings proved to be only a glancing blows against the 
social sciences, the anti-modernist conflation of empiricism with disloyalty had borne some 
fruit.  The hearings had attracted the attention of religious and social conservatives, many of 
whom did not seem to completely fathom the philosophical bases of the Reece Committee’s 
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investigation.  While men such as Clarence Manion, Willmoore Kendall and William Couch 
almost certainly grasped the “ways of thinking” that were at issue, others embraced the 
liberal-empiricist-Communist conflation because it because it served more basic political 
interests.  Governor Luther Hodges of North Carolina, for instance, and the Attorney General 
of Georgia, Eugene Cook, believed that that empiricist social science had “effected [sic] our 
American way of thinking, including that of the Supreme Court,” and fueled desegregation 
efforts in the South.60  
It is also unlikely that men such as Robert Welch, or Frank Cullen Brophy grasped 
the nature of the anti-modernist critique.  Indeed, Welch, the founder of the ultra-
conservative, anti-Communist John Birch Society, and Brophy, a wealthy Phoenix banker 
and the primary patron of both Welch and Sen. Barry Goldwater, embraced the anti-
modernist conflation primarily because they despised President Eisenhower.  In their view, 
Eisenhower’s behind-the-scenes role in ending the foundation hearings was just more proof 
that the president was “a dedicated, conscious agent of the Communist conspiracy.”  The 
political philosopher Russell Kirk, a pragmatic New Conservative, defended the president 
against Welch’s charges by replying: “Eisenhower isn’t a Communist; he’s a golfer.”  For the 
anti-modernists and their religious and social conservative allies, however, the failure of the 
Reece Committee marked the end of their initial foray onto the political plane.  The abrupt 
end of the committee also seems to have convinced them that, in the war for the soul of 
America, they were facing enemies on the Right, as well as on the Left.61 
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Enemies on the Right: The New Conservatives and the Problem of an American Ideology 
“The marvelous success and vitality of American institutions,” the historian Daniel 
Boorstin wrote in 1953, “is equaled by the amazing poverty and inarticulateness of our 
theorizing about politics.”  In this single statement, Boorstin conveyed the central 
philosophical tenet of the “New Conservatives.”  America had avoided the travails of Europe 
because it had never indulged in attempts to “abstract, to separate the universal principles of 
all societies and governments from the peculiar circumstances of their own societies and 
governments.”  Theory, according to Boorstin, almost always degenerated into the “idolatry 
of ideology” because of the temptation to put it into practice as a “blueprint” for societies.  
America, however, had never required an ideology because Americans, according to 
Boorstin, shared an “unspoken national faith,” which transmitted itself to the generations 
through a subtle process of internalization that he termed “giveness.” 62   
Emerging in the wake of the Second World War, and coming to prominence in the 
early 1950s, the New Conservatives—men such as Daniel Boorstin, Russell Kirk, Clinton 
Rossiter, Peter Viereck and Louis Hartz—believed that ideology, or more properly, 
ideological ways of thinking, had been responsible for almost all of the strife and conflict in 
the Western world since the eighteenth century.  The French Revolution’s attempts to 
“reconstruct society after an abstract pattern” had, in their view, brought an end to the “age of 
faith” that had held sway in Europe since the Middle Ages.  In the nineteenth century, 
ideology—this time in the form of nationalism—had set Europe on course that would result 
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in two world wars.  Nationalism had, in their view, undermined the rational, peaceful, realist 
order that had been established by Metternich at the Congress of Vienna.63 
Now, in the twentieth century, the New Conservatives perceived an erosion of the 
“national faith” that had heretofore protected America against the dangers of ideology.  
America, the New Conservatives argued, was beset with a crass, “assembly line civilization” 
which encouraged the abandonment of tradition and religious faith and the degeneration of 
language and aesthetic sensibilities.  The effects of modern civilization were manifest in the 
rapid growth of giant corporations, burgeoning consumerism, and the mindless philistinism 
that led Americans to regularly “commit television.”  To ensure that the national culture 
would continue to flourish, however, Americans needed only to turn for guidance to the great 
conservatives of the past: John Randolph of Roanoke, John Quincy Adams, Alexander 
Hamilton, Metternich, Lord Acton, John C. Calhoun and above all, Edmund Burke.  
Embarking on a wide-ranging critique of American politics and culture that 
encompassed history, poetry, literary criticism, journalism and political philosophy, the New 
Conservatives did not so much critique liberalism as promote a new brand of genteel 
conservatism.  Seeking to return to the values of previous eras, the New Conservatives 
studiously avoided the formulation of an explicit ideology, or in Boorstin’s words, an 
“immutable body of dogma.”  “Once conservatism becomes an ideology,” Russell Kirk wrote 
in 1954, “it ceases to be conservatism.”64  
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 The New Conservatives identified strongly with the Eisenhower Administration, 
believing that their exaltation of reason, realism and (non-political) religion reflected the 
administrations’ moderate and non-ideological character.  There seemed to be little 
consideration of the fact that Ike’s “modern Republicanism” had early on departed from the 
traditional conservative policies of the Robert Taft wing of the Republican Party.  It had 
foregone a balanced budget, embarked on an internationalist foreign policy and—much to 
Senator Taft’s consternation—appointed FDR’s Yalta translator, Charles Bohlen, as 
Ambassador to the Soviet Union.  Nevertheless, the New Conservatives remained focused on 
the administration’s rhetoric and symbolism.  The president, Clinton Rossiter declared, had 
managed to merge religion, unfettered capitalism, respect for tradition, rugged individualism 
and hard-headed realism with “a new concern for social stability and has produced an 
alloy.”65 
The New Conservatives’ concern with social stability did not, however, mean that 
they favored social and political stagnation.  They realized that American values and 
institutions would have to change and adapt if they were to survive.  They simply did not 
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view this improvement and adaptation and the veneration of tradition as mutually exclusive.  
Indeed, this willingness to change and evolve was the basis of the affinity that many New 
Conservatives perceived between themselves and the centrist, non-ideological liberalism 
typified by Arthur M. Schlesinger’s Vital Center.  Only a broad-based alliance of views, 
ideas, preferences and prescriptions could, they reasoned, successfully resist the 
blandishments of Marxist ideology. 66   
Given the views of the New Conservatives, it is not difficult to see how they came to 
blows with the anti-modernists.  Their rejection of all formal ideology, their reverence for 
tradition and religion and their support of a restrained, realist foreign policy was 
diametrically opposed to the anti-modernist project of transformation.  Although it seems that 
the two sides might have found some common ground in their shared dislike of mass culture 
and bourgeois materialism, both factions were aware that they hoped to achieve vastly 
different ends.  The New Conservatives were, quite simply, interested in upholding and 
improving traditional institutions, educating elites in the ways of democracy and the free 
market and, in so doing, ensure social stability.  Conversely, the anti-modernist project of 
transformation sought, almost by definition, to de-legitimize these very same elites and 
institutions.   
In any conflict between the New Conservatives and the anti-modernists, the latter 
should have been at a great disadvantage.  Outside of a relatively small circle of intellectuals, 
anti-modernism was still a rather obscure philosophy.  Moreover, its adherents and advocates 
were almost exclusively academics.  The New Conservatives, on the other hand, were 
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academics who also happened to be popular writers, politically connected, effective public 
speakers and adept publicists.  Viereck, for instance had won the Pulitzer Prize in 1949, Kirk 
was a regular guest at the White House and Frank Chodorov was instrumental in the 
founding of the conservative educational organization, the Intercollegiate Studies Institute.     
  As it turned out, none of this mattered to the anti-modernists and their allies.  The 
attack on the New Conservatives opened in earnest in 1955 when Walter Berns, a prominent 
student of Strauss’s and a colleague of Voegelin’s at Louisiana State, reviewed Kirk’s A 
Program for Conservatives.  In his review, Berns took Kirk to task for his presumption that 
tradition could possibly provide any meaningful intellectual criteria for distinguishing 
between good and evil.  Only political philosophy, Berns argued, could provide such criteria.  
Indeed, Berns continued, Kirk had already fallen into error by believing that America’s 
problems—the “Philistinism, the crass materialism. . .the “hymns of praise to a goal-less 
Progress. . .the Jacobin dream of absolute rights”—could be combated by returning to the 
principles of the Founders.  After all, Berns continued, “according to that basic document of 
the American tradition [i.e., the Declaration of Independence], ‘all men are endowed with 
certain inalienable rights,’ which is a proposition not so ‘remote from the Jacobin dream of 
absolute rights’ as Mr. Kirk happens to think.”67 
 Bern’s assault on the New Conservatives, while one of the more pointed, was by no 
means the only one.  The former socialists-turned-anti-modernists, James Burnham, Max 
Eastman and Frank Meyer piled on, as did Kendall and Weaver. There was also a particularly 
fierce attack by the political scientist, Samuel P. Huntington.  Huntington, a political theorist 
at Harvard, and a Truman Democrat with definite anti-modernist tendencies, judged the New 
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Conservatives’ “strained, sentimental, nostalgic, antiquarian longing for a society that is 
past” to be “irrelevant and futile.”  What was needed, Huntington argued, was a clear 
American alternative to Marxist ideology.  “Until the challenge of Communism and the 
Soviet Union is eliminated or neutralized,” Huntington wrote, “ideology has a place in 
America today.”  
After 1955, the New Conservatives also found themselves under attack by social and 
religious conservatives in the pages of a new publication that proclaimed itself to be the 
voice of American conservatism—National Review.  The brainchild of Kendall and his 
student, William F. Buckley, Jr., National Review was, almost from its inception, staffed or 
read by almost every significant conservative thinker in America.  Aside from Kendall and 
Buckley (who had gained a measure of notoriety among liberals for his book, God and Man 
at Yale), the regular contributors to the National Review were a diverse lot that ranged from 
social conservatives, such as L. Brent Bozell and Frank Chodorov, to the former Soviet spy, 
Whittaker Chambers.  Russell Kirk, seeking to remedy his chronic financial problems, also 
signed on to write about liberalism in academia.  His career, however, was to be short lived 
as his fellow National Review contributors began attacking him in print at Kendall’s urging.  
Even Buckley advanced the opinion that anyone who thought that Russell Kirk represented 
true conservatism, “was bound to enter the ranks of eccentricity.”  In 1957, Kirk asked 
Buckley to remove his name from National Review’s masthead.  That same year he assumed 
the editorship of Henry Regnery’s Modern Age. 68              
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By the dawn of the 1960s, the New Conservatives had been effectively marginalized.  
Kirk, ensconced at Modern Age for a mere two years before being replaced by Richard 
Weaver, was never again able to pose as the voice of American conservatism.  Beset with 
financial problems, he managed in 1960 to convince Henry Regnery to launch a new 
publication dedicated to pedagogy and book reviews, The University Bookman.   Although 
Kirk continued to write prodigiously, neither the curmudgeonly Bookman, nor any of the 
other fora in which his works appeared ever began to equal the reach of the National Review.  
As for Viereck, Boorstin and Rossiter, they seem to have wearied of the intramural conflict 
and submerged themselves in literary, journalistic and historical projects that removed them 
from the politics of the conservative movement.  Even so, attacks by other ideologically-
oriented conservatives continued.  Kendall, for instance, accused the trio of writing “books 
that tell how to be Conservative yet agree with the Liberals about everything.”  The 
combination of such assaults, as well as their absence from the conservative intellectual 
scene, greatly diminished their influence and they soon ceased to exert any significant 
influence on the evolution of conservatism.69  
 The defeat of the New Conservatives did not, of course, clear the way for an 
American ideology.  While many social and religious conservatives, like the anti-modernists, 
preferred the intellectual certainties and moral clarity of ideology to the uncertainties of 
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pragmatism, there was no agreement as to what creed or theoretical body could serve as the 
basis for an American ideology.  Beyond anti-Communism, the areas of conservative 
consensus encompassed a set of relatively vague and ill-defined preferences for tradition and 
the virtues and values of the past, most which had, ironically, been articulated by the New 
Conservatives as the bases of a non-ideological conservatism.  There were also areas of 
outright conflict.  The evangelical Protestantism of Weaver, for example, was hardly 
compatible with the conservative Catholicism of Manion.  Similarly, Strauss, while being a 
regular reader of the National Review, confided to Kendall that he strongly suspected 
Buckley of anti-Semitism. 
The prospect of an American ideology was in large measure also dependent on the 
national political situation.  Neither of the two presidential candidates in the 1960 contest, 
Vice-President Richard M. Nixon and Senator John F. Kennedy, were ideological firebrands.  
Some conservatives remembered how deeply impressed they had been by Senator Barry 
Goldwater’s (R-AZ) first nationally broadcast speech on the Clarence Manion Forum radio 
program in 1957.  Goldwater, however, was said to be unpopular with the major Republican 
power brokers in the East, and appeared to harbor no national political ambitions.70  
Despite the muddled state of their conservative allies, the anti-modernists remained a 
powerful force within the academic world.  Their fervor, commitment and charisma instilled 
an assertive confidence—or, in Kendall’s case, a blustery arrogance—that allowed them to 
hold their own as minorities in their political science departments.  Strauss, for example, 
wielded an immense influence in the political science department at the University of 
Chicago.  He was quite active in the politics of the department and through the considerable 
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political skills of his secretary, Faye A. Lewis, was able to direct a significant portion of the 
department’s financial resources to his graduate students and the students of other 
“normative” professors.  As a result, he commanded the loyalty of a number of his 
colleagues.   
The anti-modernists were also known for the passion and loyalty they inspired among 
their students.  Indeed, Strauss’s hold over his adherents is legendary.  His following among 
the undergraduate student body was such that during the 1950s, students formed Straussian 
“truth squads.”  The truth squads would occasionally disrupt the classes of teachers they 
believed to be hostile or indifferent to anti-modernism.  Finding seats in the large lecture 
halls, the Straussians would barrage professors with questions and/or demands that he or she 
explain their writings.  Although the university and the political science department officially 
frowned on the truth squads, there was very little effort made to deter them.  Strauss, for his 
part, made no effort to suppress the truth squads’ activities.71 
The most striking example of the ability of the anti-modernists and their allies to 
wield influence out of proportion to their numbers was their hold over the American Political 
Science Association (APSA).  Control of the APSA seems to have been an important 
component in the anti-modernist transformational project, and from the mid-1950s through 
the early 1960s, they all but controlled the organization.  In 1961, for instance, four of the 
sixteen members of the presiding council of the APSA were former students of Strauss (C. H. 
Pritchett, Kenneth Thompson, Maure Goldschmidt, and Francis Coker), and six were 
political allies (Harvey C. Mansfield, Merle Fainsod, Max Kampelman, Evron Kirkpatrick, 
Carl J. Friedrich and Elmer Plischke).  In addition, Mansfield, a devotee of Strauss, was half-
way through a ten year term as the editor of the APSA’s journal, the American Political 
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Science Review, while Pritchett served as Program Chair, Kirkpatrick as Executive Director 
and Kampelman as Treasurer.  Strauss himself was, at the time, the long-time chairman of 
the editorial board, the first political philosopher to hold the office.72   
 The anti-modernist cause was also bolstered by the relatively wide appeal of their 
writing.  Between 1958 and 1963, several anti-modernist works appeared that captured 
interest beyond the field of political science.  Among the most notable were Arendt’s The 
Human Condition, Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Truth and Method, and Harry Jaffa’s Crisis of a 
House Divided.  Not only were these works influential within other academic fields, such as 
philosophy, history and law, but they also went some way toward attracting the attention of 
wealthy benefactors, such as the Richardsons, Olins, Coors, Mellon-Scaifes, and Kochs.73 
Against this backdrop of dynamism and increasing influence, the anti-modernists 
appeared well-placed to advance their transformative project.  While their first foray into the 
political sphere had only been rebuffed (as the neoconservative myth was later to have it) by 
the personal intervention of the iconic Eisenhower, they had managed to land a telling blow 
against relativist social science.  Their critique of value-neutral empiricism   precipitated a 
burgeoning alliance with social and religious conservatives.  They had also managed to 
consolidate and enhance their position within academia.  Despite being significantly 
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outnumbered by empiricist social scientists, the anti-modernists were able to exploit 
empiricism’s lack of activism and prescriptive conclusions.   
This state of affairs, however, was to prove short-lived.  As the decade of the 1960s 
dawned, the anti-modernists were confronted with a reinvigorated empiricism.  This 
resurgence of empiricism—or behavioralism as it was now becoming to be known—was 
driven by the U.S. government’s interest in countering Communist influence by shaping 
behavior in Third World countries.  Experts on voting behavior and modernization theory 
were starting to be recruited to design new strategies for furthering the development of 
capitalist democracy and funded generously.  In the wake of this new interest in empiricism, 
the anti-modernists renewed the ideological conflict with the behavioralists and, in so doing, 
found that they faced an even greater threat: the New Left.   
                
Enemies on the Left—Again: Anti-Modernism and the Emergence of the New Left  
The New Left, or as they were known in academia at the time, the “new political 
science,” was a highly energetic and diverse philosophical and political movement that began 
to emerge in the mid-1950s.  Initially associated with the thought of William A. Williams, C. 
Wright Mills, Howard Zinn and the political philosophy of Strauss’s fellow émigré, Herbert 
Marcuse, by the mid 1960s, the New Left had proliferated in almost every academic field.  
The movement also managed to diversify rapidly into the political plane, with activists and 
interest groups in Europe and the United States identifying themselves as New Leftists.74 
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The main focus of the New Left was the achievement of social justice.  On the 
political plane, this focus translated into extensive involvement in the civil rights and anti-
war movements, as well as numerous other—and sometimes more radical, less legitimate—
causes.  In the academic sphere, the New Left concern with social justice manifested as a 
wave of criticism, methodological experimentation and revisionism that precipitated a 
number of heated controversies within history, economics, sociology and political science.  
Less attuned to academic tradition and much less deferential to authority, New Left scholars 
were also much less averse to engaging in polemics than their empiricist elders.75 
  In the field of political science, New Left scholars rejected the empiricist fact-value 
distinction in favor of analyses that incorporated values such as freedom and justice.  
Believing that liberals in general and behavioralists in particular were fixated on practical at 
the expense of justice, the New Left demanded that human values could not and should not 
be excluded from the study of politics.  Indeed, most viewed the empiricists’ disregard for 
theory and values as amoral and their large statistical works as socially irrelevant.  While 
they also saw no great evil in deploying empiricist methodologies, they insisted that surveys 
and statistical models have a prescriptive, socially-relevant value as well as a descriptive 
value.  
Although the New Left shared the anti-modernist conviction that political science 
could never be value-free, there were important differences.  The most significant difference 
lay in the two sides’ conceptions of equality, freedom and justice.  The anti-modernist view 
(as well as that of many religious and social conservatives), was grounded in the concept of 
Natural Law.  More specifically, they held that because Nature bestowed human moral and 
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intellectual capacity unequally, it was contrary to Nature to seek absolute equality and to 
promote individuals beyond their “natural” circumstances or station in society.  While the 
interests of the state required universal guarantees of physical security and the removal of 
obstacles to realizing one’s natural station (“excellence,” in anti-modernist parlance), the 
interests of the individual must, in general, be subordinated to the greater good.76 
In the New Left view, the individual was given priority over the needs of the polis.  
All human beings, they argued, were not only equally entitled to freedom and justice, but 
also entitled to protection from state attempts to infringe on the rights of the individual.  
Indeed, the New Leftists maintained that almost all existing limitations on the rights of the 
individual were really morally unjustifiable restraints imposed by the existing political and 
economic power structure.  Moreover, they held that the individual retained the unqualified 
right to define freedom and justice for themselves.77 
In 1959, Christian Bay, a faculty member of the University of California at Berkeley, 
extended the emerging New Left conception of freedom and justice even further in his 
Woodrow Wilson Award-winning book, The Structure of Freedom.  In this classic New Left 
work, Bay argued that the supreme political value is the maximum freedom of the individual 
as defined by the individual.  Although maximum freedom for every individual was, Bay 
recognized, not easily attainable as a practical matter, the idea could and should serve as a 
political ideal.  According to Bay, political systems that failed to accommodate the particular 
social, psychological and economic needs of individual citizens risked becoming illegitimate.  
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Such a relativist philosophical orientation of course, seemed bound to bring them into 
conflict with the anti-modernists.78    
In 1961, it did.  Walter Berns, a prominent student of Strauss’s then at Cornell, 
published a scathing review essay of Bay’s work.  Although Bay was quite critical of the 
behavioral (the new term for the empiricism), fact-value distinction, Berns ignored this 
aspect of the work.  Rather, he focused his fire on Bay’s focus on the individual.  Individual 
choice, according to Berns, cannot result in freedom because choice implies that values are 
relative to the individual, and relativism inevitably leads to conflict and the restriction and 
enslavement of others.  According to Bay’s definition, Berns observed, “Hitler would have 
been a free man too.  He destroyed completely whatever external restraints he perceived; he 
was therefore socially free.”  Freedom, according to Berns, can only be realized by attaining 
an understanding of “man’s nature in the ancient sense of that word.”  “To deny nature in the 
sense of a perfected end,” Berns admonished, “is to make it impossible to define freedom.  If 
we cannot speak of man as he ought to be, we cannot speak of free men.”  In short, questions 
of individual freedom must be superseded by and subsumed to duty and the quest for a 
“naturally ordered” society or, in the Straussian vernacular, “how men ought to live.”79    
Hard on the heels of Berns’s attack on the Bay, the Straussians launched a strike 
against what they perceived as their main target, the behavioralists, as empiricist social 
science was now called.  In early 1962, several prominent members of the “Michigan school” 
of behavioralism, Robert Dahl, Herbert Simon, A.F. Bentley and Harold Lasswell published 
an essay collection exploring behavioural methodology, entitled Essays on the Behavioral 
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Study of Politics.  Strauss and several of his students, Berns, Herbert Storing, Leo Weinstein, 
and Robert Horowitz, had learned of the project in its early stages and began planning a 
critique of the work before it was even published.  Confusingly entitled Essays on the 
Scientific Study of Politics, the Straussian critique was produced over two summers in 
Chicago, with Strauss and his co-authors “working together and holding seminar discussion.”  
The aim was to have their critique appear simultaneously with the behavioralists’ work.   
To call the Straussians’ work a critique of behavioral methodology is an 
understatement.  In a fierce attack, the Straussian faction repeated their traditional 
condemnations of empiricism as “relativist,” “morally bankrupt” and “disloyal,” with Storing 
asserting that “the new political science has nothing to say against those that unhesitatingly 
prefer surrender to war.”  Berns, Weinstein and Horowitz and added that behavioralists’ 
work was atheistic, dogmatic, politically irresponsible, cynical, selfish and depraved.  Strauss 
himself characterized the book as “a judicious mating of dialectical materialism and 
psychoanalysis to be consummated on a bed supplied by logical positivism.”  The attack was 
particularly focused, owing to the Straussians obvious prior knowledge of the specific points 
made by Dahl and company—including the title—and two years of lead-time.  The work 
concluded with the assertion that subjects, such as voting behavior and poverty, deflected the 
field’s attention from the fact that “the most important concern is the Cold War.”80   
The counterattack came on two flanks.  Carrying the empiricist/behavioral banner 
was Stanley Rothman.  Rothman, a conservative political scientist who specialized in 
communications studies, ventured that anti-modernism was not only anachronistic and 
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corrosive to the field but also un-American.  Engaging Strauss’s writing with his own 
esoteric interpretative method, Rothman found that the Straussian characterization of 
America as a descendant of the relativistic thought of Machiavelli, Hobbes and Locke was 
tantamount to “a rejection of the values underlying the American experience.”  Furthermore, 
Rothman maintained, the dissemination of this hostility toward American values and ideals 
seemed “designed to prepare the way for that unlikely conjunction of philosophy and power 
which will place in power the philosopher-king and the Guardians, i.e., Strauss and his 
disciples.”81    
The response from the New Left was launched by two prominent members of the 
Berkeley school, John Schaar and Sheldon Wolin.  In a detailed review of Essays, Schaar and 
Wolin characterized the book as a “melangé of invective, innuendo and bald 
pronouncements” that “treated the reader to the same observations for more than three 
hundred pages.”  Nor did Strauss himself escape reprobation.  “Fanatic,” Wolin and Schaar 
wrote, “is a harsh term and is seldom found in scholarly book reviews.  But no other term 
fits.”  After characterizing Strauss as “fanatic,” “imperious,” “disingenuous” and “dogmatic,” 
Schaar and Wolin closed with an attack on Strauss’s affirmation of the utility and morality of 
the Platonic “noble lie,” a device whereby intellectual honesty may be sacrificed to the 
political exigencies of the state: 
We wonder further what manner of justice their opponents can expect when 
the new men [i.e., the students of the future] have before them, as models, 
teachers who believe that scholarly scruples may be suspended when 
combating evil.  What will happen to nobility of spirit and sensitivity of 
intellect when students are advised that ‘intellectual honesty’ represents a 
clever dodge . . . What encouragement will there be for the wide-ranging and 
intellectually curious student when he is instructed in the hard doctrine that 
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‘what is most important for political science is what is most important 
politically?’82  
 
Strauss appears to have been taken aback by such an intense attack from an 
unexpected quarter.  In reply, Strauss was uncharacteristically blunt and openly defended the 
transformation project by asserting that “hard doctrines may be true doctrines, and in 
addition, they may be in need of being taught.”  Does not “nobility of spirit . . . call, in the 
first place for the improvement of the political community to which one belongs, for its 
pursuit of excellence, for one’s adorning of the Sparta that fate has allotted to one?”  
Strauss’s reply was followed by a counterattack by his student, Dante Germino, who 
ironically characterized the New Left as “messianic humanists,” who sought to “change the 
world, rather than simply interpret it.”  Rebuttals also ensued from Berns, Storing, Weinstein 
and Horwitz, none of whom ever again seemed to have mentioned Schaar and Wolin by 
name, but rather referred to them only as “the critics.” 83 
The three-way intramural conflict between the anti-modernists, behavioralists, and 
New Leftists had by now begun to attract the attention of non-political scientists not directly 
involved in the feud.  Some were empiricists from other fields that offered defense of the 
behavioralists’ work.  Others were New Left scholars that sought to take advantage an 
opportunity to express their feelings about Strauss and his school, make mischief or both.  
The New Left sociologist Angus Campbell, for instance, jibed at both the behavioralists and 
the anti-modernists.  Referring to Strauss’s characterization of the empiricists as “latter-day 
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Neros who fiddled while Rome burned,” Campbell conjectured that even Strauss would have 
to admit there was “some small value in knowing that Nero actually played a lyre, and that 
only 68.24 per cent of Rome burned.” 84   
As for political scientists, most wondered what effects the controversy would have on 
the field.  Some believed that the divide between political philosophy and political science 
had become so great that the fields would inevitably become two distinct fields of study.  
Most, however, surmised that classical political theory would eventually just fade away.  
Germino wondered aloud why it was that so many academics had concluded “with appalling 
swiftness” that “political theory is on the verge of extinction.”85 
 
The End of Anti-Modernism and the Thucydidean Turn 
The answer to Germino’s plaintive question, of course, was that classical political 
theory was on the verge of extinction.  The most obvious reason for political theory’s demise 
was the sudden emergence of the new social justice ethos that reached far beyond academia.  
The New Left, the advent of newly-militant civil rights and women’s movements, and the 
first stirrings of the counterculture on college campuses represented a large, mutually-
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reinforcing conjunction of social and political phenomena that, for a time, simply swamped 
all other views.  The anti-modernist dream of transformation was beginning to be realized, 
only not by the anti-modernists.     
Anti-modernism was also weakened by the fading from the scene of the first 
generation of anti-modernist teachers.  Strauss and Voegelin were nearing retirement and in 
ill health.  Kendall had been quiet since being jettisoned from Yale.  A demanding position at 
the University of Dallas, coupled with his undiagnosed heart disease, alcoholism and 
despondency over a falling out with Buckley, muffled his voice.  Löwith, Jaspers, Habermas, 
Adorno, Gadamer and Horkheimer had returned to Germany.  Of the first generation, only 
Arendt possessed the vitality, charisma and name-recognition outside of academia that might 
have revived anti-modernism.  Arendt however, had begun to move away from anti-
modernism and was rapidly becoming a thinker in a class all her own. 
As for the second generation, they lacked the numbers and the intellectual firepower 
to contend with the New Left.  Shils and Goldschmidt had taken positions in Britain.  Weaver 
had died.  The remaining anti-modernists, such Berns and Jaffa, along with Thomas Pangle, 
were, to be sure, able defenders of the faith, but did not yet command the same devotion as 
had their mentors.  Their status as “Straussians” also precluded them from achieving tenure 
at Cornell, Yale and Berkeley, respectively.  As a result, they were forced to concede much 
of the professional high ground to the New Left.  While the various conservative foundations, 
Olin, Richardson-Vick, and Mellon-Scaife, continued to dispense monies on a regular basis, 
the competition for their largesse had grown increasingly sharp.  As for the employment 
outlook, the lack of positions caused many anti-modernist scholars to remain cloistered at a 
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handful of institutions, such as the University of Toronto, the University of Chicago, and 
Claremont.86        
The increasing marginalization of the anti-modernists within academia caused some 
to look for new expressive avenues.  The most notable of these new avenues took them away 
from consideration of the Cold War to other, more provincial matters.  Temporarily 
abandoning Hobbes, Locke and Machiavelli, Harry Jaffa and Martin Diamond began to 
reinterpret de Tocqueville, Lincoln, Madison and Hamilton in an effort to justify opposition 
to desegregation, voting rights, and equal opportunity hiring.  Edward Banfield, James Q. 
Wilson and Harvey Mansfield explored the relationship between philosophy and urban life 
and the moral hazards of the American party system.  Gertrude Himmelfarb and Allan Bloom 
examined the impact of science, music and literature on contemporary political thought. 87  
Circumstances, however, brought some back to the exigencies of the Cold War.  
William J. Baroody, the resident intellectual of the nascent Barry Goldwater presidential 
campaign detected, via Clarence Manion, the outlines of a new vision of conservatism in 
anti-modernists writings.  He was particularly intrigued by their conception of a strong, 
activist and unilateral foreign policy.  Drawing on the anti-modernist works—particularly 
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Strauss—Manion constructed a foreign policy framework for the campaign.  Explicated in 
Goldwater’s ghost-written book, Why Not Victory? and some privately-circulated essays, 
this militaristic foreign policy vision even gave some of Goldwater’s fellow Republicans 
pause.  On the opposing side, Democrats began portraying Goldwater as an extremist and the 
Johnson campaign began raising the specter of nuclear war.   
In response to liberal criticism, Baroody enlisted Jaffa as a speechwriter and charged 
him with articulating a defense for Goldwater for use at the upcoming Republican National 
Convention.  Curiously, Jaffa drew upon Cicero’s injunction to the Roman Senate, and 
formulated what he believed to be succinct response for Goldwater: 
I would remind you, [lords, senators,] that extremism [extreme patriotism] in 
the defense of liberty [freedom] is no vice [crime].  And let me remind you 
also that moderation [pusillanimity] in the pursuit of justice is no virtue [in a 
Roman.] 88 
 
Although Jaffa’s efforts had quite the opposite effect from that desired, the anti-
modernist involvement with the Goldwater campaign was significant for two reasons.  First, 
it marked the first direct anti-modernist involvement in a presidential campaign.  As such, it 
helped establish their credentials as a source of intellectual firepower upon which the party 
could call.  This was particularly appealing to the Republicans insofar as they usually found 
it difficult to attract academics to their cause.  
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The end of the Goldwater campaign also signaled the appearance of a major fissure 
within anti-modernism.  While the anti-modernists had been willing to make common cause 
with social and religious conservatives to further their agenda, most had avoided 
identification with the two major political parties.  In the wake of Goldwater’s defeat, Jaffa 
and a number of his students began to claim allegiance to the Republican Party, while the 
majority claimed no party.  Within academic circles, anti-modernists began to denote Jaffa’s 
faction as “West Coast Straussians.”  In reality, these divisions had existed for some time, but 
had not been explicit.  Most of Strauss’s students, as well as those of Voegelin, adopted a 
public stance of appearing unconcerned with the politics and foreign policy of the present. 89   
For Strauss himself, the real issues remained the Cold War and the transformational 
project, although his thought seems to have experienced a renewed interest in foreign affairs.  
The reasons for this renewed interest unclear.  He may have sensed the prospects for the 
regime-change project were fading and in need of some new impetus and approach.  
Alternately, this re-orientation may have been a result of a fear that America would not 
continue to support other countries against Communism.  Although the crusading spirit of 
Kennedy’s declaration that America would “bear any burden . . . and pay any price” seems as 
if it would have appealed to Strauss, this was not the case.  Strauss did not have much faith in 
the incoming Kennedy Administration and confided to Kendall that the new president could 
be summed up in one word: “image.”90   
Whatever his motivations, by the 1960s Strauss had begun to turn his attention to 
foreign policy in earnest.  The first fruit of this new focus was a powerful denouncement of 
Realpolitik in the form of a lengthy, thirty-one page preface, inserted in a new edition of 
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Spinoza’s Critique.  Germany, Strauss maintained, had never been fertile ground for 
democracy.  A brief window of opportunity for the transformation of the regime had, 
however, existed in 1918.  The First World War had swept away the old, moribund 
conservative German social structure, as well as the emergent symptoms of modernity, 
leaving a “blank slate.”  Yet, “at the crucial moment the victorious liberal democracies 
discredited liberal democracy in the eyes of Germany by the betrayal of their principles 
through the Treaty of Versailles.”  The result of this “betrayal” was to open the door to 
fascist tyranny and the Holocaust.91   
Hard on the heels of this work, Strauss published his third major commentary on the 
Cold War (after On Tyranny and Natural Right and History), and only major statement on 
foreign policy, The City and Man.  The capstone work of Strauss’s career, The City and Man, 
presented an argument for a foreign policy based on Justice, and posited the idea that such a 
policy constituted a second avenue to the transformation of the American regime.  As such, 
the work represents a new—and the final—stage in the evolution of anti-modernism: the 
Thucydidean turn. 92  
Deriving its name from a new (or some cases a renewed) anti-modernist interest in 
the work of the Athenian general Thucydides, the Thucydidean turn was also characterized 
by a renewed interest in contemporary foreign affairs.  In most cases, the literature that 
accompanied this new intellectual impulse was prescriptive as well as analytical and strongly 
oriented toward activist U.S. foreign policy abroad.  Although it did not garner same support 
as the earlier Aristotelian impulse, the Thucydidean turn did include most of the more 
prominent and prolific anti-modernists, such as Kendall, Horkheimer, Voegelin, Strauss and, 
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in a last anti-modernist foray, Arendt.  Most of the resultant works also seem to have aimed 
at non-academic audiences, with Strauss’s contribution representing his most popularly 
successful book.93   
The subject of The City and Man is the “Crisis of the West.”  Speaking 
uncharacteristically in his own voice, Strauss described the Crisis of the West in the 
introduction as one in which “the West’s very survival” is at stake.  According to Strauss, 
this crisis has two distinct facets.  On one hand, the West faces an external threat from “the 
most extreme form of Eastern despotism.”  This threat, however, can be kept at bay by the 
Western nations’ “immense military power.” 
More insidious and dangerous, however, is the internal danger that ensued from the 
West’s loss of moral clarity.  “Spengler,” Strauss declared, “has proved to be right.”  The 
West has lost its moral clarity and become “uncertain of its purpose.”  This uncertainty, he 
argued, is deadly to a society “accustomed to understand itself in terms of a universal 
purpose.”  Better that the West “go down in honor, certain of its purpose,” than to meekly 
and willingly give itself over to degradation and slavery.    
The fact that the external threat was able to emerge and grow, Strauss argued, is a 
direct result of the West’s loss of moral clarity.  “The amiable high priests of democracy,” 
blinded by relativism, were “unable to morally distinguish between the British Empire and 
the Soviet Empire” and sought to negotiate and bargain with the enemy.  Later, “when 
Communism revealed itself even to the meanest capacities as Stalinism and post-Stalinism,” 
the West “failed to act” against Communism.  Western leaders placed their faith in the 
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imaginary restraints of a multilateralist “federation of nations” and the “pious fraud of 
disarmament.”94   
Having stated the nature of the threat openly, Strauss reverted to his customary 
esoteric style to in order to explain his prescription for surviving the Crisis of the West.  
Unfolding over the course of three chapters which treat Aristotle’s Politics, Plato’s Republic, 
and Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War, this prescription deals with domestic politics, political 
theory and foreign policy.  The first two chapters, for instance, are elaborations of Strauss’s 
earlier works on the nature of the polis and Justice, respectively.  Together, these two 
chapters reprise the arguments of On Tyranny and Natural Right.  The third chapter treats 
foreign policy through an examination of Thucydides’s account of the Peloponnesian Wars 
(431 - 401 BCE).   
In this chapter, Strauss offers a singular interpretation that is notable for two reasons.  
First, although all of his previous works contain only a single passing reference to 
Thucydides, he now declares that Thucydides, a Greek general and historian, was a 
philosopher of the first rank.  In this regard he seems to have been influenced by the 
groundbreaking work of the Harvard anti-modernist classicist, John H. Finley, who argued 
that Thucydides had been educated in philosophy, but that the general hid this fact.  Strauss 
adopts a similar position, and his contention that Thucydides was a philosopher clears the 
way for his claim that the Greek’s words should not be taken at face value.  As a philosopher, 
Thucydides’s words require interpretation.95   
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Strauss’s treatment of Thucydides is also notable for his contention that the Greek 
general was not, in fact, a proponent of realist foreign policy.  At the time, this was 
substantial departure from the accepted view within academia.  Indeed, The Peloponnesian 
War was so generally accepted as a realist-oriented work that, by the end of World War II, it 
had acquired the status of a sort of “manual” for realists.  Only Finley’s work had shaken this 
assumption.  Strauss, for his part, sided with Finley in order to strike a blow at realism.   
Strauss argued that realism ultimately brought Athens, the most powerful city-state in 
the Hellenic world, to ruin.  Viewing foreign policy through the lens of the regime, Strauss 
posited a powerful organic relationship between the character of the Athenian regime and 
foreign policy.  The door to Athens’s doom, he argued, was opened by Pericles’s decision to 
“radicalize” Athenian democracy by granting the masses a voice in Athenian democracy.  
While this policy first resulted in an ability to command enormous manpower for military 
purposes, at Pericles’s death the true import of the policy became apparent as various 
factions representing the masses were able to gain a measure of control over the city.  
Comprised of oligarchs, demagogues, intellectuals and other proponents of “extreme 
democracy,” the ruling cliques were Strauss asserted, “ruthless men with second-rate minds.”  
Disdainful of the principles that had heretofore guided Athenian policy, the factions 
conducted policy on the basis of naked interest—the interests of the masses.  The final result 
of this realist view was, according to Strauss, the strategically disastrous Sicilian Expedition 
in which the main portions of the Athenian navy and army were destroyed.96 
Strauss also argued that Thucydides’s real purpose in constructing his monumental 
history was to promote Justice as the proper basis for foreign policy.  Although Thucydides 
never makes his policy preferences known, Strauss contended that his powerful examples of 
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the evils of the realism are evidence of his true preference.  Thucydides preference for 
Justice, Strauss contends, is based on his understanding of the relationship between human 
nature and the nature of the regime.  If, for example, the citizen acts out of self-interest, his 
fellow citizens will soon follow suit.  This will, of course, translate into an acquisitive, 
interest-based foreign policy, where the state also “wants more” than it is entitled to by 
Nature.  Eventually, Strauss maintains, because human greed is not subject to moderation, 
self-interested policy will end in disaster.  Conversely, if the state or individuals acts out of 
considerations of Justice—and only Justice—it is more likely that moderation will prevail.97 
Strauss, however, also made clear that considerations of Justice must take precedence 
over moderation.  Thucydides, he claims, understood that because Nature (physis) will 
always overcome Law (nomos), those inclined to do evil—like the Soviet Union—will not be 
deterred, even by the threat of death.  In Strauss’s view, Evil is by definition an abrogation of 
Natural Law.  Thus, to intend harm represents a violation of Natural Law and bestows upon 
the intended victim a moral justification for self-preservation that would not exist otherwise.  
Thus, the state inclined to do Justice is morally justified “in all circumstances” (i.e., 
preemptively or after the fact), in assailing the state that means it harm. 98    
Although we have at this point examined the full measure of Strauss’s argument, as is 
the case with many of the anti-modernists’ works and Strauss’s in particular, the full meaning 
is dependent on the structure as well as the content of the work.  In regard to The City and 
Man, the juxtaposition of the three main chapters is the key to discerning Strauss’s intentions.  
The central position of the high theory of Plato’s Republic, flanked by the more practice-
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oriented chapters by Aristotle and Thucydides, signifies that there are two possible avenues 
of transformation of the American regime.  Aristotle’s Politics, which deals with the nature 
of the polis, represents transformation that begins within, while Thucydides’s account of the 
Peloponnesian War represents change through external exertion.  
What, then, can be said about his purpose?  I would assert that Strauss intended The 
City and Man to be a sort of “users’ manual” for the practice of politics, intended for those 
that he called “the gentlemen,” the soldiers, diplomats, bureaucrats, writers and politicians of 
the future.  Increasingly aware that classical political philosophy’s days were numbered in 
the academy, Strauss may have himself felt the shadows beginning to lengthen when, in late 
1963, he suffered a serious heart attack that forced him to leave Chicago for Claremont, 
California.  In light of these considerations, he may have wanted, like the ancient 
philosophers, to bequeath a final timeless lesson of universal applicability.  His testament did 
not, as we shall see, go unheeded.   
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2.1 The American Anti-Modernists 
 
 
 
   
                              Willmoore Kendall                                                                       Richard Weaver 
OSS man, avid baseball fan, brilliant scholar, and         He believed a society modeled on the antebellum 
provocateur extraordinaire, Kendall declared himself               South would deliver America from modern  
Strauss’s “disciple.”             materialism. 
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2.2 The New Conservatives 
 
 
            
                Russell Kirk               Daniel Boorstin 
Conservative philosopher and     A philosopher and historian of 
antiquarian, he believed ideology    ideas, he believed Americans 
was toxic to conservatism.           shared an “unspoken national 
       faith. 
 
      
         Clinton Rossiter                  Peter Viereck 
A political scientist, his moderate    Poet, historian and playwright, he 
positions on Vietnam and civil    denounced the anti-modernists as 
rights led Allan Bloom to brand    “Goldwater intellectuals.” 
him a “traitor.”                                                                                          
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2.3 Founders of the New Left 
     
                                                        
 William Appleman Williams              C. Wright Mills 
His 1959 critique of U.S. foreign    His The Power Elite argued  
Policy, The Tragedy of American    that the growing power of social  
Diplomacy was the classic New    elites diminished social justice   
Left statement on U.S. foreign    and marginalized ordinary 
policy.       citizens. 
 
                               
            Herbert Marcuse 
An émigré who studied under  
Heidegger, and later served in the  
OSS, Marcuse fused 
Heidegger’s postmodernism with  
Marxism.   
  
Chapter 3 
Neoconservatism as Strategy: Albert Wohlstetter and the Transformation of American 
Nuclear Doctrine 
 
When Albert Wohlstetter died on January 10, 1997, very few Americans noticed.  
The New York Times did not publish a death notice until January 14, and that was buried in 
section B, page 8.  “If Henry Kissinger had died last Friday,” former Wall Street Journal 
editor Jude Wanniski observed, “the weekend newspapers and television programs would 
have devoted considerable space to his obituary.  In fact, of the two men, Kissinger and 
Wohlstetter, it is no exaggeration to say that Wohlstetter was the more influential.  It is no 
exaggeration, I think, to say that Wohlstetter was the most influential unknown man in the 
world for the past half century.”99 
A closer look at Wohlstetter’s career seems to bear out Wanniski’s assessment. Over 
the course of a career that spanned almost fifty years, Wohlstetter built a reputation as an 
expert in strategy that is almost unsurpassed in American history.  As a RAND Corporation 
analyst in the 1950s, Wohlstetter took part in the early U.S. efforts to think through the awful 
new realities of the atomic age.  In the process, he seemingly single-handedly designed some 
of the most significant planning and conceptual elements of early U.S. nuclear strategy.  
Over the next four decades, as an academic, government consultant and private citizen, 
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Wohlstetter’s voice was heard in almost every significant debate over strategic affairs.  
Indeed, his influence was such that presidents from Dwight Eisenhower to Bill Clinton gave 
serious consideration to his views on issues ranging from surprise nuclear attack, to the 
Cuban missile crisis, to arms control, to the air strikes designed to halt the “ethnic cleansing” 
of Bosnia.100  
Wohlstetter’s most historically significant and lasting influence, however, derives 
from his role as one of the “founding fathers” of neoconservatism.  Wohlstetter merits this 
title in two respects.  As a strategic theorist, Wohlstetter, more than any other individual, is 
responsible for the introduction and promotion of the neoconservative impulse in the realm 
of American strategic thought.  This impulse, which incorporates the anti-modernist idea that 
through moral clarity it is possible to eradicate evil and establish Justice, translated onto the 
strategic plane as the idea that not only was it possible to fight and win a nuclear war with the 
Soviet Union, but that one day it would be necessary to do so.101 
Wohlstetter is also a founder insofar as he played a central role in the coalescence of 
neoconservatism into a political movement.  Over the course of his long career, Wohlstetter, 
through a combination of professional virtuosity, personal charisma and bureaucratic-
political skill, built a group of students, protégés and colleagues into a distinct intellectual 
“clique.”  Recognizable by their loyalty to, and promotion of Wohlstetter and his ideas and 
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policy preferences, this clique began establishing the neoconservative reputation for strategic 
competence and expertise in the early 1960s.  In so doing, these men also formed the core of 
what would become a neoconservative movement to transform U.S. national security policy. 
 
Early Life and Education: Logic, Lenin and Anti-modernism 
 Albert James Wohlstetter was born in New York City on December 19, 1914, the 
youngest of the four children of Philip and Nellie Wohlstetter.  The elder Wohlstetter was a 
relatively recent Jewish immigrant from Austria-Hungary who served as the Chief Legal 
Counsel to the Metropolitan Opera. Philip not only provided a comfortable living for his 
family, but also able had performers appearing at the Met, such as Milo Pico, Enrico Caruso, 
and Giulio Gatt-Cassoza, to the Wohlstetter home.  Unfortunately, the Wohlstetter family’s 
genteel lifestyle ended rather abruptly in 1918 when Philip Wohlstetter died.  Nellie 
Wohlstetter, struggling to make ends meet, took a job and moved the family to a more 
affordable apartment in the Washington Heights neighborhood of New York.  The oldest son, 
Bill, who was 15, also took a job. 102 
 As he grew older, the youngest son, Albert began to exhibit an authoritarian streak 
that annoyed and disturbed his family members.  Taking it upon himself to uphold the 
family’s cultural and intellectual standards, the teenaged Albert encouraged and moderated 
wide-ranging family discussions and debates at the dinner table, just as his father had done.  
An excellent student, Albert was, his brother Charles recalled, a formidable opponent in 
debate.  As the Wohlstetter children aged and began to become aware of popular culture, 
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Albert also began to police the home’s reading materials, disposing of any that he did not feel 
to be sufficiently intellectual or tasteful.103 
 In 1931, at the age of 17, Albert entered New York’s City College, (CCNY).  
Although the Depression had further eroded the family’s already modest financial resources, 
Wohlstetter applied for a CCNY scholarship in modern dance.  Relatively skilled in the fox 
trot, samba, tango and mambo (presumably as a result of his early exposure to the musicians 
and dancers that had visited his home), he received the scholarship.   Once enrolled at City 
College, however, Wohlstetter gravitated rapidly toward mathematical logic, an obscure and 
esoteric field that explores the relationships between the natural sciences and philosophy in 
order to discern the true nature of reality.104  
At CCNY, Wohlstetter studied under the Russian émigré philosopher and 
mathematical logician, Morris Raphael Cohen.  A former Marxist, Cohen’s mature 
philosophy—as well as his style of teaching—embraced a Platonic conception of objective 
reality that he believed manifested itself through ideas.  Cohen’s philosophy also contained a 
distinct anti-modernist element that held both socialism and liberalism to be manifestations 
of modernity and, as such, inimical to the essence of Western civilization.  Both systems, he 
believed, promoted social “leveling” by removing “the political and economic restraints 
which kept the multitude from the realm of education,” and as a result, had “let loose a horde 
of barbarians for the invasion of the fields of intellectual culture.” 
At the time of Wohlstetter’s enrollment, Cohen was engaged in the development of a 
heuristic theory he called “principle of polarity.”  Reserved for what one colleague 
characterized as “a small and almost secret circle,” the polarity theory was aimed at solving 
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social and political problems through a focus on “opposites,” or contradictory (or seemingly 
contradictory) ideas.  This focus on opposites would, Cohen held, help to strip away the 
various relativist assumptions that he presumed had accumulated over time and been 
reinforced by repeated human agreement, and uncover aspects of objective reality.  
Wohlstetter, for his part, apparently became quite adept at Cohen’s techniques.  He published 
a senior thesis, “The Structure of the Proposition and the Fact,” which purported to 
mathematically describe how similar assumptions are to facts.105 
Wohlstetter’s collegiate career also marked his earliest exposure to socialism.  In the 
philosophy department of the CCNY of the 1930s, one’s political awareness was often 
measured by one’s awareness of socialist thought.  Groups representing the Stalinist, 
Leninist, Social Democratic and Trotskyist variants of socialism, as well as a number of sub-
variants, the Shermanites, Cochranites, Oehlerites, Lovestoneites, Weisbordites, Stammites, 
Marlenites, Mienkovites and Fieldites, existed in practically every union hall, educational 
institution, and neighborhood gathering-place in New York City.  Indeed, socialism was so 
ubiquitous and dynamic in the New York of the 1930s, that the literary critic Lionel Abel 
characterized the city as “the most interesting part of the Soviet Union.”106 
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 Wohlstetter seems to have preferred a Leninist variant of socialism.  Originally a 
member of the main Trotskyist group in the United States, Max Shachtman’s Socialist 
Workers Party (SWP), Wohlstetter and his City College classmates, Lawrence Kagan and 
Morton White left the group in 1932.  At issue was an American version of the “Party 
versus workers” primacy question that had once confronted Lenin: Did the Party exist to 
serve the workers, or did the Party’s interests trump those of the workers?  Believing, like 
Lenin, that the Party should be supreme, Wohlstetter, Kagan, White and five others SWP 
dissidents founded the “Organization Committee for a Revolutionary Workers’ Party” 
(OCRWP), or “Fieldites,” after their leader, B.J. Field.  Once separated from the parent 
organization, the Fieldites, began describing the mainstream Trotskyists as “utterly 
compromised,” ideologically and morally.  Eventually the Fieldites’ anti-SWP rhetoric 
became so harsh that Abel once heard them discussing the Trotskyites and thought that they 
were discussing the Republican Party!107 
Wohlstetter’s preference for the Fieldite faction probably had much to do with his 
personality and the highly theoretical orientation of the group.  Quite atypically of the 
socialist splinter groups of the time, the Fieldites’ meetings did not primarily consist of 
organizing fiery denunciations of capitalism or other groups.  Rather, the Fieldites preferred 
calm, reasoned discussion, interspersed periodically with research presentations.  Field 
himself had been an economic statistician, an occupation not particularly known for 
producing dynamic revolutionaries.  The group’s primary theoretical activity consisted of 
subjecting political issues to what sounds like an early form of systems analysis or 
economic analysis.  This dialectical technique consisted of “breaking” an issue into parts 
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and analyzing the pieces.  This theoretical development effort was characterized at the time 
as “political cubism.” 108 
 By mid-1935, the Fieldite faction had begun to implode, as most of its most able 
members—Wohlstetter and White, in particular—left for graduate school or joined other 
socialist sub-groups.  Wohlstetter enrolled in Columbia University in the fall of 1935, 
aiming to continue his studies in mathematical logic, as well as statistics and economics.  
Upon arriving at Columbia, Wohlstetter began his studies under the Romanian émigré, 
theoretical mathematician Abraham Wald.  Wald also served as advisor to Jacob “Jack” 
Wolfowitz, a young New York City high school math teacher studying part-time for his 
Ph.D. in statistics. 
Wald also introduced Wohlstetter to one of Columbia’s most prolific patrons, Frank 
Altschul.  Altschul, a prominent investment banker with a keen interest in foreign affairs, 
was personally acquainted with such notables as Henry and Claire Booth Luce, Alf Landon, 
Herbert Hoover, the Dulles brothers, David Ben-Gurion, Reinhold Niebuhr and Margaret 
Bourke White.  A staunch anti-Communist, Altschul was later to become a founding 
member of the original Committee on the Present Danger.  Taking Wohlstetter under his 
wing, Altschul began to introduce the young man to his rarefied social circle.  He also 
lectured Wohlstetter on the evils of socialism.  Presumably, Wohlstetter did not mention his 
extracurricular activities with the Fieldites.109 
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While at Columbia he also met Roberta Morgan, a Vassar graduate (B.A., 1933), 
working toward her Master’s degree in Political Science.  Finding that they shared an 
interest in socialist politics and modern dance, Albert and Roberta quickly became 
romantically involved.  Both had completed their coursework in 1939, and they celebrated 
by getting married and making plans for traveling to Great Britain.  America’s entry into the 
war in 1941, however, interrupted their plans.   
Although Wohlstetter was exposed to the draft, he was able to avoid service.  His 
brother Charles, by now a Wall Street investment banker who counted E.F. Hutton and J. 
Paul Getty among his personal friends, was able to secure a civilian position for him.  In 
early 1942 Charles prevailed upon his friend, former Rutgers economics professor and head 
of the newly formed Office of Production Management, Supply Priorities and Allocations 
Board (PMSPAB), Arthur Burns, to appoint Wohlstetter to its economic research section.  
In 1942, the PMSPAB was organizationally (and alphabetically) streamlined into the War 
Production Board (WPB), and Albert was appointed to its Planning Committee.  The new 
position, aside from more responsibility and professional prestige, allowed Wohlstetter to 
gain invaluable experience in government planning and procurement systems. 
Wohlstetter’s new position also required him to spend much more time in 
Washington.  His time there allowed him to make a number of high-placed contacts.  Most 
notable among these was Charles Hitch.  A former Oxford economist who had abandoned 
academia to serve as a corporal in the Army Air Force, Hitch later became the Assistant 
Director of the U.S. Army Air Force-Douglas Aircraft Corporation joint venture known as 
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RAND (for Research And Development) Corporation.  Wohlstetter’s acquaintance with 
Hitch was later to prove very important to his career.110 
 
In On the Ground Floor: Wohlstetter and the First Window of Vulnerability  
The end of the war found the Wohlstetters unemployed, and in 1947, they moved to 
California to pursue employment.  Almost as soon as they arrived in California, the 
Wohlstetters ran into Abraham Girshick, an old friend from Columbia’s statistics 
department, on the street in Santa Monica.  Girshick immediately attempted to recruit both 
Roberta and Albert to join him at the newly formed RAND Corporation.  In short order 
Roberta interviewed with Albert’s old acquaintance Charles Hitch, and was hired as a 
consultant in RAND’s social science division.  Albert signed on with a fabricated housing 
manufacturer called General Panel Inc.  In 1949, however, General Panel filed for 
bankruptcy.111   
Wohlstetter’s luck had changed by 1950.  The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 
sparked planning for an expanded and re-organized Air Force, and these changes were 
reflected in expansion and re-organization at RAND.  Roberta, aware that Hitch was casting 
about for people with mathematical-analytical and management backgrounds, approached 
him about a consulting position for Albert.  In early 1951, Hitch hired Wohlstetter as a 
consultant, and assigned him to the Mathematics Group under John Williams.  Williams 
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assigned Wohlstetter to an internal project headed by the scientific management expert, Igor 
Ansoff, entitled “Outline of a Study for the Plans Analysis Section.” 112  
The expansion and transformation of the Air Force during this period presented it 
with a number of large and open questions.  Air Force planners, for instance, sought to 
acquire several new types of airplanes, including at least one, and possibly two, new 
intercontinental bombers.  Almost all of the programmed airplanes incorporated new 
technologies that presented a number of manufacturing challenges.  As a result, the service 
found it extremely difficult to estimate its costs.  In the face of such a massive investment—
and tough questions from the Congress—the Air Force wanted to be quite certain about its 
choices.  As a result, the service asked RAND to “examine all types of hot and cold war 
situations likely to occur in the near future,” to match each with “the most efficient and 
flexible strategies and weapons,” and to “forecast costs.”113  
The Air Force’s expansion also involved implementation of its “forward-basing” 
strategy that would literally contain the Soviet Union by surrounding it with Strategic Air 
Command (SAC) airbases.  The number of air wings was slated to increase from 40 to 110, 
and approximately 82 new airbases would be constructed.  In terms of manpower, forward-
basing required an increase in total service personnel of approximately 400 per cent.  
During peacetime, these bases would be operated below full strength, with approximately 
half of SAC’s strategic bomber force dispersed among them.  Upon receipt of strategic 
warning, however, SAC would begin operating under a deployment plan, code-named 
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“Reflex,” in which the entire U.S. bomber force would fully deploy to the forward bases 
and, within “several days,” begin combat sorties against Soviet targets.  RAND’s task was 
to examine the forward-based strategy, seek to improve on earlier Air Force analyses, and 
make recommendations about site selection, defensive measures, and costs.114    
Charged with directing the gigantic, multifaceted project, the economist David 
Novick began to scour RAND for all available personnel.  Wohlstetter, then still a 
consultant, was assigned to look at dispersal and “hardening” measures that the Air Force 
might take to mitigate the vulnerabilities of its air bases.  This represented a daunting task 
for Wohlstetter insofar he had no prior experience in military affairs or heavy construction.  
Moreover, he would have to do a large portion of the work single-handedly.  As a 
consultant, Wohlstetter had no authority to requisition internal resources or assign tasks to 
regular RAND employees.  Rather, he had to rely on cajoling and bargaining to gain 
assistance from engineers, physicists and other professionals—an approach that he 
described as “more seduction than rape.”115 
As a seducer, however, Wohlstetter was relatively successful.  He managed to secure 
significant assistance from several analysts from the Mathematics Group, Edward Quade, 
Henry Rowen, Alain Enthoven and Fred Hoffman.  Applied mathematicians Quade, Rowen 
and Enthoven were sought out by Wohlstetter to examine the sortie and probable attrition 
rates of U.S. strategic bombers in a conflict with the Soviet Union.  These rates would play 
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a crucial role in determining the location and defensive characteristics of the new SAC 
bases.116 
The difficulties Wohlstetter encountered in securing assistance may have also led to 
another, more serious problem.  In May of 1953, Novick received a call from the president 
of RAND, Frank Collbohm, asking if he was aware that Wohlstetter had drafted a summary 
of the air base study’s key findings (Summary Staff Report, R-244-S), and had briefed 
members of the Air Force’s Air Staff on it.  Collbohm was troubled by the material in 
Wohlstetter’s presentation, and did not want Wohlstetter to conduct further briefings until 
the data could be analyzed further.  Novick replied that he had approved neither the 
summary nor the briefing, and asked Collbohm to send him a copy of Wohlstetter’s report. 
The next day, Novick summoned Wohlstetter to his office to express his concerns 
about the veracity of the data contained in Wohlstetter’s summary.  “Albert,” Novick asked, 
“where did you get these numbers?”  Wohlstetter replied that he had gotten them from his 
secretary.  Upon questioning, the secretary told Novick that she had gotten the data from 
Wohlstetter.  Novick again called Wohlstetter to his office to inquire about the figures.  On 
this occasion, Wohlstetter replied that he had gotten the figures from Quade.  When Novick 
asked Quade about the data, however, Quade told Novick that the numbers must have come 
from Wohlstetter.  At this point, Novick, convinced that Wohlstetter had falsified his data, 
fired him.117 
Wohlstetter was not, however, prepared to end his career at RAND so quickly.  The 
next day, he made an early morning trip to the Los Angeles airport to meet Charles Hitch, 
who was returning from Europe.  Telling Hitch that Novick had “censored” his work, 
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Wohlstetter prevailed upon Hitch to come with him immediately to RAND to confront 
Novick.  Going to Novick’s office alone, Hitch heard his version of events and, apparently 
satisfied, departed for home and some much needed rest.  After Hitch had left, Novick 
called Wohlstetter to his office again and informed him in no uncertain terms that he was 
not being censored, but fired.  The matter seemed at an end.118 
Wohlstetter’s career at RAND did not, however, end with his termination by Novick.  
Although the historical record is murky, it seems that Lawrence Henderson, the chief of 
RAND’s Washington office, telephoned Hitch to protest Wohlstetter’s firing.  Wohlstetter 
had arranged to brief the Air Staff, and Henderson feared that explaining his departure at a 
critical juncture in the project would be quite awkward.  Hitch, apparently also not wanting 
to endanger RAND’s Air Force contract, informed Frank Collbohm that he wanted to re-hire 
Wohlstetter as a regular employee.  Although Collbohm objected, he and Hitch eventually 
reached a compromise whereby Wohlstetter would not conduct any further briefings until a 
complete draft of the final report was available, and not just the Summary Staff Report (R-
244-S) prepared by Wohlstetter.  As a result of this compromise, Wohlstetter was re-hired—
this time as a RAND employee—in June, 1953. 
Wohlstetter’s ability to avoid being sacked at RAND is a testament to his political 
instincts and ability, as well as a great deal of luck.  He had had the foresight to have himself 
assigned as the Washington briefer, perhaps aware that this position would bestow a 
measure of indispensability.  Of course, it also demonstrates a measure of presumption 
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insofar as Wohlstetter seems to have contacted Henderson without the knowledge of his 
direct superiors.  He had, it seemed, already learned something of bureaucratic politics. 119 
Despite the difficulties attendant to its completion, the final version of the air base 
study was presented to the Air Staff for review in October, 1953.  Entitled “Selection and 
Use of Strategic Airbases” the study compared the Air Force’s “Reflex” plan with three 
other systems: 1) a modified version of “Reflex” in which the bombers were positioned at 
the nearest of the foreign bases; 2) a system in which the bombers were based both abroad 
and within the continental U.S. and re-fueled in flight; 3) a continental U.S.-based system in 
which the bombers were re-fueled on the ground at overseas bases.  In a conclusion that 
seems counter-intuitive, Wohlstetter found that the third option would be cheaper by almost 
$9 billion.120 
More astonishing and significant than the cost figures was the degree to which the 
U.S. strategic bomber force was found to be vulnerable to a Soviet attack.  While studying 
the distribution of the SAC bomber force in the overseas bases, it became obvious to 
Wohlstetter rather quickly that the bombers were vulnerable to a preemptive Soviet strike.  
When the damage estimates of what aircraft and infrastructure could be expected to survive 
were considered, however, the results were shocking.  A Soviet attack, Wohlstetter 
concluded, would destroy anywhere from 60 to 85 per cent of America’s atomic delivery 
capability with only “small numbers of A-bombs.”  Moreover, the destruction to runways 
and re-fueling and maintenance facilities would be so complete that any aircraft that 
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managed to survive the initial attack would not be able to re-load and re-fuel at the overseas 
bases.121 
Although many of Wohlstetter’s RAND colleagues were dubious of his findings, 
checking and re-checking could find no fault with his analysis.  The Air Force, too, 
mistrusted his results and hastily assembled an ad hoc study group to verify his conclusions.  
Like the RAND team, they also found no errors.  Although the task of the “checkers” was 
complicated by the fact that many of Wohlstetter’s figures and formulae originated with 
SAC, with little or no explanation as to how the Air Force had arrived at them, the 
conclusions seemed valid.  Finding no mathematical errors, the Air Force asked for an 
explanation of his methodology. 
Wohlstetter’s unique conclusions were not, however, the result any unique 
methodology, but a result of his alteration of the premise of the basing study.  In a manner 
reminiscent of Cohen’s polarity theories, Wohlstetter managed to strip away the various 
“intuitive” assumptions that surrounded the problem.  His most basic alteration of the study’s 
premise was to assume that the Soviets would one day mount a surprise attack.  Proceeding 
from this premise, Wohlstetter began to look at costs and sortie rates based on time and 
distance.  The earlier Air Force analyses of “Reflex” had proceeded from the seemingly 
common-sense assumption that the sheer proximity to the Soviet Union of the forward 
foreign bases meant that they would be cheaper and result in more bombers over the targets.  
As a result, these earlier analyses tended to look for ways to improve conditions and 
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equipment at the forward bases, while completely overlooking the increasing vulnerability of 
the bomber force. 122 
Although Wohlstetter’s conclusions appeared to have undermined most of the 
operational assumptions upon which the forward-basing strategy rested, the Air Force did not 
elect to immediately abandon that strategy.  The primary obstacle to Air Force acceptance of 
the study’s recommendations was General Curtis LeMay, the commander of SAC.  LeMay 
opposed the removal of the SAC bomber force to the continental United States because he 
did not regard vulnerability as a problem.  SAC’s bombers would not await a Soviet strike 
against them before they took to the air.  Moreover, LeMay believed that relocation to the 
United States would greatly complicate the sort of World War II-style strategic bombing 
campaign that SAC had planned for against the Soviet Union.  LeMay did, however, move to 
reduce SAC’s vulnerability by developing a plan—which was never fully implemented—
whereby approximately one-half of the bomber fleet was to be kept on “ground alert” at all 
times.  SAC also partially instituted a plan whereby various nuclear-armed units were rotated 
among the overseas bases for “training.”  The idea here, of course, was to complicate Soviet 
targeting by conducting a sort of strategic “shell game,” in which the Soviets could never be 
sure exactly which air wings were armed with atomic weapons.123 
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Despite SAC’s initial lukewarm reaction to Wohlstetter’s work, the basing study represents a 
transformative event in the evolution of American strategic thought.  Wohlstetter’s study and 
its companion studies were the first serious consideration of “nuclear war-fighting,” or the 
use of nuclear weapons against a similarly armed enemy.  While there was, by the late 1940s, 
a burgeoning body of literature on how nuclear weapons might be used in war, the majority 
of these works focused on what SAC could do to the Soviet Union on a clear day.  Almost 
none of the earlier works took into account the incredible operational complexities involved 
in actually fighting a war with nuclear weapons. 
Similarly, almost no one took defensive measures, accidents, or equipment, 
communication and leadership failures into account.  The few authors that did address the 
problems inherent in nuclear operations, such as Bernard Brodie and Thomas Schelling, 
offered few prescriptions.  As a result, many began to suspect that, against a similarly armed 
enemy, nuclear weapons had no real political and military utility beyond mutual deterrence.  
As Harry Truman put it, “an atomic war is totally unthinkable for rational men.”  
Wohlstetter’s analysis, however, indicated that not only was nuclear war militarily 
“thinkable,” but also that striking first was the only route to victory.124 
The basing study was also a milestone in Albert Wohlstetter’s career.  From 1951 to 
1956, he delivered literally hundreds of briefings to policymakers, academics, military 
leaders and defense contractors.  Indeed, in one notable stretch of seven months, he delivered 
no less than ninety-two briefings.  In the process of conducting these presentations, 
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3.1 Albert Wohlstetter 
 
   
                Wohlstetter at RAND, 1958   Congressional testimony,    
                                         1975  
 
                 
                                                       
            Morris Raphael Cohen 
in his academic regalia as head of the Mathematics and Philosophy Department at City College of 
New York.  Wohlstetter’s graduate advisor, his fusion of anti-modernism and mathematical logic 
provided a model for Wohlstetter’s approach to strategic problems.  
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3.2 Wohlstetter at RAND 
 
The RAND Corporation in 1947 
  
 
General Maxwell Taylor (l) with Wohlstetter’s boss, Frank Collbohm, RAND, 1958 
 
Wohlstetter in his office at RAND 
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3.3 Wohlstetter and his Nuclear Family 
 
Albert Wohlstetter’s living room sometime in the 1960s 
L-R: Andrew Marshall, Daniel Ellsberg, Frank Trinkl, Wohlstetter, Roberta 
Wohlstetter. 
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Wohlstetter not only became personally identified with the issue of strategic vulnerability, 
but he also literally became the face of RAND within the defense establishment.  Tall, trim, 
impeccably dressed, and self-assured, he undoubtedly cut a striking figure in front of an 
audience.  Possessing an almost superhuman ability to talk for hours (a “monomaniacal 
monologuer,” according to one colleague), his presentations were, from all accounts, 
forceful, interesting and quite eloquent, as well as physically and mentally demanding.  
Wohlstetter, however, did not suffer critics gladly.  Hostile questions were likely to be 
dismissed curtly, or the questioner demolished with a barrage of logic and obscure facts that 
Wohlstetter would recite from memory.125 
 
Closing the Window of Vulnerability: Wohlstetter, Limited War and Counterforce 
Dwight Eisenhower had been in the White House barely a month when his 
administration began to take fire for its lack of a well-defined security policy.  The first 
significant criticism emanated from Senator Henry M. “Scoop” Jackson (D-WA), a member 
of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee.  
Chaired by Senator Russell B. Long (D-LA), the subcommittee decried the “excessive” cost 
and high vulnerability of U.S. air bases abroad.  Drawing heavily on Wohlstetter’s basing 
study, Long’s subcommittee prepared a public and well-publicized report that detailed U.S. 
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vulnerabilities.  The grim tenor of this report not only moved the issue to the top of the 
Armed Services Committee’s agenda, but also prompted a parallel investigation into SAC 
vulnerability in the House.126 
Despite appearances and congressional accusations, the Eisenhower Administration 
was not sitting on its hands.  Ike had come into office promising a New Look” at U.S. 
national security and had commissioned in February 1953 what was to be the first of several 
defense studies, “Project Solarium.”  Completed in December, “Project Solarium” resulted 
in what was to be the strategic centerpiece of the Eisenhower Administration’s security 
policy: Massive Retaliation.  First articulated by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on 
January 12, 1954, Massive Retaliation put the Soviets on notice that any aggression on their 
part would potentially be met by a U.S. nuclear strike.  Where the nuclear blow would fall 
or in response to what Soviet actions was not spelled out but left intentionally vague.  The 
United States, Dulles said, would “reserve the right to retaliate in places and with means of 
our own choosing.”127 
The articulation and subsequent elaborations of Massive Retaliation did little to 
silence the administration’s critics.  Criticism of Massive Retaliation became a veritable 
cottage industry within American and British academia, largely on the grounds that it 
simply was not credible to threaten nuclear war over any intrusion upon the “Free World.”  
Congressional critics took a different tack, arguing that the administration was simply not 
doing enough to protect the nation.  Various Democrats (and at least one Republican) 
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seeking to establish themselves as defense experts, initiated a series of hearings on various 
aspects of national security policy.  Some explored continental defense and the state of 
missile technology.  Other hearings, reflecting the influence of Wohlstetter’s RAND 
colleague, Herman Kahn, looked into civil defense and post-nuclear war conditions.  The 
most prominent investigation, however, was Symington’s “bomber gap” hearings.  
Exploring the possibility that the Soviets were producing their “Bear” and “Bison” bombers 
much faster than the United States was building the B-52, the subcommittee generated a 
great deal of newsprint and presidential bile, but very little substantive information.128 
The Congress was not, however, the only branch of government conducting 
investigations.  Throughout Eisenhower’s two terms, the president authorized a number of 
studies by both government agencies and private consultants—chartered as presidential 
“panels” and “committees”—to look into various aspects of U.S. national security.    In the 
spring of 1957 one of these agencies, the Federal Civilian Defense Administration (FCDA), 
submitted a remarkable and disturbing report to the White House.  The United States, the 
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FCDA report stated, would lose somewhere between 70-90 per cent of its population and 
100 per cent of its industrial base if the Soviet Union launched a nuclear attack against the 
nation.  In order to prevent such a catastrophic loss of life, the agency recommended that 
the government construct a system of blast shelters for the population at a cost of 
approximately $40-$50 billion.129  
The FCDA report presented Eisenhower with a dilemma.  The cost of constructing a 
national system of blast shelters was, as Ike knew, prohibitive.  Indeed, the $40 billion 
price-tag was roughly equivalent to one-quarter of the entire U.S. defense budget.  
Sensitized by the Democrats’ charges, the president was not, however, willing to simply 
ignore the FCDA findings.   In order to resolve the quandary, Eisenhower ordered his 
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Robert Cutler, to form a presidential 
investigatory panel, designated the Security Resources Panel, to “form a broad-brush 
opinion of the relative values of various active and passive measures to protect the civil 
population in case of nuclear attack.”130   
As chairman of the panel, the president selected H. Rowan Gaither.  Although 
Gaither, a prominent San Francisco attorney, had never served in government, he was well-
versed in national security affairs and grasped the gravity of the issues at stake.  Gaither 
was also a close personal friend of Eisenhower’s and a man that the president believed 
could be relied upon to present an objective report.  As chairman of the board of the RAND 
Corporation and president of the Ford Foundation, Gaither not only had knowledge of, and 
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access to, some of the finest minds in the country, he also had the prestige and professional 
leverage to enlist their assistance.  In less than a month, Gaither, had recruited former MIT 
faculty member, Robert C. Sprague, former Deputy Defense Secretary William C. Foster, 
and a large scientific, engineering and economic staff borrowed from MIT, the Institute for 
Defense Analysis and RAND.  Paul Nitze, the former director of the State Department’s 
Policy Planning Staff and the author of NSC-68, and Colonel George A. Lincoln of West 
Point were added as advisors.131 
Thus constituted, the Security Resources Panel of the President’s Science Advisory 
Committee (or the “Gaither Committee,” as it was informally known), set about its work in 
the summer of 1957.  The Panel’s work, however, was almost immediately interrupted by a 
sudden illness that landed Gaither in the hospital.  In the interim Nitze and Foster insisted to 
Sprague (who was serving as acting director) that the Panel broaden its inquiry to include 
almost every aspect of national security policy, despite Cutler’s explicit injunction that “it 
should be clearly understood that the Panel’s mission does not extend to a detailed 
examination of national security policies and programs for the purpose of recommending 
specific modifications in such policies or programs.”  Sprague agreed to broaden the 
Panel’s research purview with the understanding that the final report would, however, be 
subject to Gaither’s approval.  
Upon his return, Gaither contacted Wohlstetter to ask him his opinion of broadening 
the study.  Wohlstetter proposed that the committee consider the vulnerability of U.S. 
                                                 
131
 Morton H. Halperin, “The Gaither Committee and the Policy Process,” World Politics 13, 3 (April 1961): 
362. 
 
 117 
strategic forces.  Gaither not only accepted Wohlstetter’s suggestion, but also asked him to 
consult on the study.  Wohlstetter agreed and briefed members of the Panel extensively.132 
The influence of Wohlstetter’s thought was evident in the Gaither Committee’s final 
report, which appeared in the fall of 1957 as “Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age.”  
The report did address its original task by considering civil defense as well as the 
capabilities of U.S. conventional forces, the structure of the Defense Department and the 
Soviet economy.  But the main focus was on the vulnerability of U.S. strategic forces.  
SAC, the committee found, was “seriously vulnerable” to a surprise attack.  Over the next 
two years, however, this vulnerability would only increase as the Soviet Union began to 
deploy “a significant ICBM delivery capability with megaton warheads.”  By late 1959, the 
Gaither Report concluded, “SAC would be completely vulnerable” to a Soviet attack.133 
In order to prevent this “window of vulnerability” from opening, the Gaither 
Committee made several recommendations, some of which were not new, but had not 
previously been integrated into a comprehensive strategy.  Gaither recommended, for 
instance, that the U.S. bomber force should be relocated to the United States.  While this 
echoed Wohlstetter’s basing study, Gaither integrated some of the recommendations that 
the Air Force had submitted prior to the basing study, such as deploying the bomber force 
in underground, steel-reinforced concrete hangars, and ringing the air bases with the Nike-
Hercules surface-to-air missile system.  The committee’s report also recommended that the 
government take steps to enhance strategic intelligence and warning.   
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Although the consideration of offensive capabilities had not been part of the Gaither 
committee’s charter, the report also made recommendations for improving U.S. striking 
power.  These recommendations, however, went beyond what seemed to sufficient for 
simple deterrence.  While the CIA was estimating that the Soviet Union would have no 
more than a dozen intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) operational by 1961, Gaither 
advised that the Atlas and Titan missile programs be expanded from the approximately 60 
missiles programmed, to something on the order of 800.  The still-developmental Polaris 
and Minuteman programs, the report further advised, should be significantly accelerated.  If 
there was to be a vulnerability problem in the next few years, the Gaither Committee 
seemed intent on ensuring that it was a Soviet vulnerability problem.  The total cost for 
these and the Gaither Panel’s other recommendations: an additional $60 billion over the 
next five years.134  
Despite the enormous costs projected by the Gaither Report, the president was 
impressed by the sense of crisis that the report conveyed.  According to Eisenhower’s 
science advisor and close friend, Dr. James Killian, Ike now seemed “haunted” by the 
possibility of a Soviet surprise attack.  Eisenhower, however, only authorized one 
significant new defensive measure: the acceleration of the enhanced over-the-horizon radar 
system known as the “Ballistic Missile Early Warning System” (BMEWS).  The president’s 
main response was the acceleration of the Titan, Atlas, Minuteman and Polaris missile 
programs, although not to the degree recommended by the Gaither Committee.  Eisenhower 
also authorized the Defense Secretary McElroy to initiate planning for the development of a 
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single, integrated targeting plan under the direction of SAC command in Omaha, and 
pressed forward with the development of the Nike anti-missile missile system.135 
Eisenhower also sought to moderate the problem of surprise attack through 
diplomacy.  In January 1958, Eisenhower—over the objections of the Joint Chiefs and the 
Defense Department—proposed that the United States, the Soviet Union and its Eastern 
bloc allies, as well as Britain, Canada, Italy and France, meet to discuss surprise attack.  
The talks, the president suggested, could take place at a special conference within the 
context of the nuclear test ban negotiations already scheduled for that summer in Geneva.  
The Soviet response was favorable, if characteristically slow, with the acceptance note 
arriving in Washington on September 15.  With the conference slated to begin on 
November 10, Secretary of Defense McElroy, Secretary of State Dulles and Eisenhower’s 
chief science advisor, James Killian, began to quickly assemble a team of nuclear “experts.”  
William C. Foster, late of the Gaither Committee was selected to head the American 
delegation.  Foster, in turn, prevailed upon Wohlstetter to serve as the deputy chief 
scientific advisor.136   
As the U.S. delegation convened in Washington in the fall of 1958 to prepare 
hurriedly for the Geneva talks, two papers circulated among the delegates that would define 
American strategic thought for the next fifty years.  The first of these, “Space 
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‘Disarmament,’ by the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) consultant Lewis C. Bohn, was 
a manifestation of an emerging school of thought—the “Charles River” school—that 
viewed stability as the key to avoiding surprise attack.  Named for its association with 
Henry Kissinger of Harvard and Thomas Schelling of MIT (institutions along the banks of 
the Charles River), the Charles River school emphasized the ability to ride out an initial 
blow and inflict unacceptable damage on the enemy.  Under the Charles River concept of 
stability, the threat of mutual destruction, or what would come to be called “mutual assured 
destruction” (MAD) by the popular press, would obtain as long as both sides maintained 
reasonably secure strategic forces (i.e., forces capable of surviving an attack and 
retaliating).  The key to preventing surprise attack, therefore, would be to limit the number 
and types of arms.  High numbers greatly increased the chance of accidents, Bohm argued.  
Similarly, Bohn maintained that counterforce weapons (i.e., weapons aimed at the other 
side’s weapons) were destabilizing insofar as they placed a premium on striking first, lest 
one’s weapons be destroyed on the ground.137  
As a counterpoint to Bohn, Wohlstetter circulated a paper—later published as “The 
Delicate Balance of Terror”—that was to serve as the foundation for his evolving concept of 
nuclear war-fighting.  Although it offered no explication as to precisely how a nuclear war 
might be fought to a politically significant victory, “The Delicate Balance” undercut the 
Charles River doctrine of stable deterrence through mutual assured destruction.  
Wohlstetter’s thesis in this regard was that the strategic balance was not stable, but a 
precarious situation. The weapons did not, in and of themselves “automatically” create a state 
of mutual deterrence.  Rather, deterrence emerged from the interplay of a range of complex 
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factors, such as force structure, dispersal, location, security, doctrine, etc.  Insofar as it was 
unlikely arms control would ever be able to address all of these factors simultaneously, one 
might be actually be doing more harm than good by concluding agreements that night upset 
the delicate balance upon which deterrence rested.   
Of the factors which upheld deterrence, the invulnerability of the strategic force was 
the most important in Wohlstetter’s view.  Vulnerable forces on both sides would create an 
extremely unstable situation “not unlike the old-fashioned Western gun duel” where striking 
first would be the only way to survive.  According to Wohlstetter, the choices made by U.S. 
planners in the areas of weapon acquisition and strategic doctrine would be much more 
crucial to maintaining deterrence.  In regard to weapon acquisition, Wohlstetter details six 
requirements that planners should meet before considering future weapon-systems. 
Wohlstetter offered no discussion of strategic doctrine in his paper.  He demurs, 
saying only that “a sufficient military policy cannot be discussed in detail here.”  This 
reticence to discuss doctrine appears a curious development in light of its obvious importance 
to his thinking about deterrence.  Although Wohlstetter probably knew that his argument 
about the importance of vulnerability would inevitably lead to a debate over doctrine, he 
probably also realized that it was not a question likely to be taken up in Geneva for military 
and political reasons.  It is possible, nevertheless, to discern what he considers to be the main 
flaw of existing doctrine and its remedy.138  
Wohlstetter believed that any U.S. strategic doctrine dependent on assured destruction 
was illogical.  He hints at this illogicality in a brief discussion of the likelihood of a general 
Soviet-American war.  In this discussion, Wohlstetter concluded that the threat of a massive 
                                                 
138
 Albert Wohlstetter, P-1472: The Delicate Balance of Terror, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1958); “The Delicate 
Balance of Terror,” Foreign Affairs, 37, 2 (Winter 1958/59): 211- 217, 218-220, 232. 
 
 122 
attack on Russian cities would not deter the Soviets because of their disregard for human life.  
“Russian casualties in World War II,” Wohlstetter observed, “were 20,000,000.  Yet Russia 
recovered extremely well from this catastrophe.”  A much more logical choice, Wohlstetter 
would argue the next year, would be to re-orient U.S. strategic doctrine and force structure 
toward counterforce—and by implication, preemption—in order to target that which the 
Soviet leadership valued above all else, its “military power and the means of domination.”139 
Wohlstetter’s argument about the insufficiency of U.S. strategic doctrine rested on a 
view of the Soviets that was distinctly at odds with that of most other strategists of the time.  
Almost every other American, British and French strategist predicated their thinking on the 
assumption that the Soviets were rational enemies.  This concept of rationality extended, in 
most cases, beyond the precise meaning of the word to encompass the belief that the Soviet 
leadership valued, to some degree, the lives of the population.  Even Kissinger, whose 
characterization of the Soviet leadership tended toward caricature, did not attribute to them 
sufficient callousness to sacrifice millions of Soviet citizens for political and military ends.  
Indeed, some of Wohlstetter’s RAND colleagues perceived a degree of military imbalance in 
the Soviet leadership’s preference for large-scale bomb shelter building programs.140  
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Wohlstetter’s view of the Soviets is a vivid example of how anti-modernist 
philosophy informed his thought.  As adherents of the most extreme form of modernity, 
Communism, the Soviets could be expected, in the anti-modernist view, to exhibit extreme 
relativism in their behavior.  In this regard, a conscious decision to sacrifice millions of 
Russians in a nuclear war for a political end would constitute an almost complete inability to 
distinguish between good and evil.  In terms of strategy, the Soviets’ complete estrangement 
from the most basic of values meant that any deterrent scheme that rested on a countervalue 
threat was useless.  The Soviets’ total disregard for human life also meant that the Soviet 
leaders would not be constrained by any moral considerations in taking the decision to launch 
missiles against the United States. 
Wohlstetter’s motivation in making this claim is, of course, open to interpretation.  It 
may have been that Wohlstetter saw the example of 20 million Russian dead as a device to 
undercut the main argument against a war-fighting strategy.  After all, it is very likely that he 
was aware that the Soviets did not willingly sacrifice millions in World War II.  It is also 
likely that Wohlstetter realized that the Soviet losses were incurred over time and the 
leadership had no idea as to the eventual total.  At least one contemporary observer, however, 
did not perceive his example as a device.  The British operations researcher, P.M.S. Blackett 
noted the pronounced “moral asymmetry” in Wohlstetter’s view of the Soviets and believed 
it to be genuine.141 
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Thus informed by these two competing views of the strategic environment, the 
American delegation prepared to leave for Geneva.  On the eve of departure, however, 
Foster received instructions that the discussions in Geneva would be limited to “technical 
matters” of the sort proposed by Wohlstetter.  National Security Advisor Gray informed 
Foster that he, General Twining (recently appointed chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), 
Defense Secretary McElroy, and Secretary of State Dulles were in agreement that the 
delegation would not be authorized to discuss the limitation or cancellation of any U.S. 
weapons programs.  Rather, the delegation’s charter was limited to “identifying and 
defining the instruments of surprise attack and detection.”  More specifically, they were to 
explore what measures could be implemented to enhance the command and control of 
strategic bombers and missiles, communications, and the strategic implications of existing 
and planned offensive and defensive systems.142  
Once in Geneva, “The Conference of Experts for the Study of Possible Measures 
Which Might Be Helpful in Preventing Surprise Attack” seemed that it might founder on 
the very first day.  The Soviets insisted on discussing specific disarmament and limitation 
schemes, something the U.S. delegation had no authority to do.  After some cajoling, 
however, the Soviets relented and agreed to actually discuss ways to prevent surprise attack.  
In the course of these discussions, Wohlstetter’s ideas were at the fore.  The Soviets 
concurred with his view that there could be instances in which a nuclear attack was not 
necessarily an insane act, but a rational, calculated military decision.  They also came to 
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accept Wohlstetter’s contention that the strategic balance was precarious, and made all the 
more so by advancing technology and the increasing complexity of command and control. 
Other national delegations, however, did not so readily accept his contention that 
maintaining an invulnerable deterrent in the face of growing counterforce capabilities was 
the central strategic problem of the nuclear age.  The French, in particular, were opposed.  
An invulnerable American missile force meant that cities—European cities—could become 
the primary Soviet targets.  Cities, they feared could be “traded” in tit-for-tat exchanges in a 
“limited war” scenario.  As a result, the French delegation termed Wohlstetter’s ideas 
“pernicious.”  Unknown to the French, their opinion converged with that of the Eisenhower 
Administration itself.  Dubious of the contention that any war with the Soviet Union could 
be limited in any fashion, the Eisenhower Administration remained committed to Massive 
Retaliation.143 
 
The Strategic Guru: Wohlstetter and His Nuclear Family 
By the time of the Geneva Conference, Wohlstetter had established a reputation 
within RAND as a first-rate strategic thinker and one of its most valuable assets in selling 
the corporation’s services.  Bright, forceful and well-connected within the defense 
community, Wohlstetter possessed many of the attributes of a successful salesman.  As 
RAND’s management undoubtedly realized, his work translated into millions of dollars in 
government contracts.  According to RAND physicist Ernst Plessett, “as far as RAND’s 
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management was concerned, Wohlstetter could walk on water.”  This high regard apparently 
was not, however, mutual.  Wohlstetter’s frequent briefings to the RAND board of trustees 
and the management committee were characterized, Plessett observed, by a “shocking 
arrogance.”144   
Understandably anxious to keep such a valuable employee happy, in 1956 RAND 
management created what was to be the main incubator of the legend of neoconservative 
strategic expertise and competence: the Strategic Air Power Research Group (SAPR).  As 
director of the semi-autonomous group, Wohlstetter quickly built SAPR into a force to be 
reckoned with inside of RAND.  Well-funded and staffed by some of the corporation’s most 
gifted thinkers, such as Henry Rowen, Fred Iklé, Andrew Marshall,  William Kaufmann, 
Daniel Ellsberg, Alain Enthoven and James Digby, Wohlstetter’s group was responsible for 
developing several operational innovations.  The group, for example, developed the famous 
“fail-safe” mission concept and the “Permissive Action Link” (PALS) control system.  A 
command and control system, the “fail-safe” scheme required U.S. strategic bombers to 
abort any mission and return to base unless they received a specific coded message at a pre-
designated point along their attack route.  The PALS, meanwhile, was an actual device that 
employed encrypted signals to secure nuclear weapons against unauthorized launch and/or 
detonation.145 
As Wohlstetter’s star rose within RAND, he was perceived by some to be arrogant, 
abrasive, and something of an empire-builder.  Although this perception may in part be 
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attributable to professional jealousy, Wohlstetter’s working style probably did little to allay 
such views.  Ensconced in a large office, painted and furnished in all white, he generally 
took little interest in the projects and opinions of others—unless they seemed to impinge on 
his intellectual or bureaucratic turf.  Economist and RAND vice-president Gus Shubert 
maintained that Wohlstetter had little compunction about publicly disparaging his 
colleagues.  Shubert has recalled, for instance, that Wohlstetter interrupted a meeting 
between the two to loudly accuse his friend and colleague, Herman Kahn, of “poaching” his 
ideas for a paper Kahn was writing.146 
Wohlstetter also seems to have also had a quite low regard for his colleagues in the 
other disciplines.  He seems to have been particularly averse to the physicists, engineers and 
other “hard” scientists that were working on strategic issues.  The engineer and guidance 
expert, Edward Barlow felt that Wohlstetter regarded scientists to be “hardware people 
trying to work outside their specialty.”  Wohlstetter’s view of his colleagues seems to have 
been reciprocated, as many of them held less-than-complimentary opinions of him.  RAND 
physicists Ernst Plessett and Bruno Augenstein regarded Wohlstetter as “arrogant” and “a 
bullshitter,” respectively, while Roman Kolkowicz characterized him as “ruthless and 
nasty.”147 
Within his inner circle of friends and associates, Wohlstetter appears to have been 
something of a benevolent autocrat.  Renowned for their gourmet tastes, the Wohlstetters 
threw lavish parties, complete with the best in food and drink, at their glamorous, bamboo-
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surrounded Hollywood Hills home.  The evening entertainment might consist of dancing or 
classical music or, as was once the case, an attempt to calculate Herman Kahn’s 
considerable weight by estimating how much water his gigantic girth displaced in the 
swimming pool.  At other times, the evenings were marred by Albert’s long-winded 
assessments of “an interesting little wine” that he had encountered, or a particularly tasty 
dish that he had enjoyed in Washington.  The guests, apparently, were also expected to 
compliment their hosts’ exquisite tastes.  Indeed, one guest recalled that, amid Wohlstetter’s 
hospitality, the guests were always expected to “praise his bamboo.”148    
Wohlstetter’s relationship with the younger associates within his research group, 
however, appears to have bordered on a cult of personality.  Continuously seeking to 
enhance the intellectual firepower of the group, Wohlstetter would seek out bright young 
employees for potential recruitment.  Usually, the young targets were swayed by 
Wohlstetter’s considerable charisma and reputation within the strategic community.  
Wohlstetter protégés, Frank Trinkl, David McGarvey and Daniel Ellsberg (whom 
Wohlstetter hired in 1959), have conceded that they looked upon him as a father-figure.  
Ellsberg, in particular, has written that the group was like a family, with Henry Rowen (the 
deputy director of the group), “an older brother, and Albert, my father.”149 
The relationships between the analysts within the Strategic Airpower Group were so 
close and insular that they became something of a curiosity at RAND.  Barlow, for instance, 
characterized the SAPR analysts as Wohlstetter’s “followers,” rather than his subordinates.  
Bernard Brodie, perhaps the only American strategic analyst whose influence within RAND 
                                                 
148
 Wells, p. 134-135; On Not Confusing Ourselves: Essays in Honor of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, ed. 
Andrew Marshall, J.J. Martin and Henry S. Rowen (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 90. 
 
149
 Wells, p.135. 
 
 129 
approached Wohlstetter’s, also noted the group’s extraordinary devotion to Wohlstetter.  
Brodie characterized the Wohlstetter group as “exhibiting a marked degree of personal and 
intellectual separation from most members of that organization [i.e., RAND].”  Brodie and 
others at RAND was also astounded at the readiness of members of the group to give 
Wohlstetter credit for their work or ideas.  Fred Iklé, for instance, had conceived of PALS 
as a way of preventing nuclear accidents, yet he and others of the group felt that Wohlstetter 
deserved the credit.  Similarly, during the large multi-year, interdisciplinary Strategic 
Offensive Forces Study, Wohlstetter, according to Barlow, “completely divorced himself 
from the study,” even though he was officially its deputy director.  Barlow was thus 
astounded when Enthoven and Ellsberg, who had performed the lion’s share of the work, 
credited Wohlstetter for the SAPR group’s contribution.150 
As the 1950s drew to a close, Wohlstetter had established a reputation within the 
U.S. defense community as one of the nation’s preeminent nuclear strategists.  Despite the 
fact that his literary output included almost no public materials, his ideas were widely 
disseminated through his service as a consultant to two presidential commissions (Killian 
and Gaither), a senatorial staff (Jackson), a delegate to an international arms control 
convention (the Surprise Attack Conference) and, as always, his ceaseless briefings to 
military planners, congressional staffers and academic seminars.  His work had also become 
a sort of touchstone for the counterforce proponents of the Air Force as they sparred with the 
Army and Navy over the outlines of the defense budget, as well as for various critics of the 
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Eisenhower Administration.  Indeed, he seemed to relish the fight and he would later say 
that he was driven by an innate taste for “coming down at right angles to orthodoxy.”151 
Wohlstetter’s main challenge to “orthodoxy” during this period involved warning of 
two crises: one strategic and one cultural.  In regard to the strategic crisis, he had become 
convinced in the wake of the Geneva Conference that the Soviet Union would not tolerate a 
state of perpetual strategic inferiority.  Whether out of a preference for Kennedy in the 
upcoming election, out a genuine sense of alarm or both, Wohlstetter began to warn of a 
sudden and substantial increase in Soviet strategic power and call for an alternative to 
Massive Retaliation.  Wohlstetter’s warning about growing Soviet power appeared most 
prominently in a revision of “The Delicate Balance,” published in the journal, Foreign 
Affairs: 
We must expect a vast increase in the weight of attack the Soviets can deliver 
without warning, and the growth of a significant Russian capability for an 
essentially warningless attack.  As a result, strategic deterrence, while 
feasible, will be extremely difficult to achieve, and at critical junctures in the 
1960s we may not have the power to deter attack. 
 
By 1960, a sense of crisis and urgency began to coalesce within RAND.  There was, 
according to Ellsberg, a feeling that the United States was “on a collision course” with the 
Soviet Union.  This feeling was reinforced by the SAPR Group’s initiation of a study of 
war-fighting strategies.152 
 In addition to the crisis on the strategic plane, Wohlstetter began to perceive a crisis 
within American society and culture.  There was, he believed, a generalized loss of moral 
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clarity afflicting the nation similar to that diagnosed by the anti-modernist scholars of the 
time.  Also like the anti-modernists of academia, Wohlstetter attributed this loss of moral 
clarity to modernity.  More specifically, he detected a deleterious influence amid the 
pressures and perceptions generated by consumerism, popular culture and a desire for 
comfort.  On the political plane, this loss of moral clarity translated into a loss of national 
purpose and a willingness to abdicate international responsibilities.  America, Wohlstetter 
asserted, had once believed that “negotiations with the Communists are futile, if not 
treasonable, and that liberation of the satellites should come first.”  Now, however, “many 
of us have staked enormous hopes on the possibility of concluding broad agreements with 
the Russians soon, and our resolution to defend parts of the free world against Communist 
aggression has become subject to doubt . . . the Ghost of Paris has displaced the Spirit of 
Camp David and the Spirit of Geneva.”153 
Although it is unclear what prompted Wohlstetter’s foray into philosophy and the 
state of American culture, his new investigations coincided with the beginning of the end of 
his career at RAND.  The Air Force’s interest in and need for large-scale studies in strategy, 
physics and engineering had begun to wane as the service itself acquired the necessary 
expertise.  As a result, in 1957 RAND’s leadership began to make an effort to acquire a 
more varied clientele.  This effort was accompanied by other internal changes instituted by 
RAND’s long-time president, Frank Collbohm.  Budgets for the various working groups, 
for example, were now to be drawn up on the basis of “pipelines,” or projections of 
revenue.  As a result, many of the older departments that had traditionally been used as in-
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house resources, but had few projects of their own “in the pipeline,” found their resources 
reduced or terminated altogether.  The Mathematics Department, for example, was slated 
for disbandment in 1961.  Accounting methods were also standardized across the various 
units and employee reporting requirements for billing purposes were tightened.  These 
changes made it much more difficult for project managers to “borrow” human resources 
from other units, and for employees to initiate projects out of personal interest. 
As a result of these changes, many of the older employees grew disgruntled.  
Wohlstetter and Kahn preferred working on projects that they themselves had conceived 
within their own autonomous groups.  After the preliminary work had been done, they 
would then embark on a briefing tour to find clients willing to subsidize the project to 
completion.  Now, however, with the internal changes at RAND, it was hardly possible to 
operate in this fashion.  In February 1960, Wohlstetter sent Collbohm a sixty-nine page 
memorandum, signed by a number of other RAND employees, outlining his grievances.  
Collbohm did not respond, and Wohlstetter and many of the other signatories decided that 
the time had come to leave RAND.  In March, Wohlstetter asked for and received a six-
month leave of absence which he subsequently spent as a resident scholar at the Council on 
Foreign Relations.  Although he did not officially resign until January 1, 1963, he was never 
to return to RAND.  As for the SAPR Group, Wohlstetter, Dorothy Fosdick (the subject of 
the next chapter) and Gen. Maxwell Taylor arranged for the group to move en masse into 
government service.154 
This move into government was a significant moment in the history of 
neoconservatism insofar as it marked the beginning of the legend of neoconservative 
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strategic expertise.  Although not every member of SAPR could be characterized as a 
nascent or eventual neoconservative, the association with Wohlstetter and his thought 
proved to be a strong one.  This association was reinforced (as we shall see in the next 
chapter) by their almost immediate impact on U.S. national security policy. 
 
Chicago: Thucydides and Nuclear Strategy 
The three main themes of Wohlstetter’s career—strategy, politics and philosophy—
seemed to converge during his brief, but eventful career as a professor of political science at 
the University of Chicago.  During his time at Chicago, Wohlstetter continued to refine his 
strategic thought through his teaching and periodic work as a government consultant.  He 
also continued to recruit new devotees and add to the cohort of neoconservatives that would 
eventually comprise the body of the movement within the national security establishment.  
As for his nascent interest in the national moral fabric, Wohlstetter would find philosophy 
very much a part of his academic career.  
Philosophy, in fact, was a significant factor in his hiring.  Although he had neither 
contemplated nor sought an academic position, Leonard Binder, the chairman of the 
Political Science Department believed Wohlstetter could be a valuable asset to the 
department’s quantitative reputation.  Since the end of World War II, quantitative 
methodologies had steadily displaced normative analysis in the field, but Chicago still 
lagged behind as a result of the influence of Leo Strauss within the department.  Although 
Chicago’s Political Science department was, to be sure, still one of the more prestigious in 
the nation—home to such august figures as Morton Kaplan, Hans Morgenthau and Binder 
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himself—even their presence had not been enough to displace Strauss’s normative political 
philosophy.155 
In early 1963, Kaplan learned that Wohlstetter had left RAND and began to lobby 
for his hiring.  Kaplan believed that a man of Wohlstetter’s talents and charisma could not 
only serve as a formidable counterbalance to the Straussian influence within the 
department, but also reinforce Kaplan in his in his bid to displace Morgenthau as head of 
the Committee on International Relations.  Binder, for his part, agreed with Kaplan that 
Wohlstetter could help tilt the department away from the normative perspective.  As a 
result, Binder made Wohlstetter an offer in the summer of 1963 for a tenure-track position.  
Wohlstetter accepted.156 
Wohlstetter’s career at the University of Chicago began in the fall of 1964, but 
Binder was soon disappointed.  Wohlstetter’s presence did little to offset Strauss’s influence 
in the department.  Indeed, as time went on, Wohlstetter and Strauss became closer.  
“Chicago was a place,” Wohlstetter has maintained, “where, much more than in any other 
universities I’ve seen, it’s easy for professors to get to see each other.”  Although their 
interests were quite different, Wohlstetter was quite conversant in political theory as a result 
of his early experiences with Cohen and the Fieldites, and he and Strauss spoke often.  As 
the United States involvement in Vietnam expanded during the 1960s, Wohlstetter and 
Strauss drew closer.  Along with Kaplan and Nathan Leites, a former RAND analyst who 
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pioneered psycho-political analysis of the Soviet leadership, they formed the core of the 
pro-war bloc within the political science department.157   
As if to cement his place in the normative faction within the Political Science 
Department, Wohlstetter became tangentially involved in the two-front conflict with the 
behavioralists and the New Left.  While Strauss was engaged in his final intellectual 
campaign against the New Left political theorists Wolin and Schaar, Wohlstetter was 
engaged with the British scientists, C.P. Snow and P.M.S. Blackett.  Angered by Blackett’s 
criticism of U.S. strategic thought as militaristic and Snow’s contention that nuclear 
strategy should be guided by natural scientists rather than “professional” strategists, 
Wohlstetter launched a broadside in the journal Foreign Affairs. There he castigated all 
empirical scientists for their pretensions to prescience and their “value-neutral” perspective.  
Examining various pronouncements that had emanated from the scientific community since 
the end of World War II, Wohlstetter characterized their dire warnings about nuclear war-
fighting and arms control as a false choice between “annihilation on one hand, or a paradise 
on Earth.”158  
Wohlstetter also directed some of his fire toward those realists who argued that 
America was overextended in its political and military commitments.  In two papers written 
in the late 1960s, Wohlstetter argues that the realist view which has held sway in the West 
since “Hobbes and Rousseau had defined the anarchy of sovereign independent states as a 
state of war,” is no longer a sufficient conceptual framework for predicting and describing 
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the behavior of states.  One reason for this insufficiency, he maintains, is that the traditional 
realist emphasis on national interests is almost always inextricably bound up with relativist 
assumptions about time, distance and costs.  As a result, realist analyses often create false 
choices and/or fail to fully appreciate the impact (or potential impact) of new technologies.  
Strategic planning, in turn, suffers as reflexive assumptions are incorporated into strategy 
and policy.   
In order to illustrate how reflexive relativism skews decision-making, Wohlstetter 
dissected two “intuitive” assumptions that he believed had led to misguided perceptions 
about the strategic environment.  The first was the assumption (that he attributes to George 
Kennan) that "the effectiveness of the power radiated from any national center decreases in 
proportion to the distance involved."  Wohlstetter demonstrated that new jet transports 
allowed America to airlift four times as much military equipment the 8500 miles from the 
U.S. to the Thai border as China could transport to the Laotian border from 450 miles away.  
Similarly, Wohlstetter pointed out that, despite the popular mythology of an “ever-
accelerating spiral in arms budgets” and declining security, advances in guidance 
technology and manufacturing techniques had allowed the costs of strategic missiles to 
decline by 40 per cent over the last four years. 
To gain a clearer picture of objective reality, Wohlstetter called for the development 
of analytical methodology that fused mathematical modeling and knowledge of the values 
and political preferences of various national actors.  Although he does not claim that his 
new approach is a finished methodology, Wohlstetter suggests that his new approach would 
involve an understanding of the “structural certainties” (or national character) and 
objectives of states.  Combined with some sense of the probable trajectories of 
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“transformative” technologies, it would be possible to formulate an effective predictive 
methodology.159 
Wohlstetter further refined his strategic thought in the classroom.  He developed a 
course entitled “Classical Strategy and Nuclear War.”  A course that began with a study of 
Thucydides and used the Greek’s insights as a theme throughout, the course was often 
abandoned by Wohlstetter for consulting engagements in Washington.  Despite his infrequent 
presence on campus, Wohlstetter still managed to attract a number of able students who went 
on to careers within the government bureaucracy.  Among these students was the son of his 
old friend Jacob Wolfowitz, Paul Wolfowitz.  He also recruited to Political Science a young 
Afghani, Zalmay Khalilzad.  In addition to these young men, Wohlstetter supervised 
something on the order of fifteen Ph.D. students during his seven years at Chicago.  In the 
history of neoconservatism, these students represent the main part of the generation that 
would man the bureaucratic ramparts of the Reagan Administration in the 1980s, and carry 
the movement through to the advent of the George W. Bush Administration.  In 1968, 
however, they were reinforcements for the coming battle with Nixon Administration over 
détente and arms control.160 
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Chapter 4 
Neoconservatism as Policy: Dorothy Fosdick and the Transformation of U.S. National 
Security Policy 
 
Maynard Robinson screamed as his shirt burst into flame.  An experienced Maine 
lobsterman, Robinson had been working on his boat engine off Southport when an accidental 
spark ignited the gasoline and oil on his hands and quickly spread to his clothing.  Robinson, 
however, was fortunate on this day.  Twenty-three year old Dorothy Fosdick had been sailing 
in the area when Robinson’s screams and the smoke from his burning boat attracted her 
attention.  Pulling her small launch Vagabond alongside the lobster boat, she doused the fire, 
carried the injured man to her boat and raced toward shore to seek medical attention for 
Robinson.161 
Dorothy Fosdick’s rescue mission off Southport in the summer of 1937 foreshadowed 
a career that was, seemingly, a series of rescue missions.  Over the course of her long career 
in government, Fosdick participated in almost every significant U.S. foreign and security 
policy development from 1945 until the 1980s.  As the first woman to serve on the State 
Department’s Policy Planning Staff, Fosdick participated in the shaping of the Marshall Plan 
and NSC-68.  As chief of staff to Senator Henry M. “Scoop” Jackson in the 1950s and 1960s, 
she helped rescue his career from political obscurity and helped him contend with five 
presidential administrations over the shape and direction of U.S. policy. 
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Fosdick’s most historically significant and lasting influence, however, derives from 
her role as one of the founders of neoconservatism.  More than any other single individual, 
Fosdick is responsible for introducing neoconservatism to official Washington, and 
interjecting a distinct neoconservative world-view into U.S. national security policy.  In the 
course of her forty year career in government, she brought a perspective to various issues 
which drew on anti-modernism, Wilsonian idealism and the muscular Christianity associated 
with the thought of Reinhold Niebuhr.  From her perspective, the Soviet Union appeared as a 
militant, irreconcilable foe, bent on world domination.  In light of this threat, the task of U.S. 
foreign and security policy was the destruction and rollback of Soviet power, rather than 
containment or management.  
Fosdick also interjected neoconservatism into U.S. policy through her recruitment of 
a succession of young, intelligent, highly motivated young men from Strauss’s and 
Wohlstetter’s seminars at the University of Chicago and the RAND Corporation to 
Washington.  Installing these young neoconservatives as analysts or bureaucrats in various 
government agencies, or as staffers on Jackson’s senatorial staff, Fosdick insured that 
neoconservatism would, for the foreseeable future, have a voice in the shaping of U.S. 
national security policy.    
Fosdick is, however, not only responsible for introducing neoconservatism to the 
policymaking world, but also in introducing the policymaking world to neoconservatism.  
Her knowledge of and long experience in government, as well as her maneuvers on behalf of 
Jackson in the 1950s and 1960s imbued nascent neoconservatism with that granular 
understanding of how the policymaking process responds—and can be manipulated—that 
was to become so characteristic of the movement.  Through her efforts, neoconservatism 
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began to evolve beyond the theoretical, abstract worlds of Strauss and Wohlstetter into a 
distinct political force that aimed to utterly transform U.S. national security policy by re-
orienting it away from containment and deterrence and toward confrontation, rollback and 
war-fighting. 
    
Beginnings: An Education in Theology, Politics and Anti-Modernism  
Dorothy Emerson Fosdick was born on May 1, 1914 in Montclair, New Jersey.  One 
of two daughters of the Reverend Harry Emerson Fosdick and Florence Whitney, Dorothy 
was nicknamed “Dickie” by her older sister, Elinor, who had trouble pronouncing her given 
name.  Extremely small and frail as a child, Dickie made up for her stature with an 
“impressive fearlessness.”  Before she was a teenager, she had become quite an 
accomplished outdoorswoman.  She particularly excelled at swimming and sailing. 
Dickie also became quite familiar with politics at an early age.  Her father, Harry, was 
the first pastor of Riverside Church in New York City and one of the most prominent liberal 
Baptists in the country.  From the pulpit at Riverside, Harry E. Fosdick led the liberal forces 
against the fundamentalist Baptists in the internecine struggle that had erupted at the turn of 
the twentieth century.  Rev. Fosdick also taught theology at nearby Union Theological 
Seminary.  As a result of his positions, other distinguished theologians, Reinhold Niebuhr 
and Paul Tillich, as well as the socialist theologian Norman M. Thomas, were frequent 
visitors to the Fosdick home.  During these visits it was not unusual for Dickie to engage 
them in intense discussion and debate, particularly Niebuhr or, as she called him, “Reinie.”162 
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She also enjoyed listening to the political tales of her uncle Raymond.  Raymond B. 
Fosdick, a lawyer whose only client was John D. Rockefeller, was also a close friend of 
Woodrow Wilson and the only man to ever hold the title, Undersecretary of the League of 
Nations.  On his visits to his brother’s home, Raymond Fosdick frequently recounted 
Wilson’s efforts to construct a stable, peaceful and just international order.  He so influenced 
his niece’s thinking that Elinor once remarked that Dorothy took the U.S. refusal to join the 
League as “a personal affront.”  Later, as a senior at Horace Mann High School she wrote an 
award-winning essay on the formation and goals of the League.163 
In 1930, Fosdick began her academic career in earnest.  In the fall of that year she 
entered the all-female, Smith College in Northampton, Massachusetts.   Once at Smith, she 
declared herself a political science major in honor of her hero, Woodrow Wilson.  Intending 
to concentrate in government, she became enamored of political theory and philosophy, and 
applied for summer study in Germany.  She was accepted, and in the summer of 1931, she 
departed for the University of Marburg. 
Arriving in Marburg in early June, Fosdick found it “rife with political intrigue.”  The 
erstwhile home of Heidegger and the cradle of anti-modernist political philosophy, Marburg 
at the time was maelstrom of ideas, politics and passions which she found “thrilling.”  She 
was also, for the first time, exposed to the power of ideas, as fascism, Communism, pan-
Slavism and German nationalism competed with Husserl, Hegel and Plato for the students’ 
attention and loyalty.  It was less an education political philosophy than an ideological 
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immersion, and the experience left a deep impression on Fosdick.  “I never knew,” she wrote 
to her father, “what war or hate was, or what ideas mean to people until now.”164     
Her most memorable moment at Marburg was, however, a seminar on Plato given by 
an anonymous German professor.  On the first day, seated in a hot crowded auditorium at the 
end of a day of long and uninteresting lectures, she was contemplating returning to her 
dormitory early when the last lecturer entered.  Although “he appeared to be not quite 
middle-aged . . . he was a little, shrunken, wizened-faced, runty-legged, shovel-headed 
gentleman whose face was the exact image of a monkey.”  Over-burdened with books and 
papers, the professor kept the students waiting as he arranged his belongings and fumbled 
with his cigarettes and cigarette holder.  Once situated, however, the professor proceeded to 
give and lecture entitled, “Die Seele” (The Soul), which was, in Fosdick’s words, “the most 
brilliant exposition of the Platonic theory that the needs of the community should take 
precedence over the needs of the private citizen.”  “I do not think,” she wrote in her diary, 
“that I should ever forget it.”165 
Upon returning to the United States, Fosdick threw herself into life at Smith.  She 
took extra courses with an eye toward graduate school.  She also became a star athlete.  Even 
though she was only 5’ 1”, she excelled in basketball, field hockey and lacrosse, and was 
named to the All-Smith and All-State teams in all three sports.  Continuing her studies in 
political philosophy, she applied for another summer sojourn in Europe, this time to the 
Alfred Zimmern School in Geneva.  She was accepted, and spent part of the summer of 1933 
in the League of Nations Library doing research for her senior thesis.  She found Geneva, “a 
bit too Utopian,” and returned to America early.  The rest of the summer was spent at 
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Harvard, where she took a course on Plato under the Russian Zionist scholar, Hans Kohn.  
The next year, on August 23, 1934, Fosdick graduated from Smith with a Bachelor of Arts 
degree in Political Science.  On the same day she learned that she had been accepted to 
graduate school at Columbia.166   
Beginning at Columbia in the fall of 1934, Fosdick sought to specialize in 
international organization while continuing her investigations into political theory and 
philosophy.  She found the faculty at Columbia, however, a “mixed bag.”  Fosdick found the 
Pulitzer Prize-winning historian, Samuel Flagg “American Flag” Bemis and his triumphalist 
narrative of U.S. foreign relations particularly insufferable.  Conversely, Fosdick was 
“enthralled” by her doctoral advisor, Max Horkheimer.167  
Horkheimer was an anti-modernist scholar who, like Strauss, Arendt and Marcuse, 
had fled Germany as the Nazis rose to power.  The son of a German factory owner, 
Horkheimer had been groomed in the years before World War I to take over the family 
business.  After the First World War, he enrolled in the University of Munich to study 
philosophy.  While a student, he became attracted to Marxism, but the violent conflicts 
between the Communists and Nazis during the 1920s left him disillusioned with politics.  
Horkheimer also became convinced that the violent hostility toward traditional values 
exhibited by both the radical Right and Left indicated some deeper philosophical and 
sociological affinity between ideologies.  His search for the source of this affinity was to 
dominate and define his career.   
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Horkheimer distinguished himself early on with a novel approach in which he sought 
to develop a methodology—Critical Theory—that drew on sociology and history, as well as 
philosophy to understand ideological phenomena.  In 1925, at the relatively young age of 
thirty-four, Horkheimer was named Direktor of the Institute for Social Research at the 
University of Frankfurt am Main.  He was forced to abandon teaching and research in 1933 
when the Nazis forced him to “retire.”  Immigrating first to Switzerland, Horkheimer 
relocated the entire Institute—now renamed The International Institute for Social Research—
to New York when Columbia University agreed to host it. 
Like many of the other German scholars that comprised the “university in exile,” 
Horkheimer was an anti-modernist.  He was convinced that the Francis Bacon and Thomas 
Hobbes and the philosophers of the Enlightenment had introduced into Western 
consciousness the notion that Reason could and would conquer Nature.  Reinforced by the 
Enlightenment, this idea had, in turn, set in motion a relentless quest for mastery over the 
secrets of Nature.  The price of mankind’s victory over Nature, however, was that universal 
ideals, such as Beauty and Excellence were replaced by a manufactured, philistine mass 
culture.  Justice was supplanted by order and Philosophy by grim, violent ideologies.  The 
timeless truths that had guided humanity since the time of Plato had, Horkheimer believed, 
disappeared before the onslaught of relativism and historicism.  Nazism was, for 
Horkheimer, the logical culmination of modernity and the “fatal dialectic” of the 
Enlightenment.168 
Strongly attracted to Horkheimer’s thought, Fosdick’s graduate work reflected his 
anti-modernism.  Her dissertation, “Liberty as a Protean Concept in Contemporary Political 
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Thought,” argued that the rise of relativism and historicism since the Enlightenment had 
opened the door for modern ideologies to assign their own utilitarian meanings to timeless, 
universal Ideas.  Focusing on the idea of Liberty, Fosdick maintained that the meaning of 
Liberty had, since the Enlightenment, been altered and redefined to suit the ends of 
monarchists, Bonapartists, the Roman Catholic Church, Communists, pragmatists, fascists 
and capitalists.  These “counterfeit” conceptions—der ganz Andere, or “the entirely Other” in 
Horkheimer’s phrase—could be discerned by a concern with ends over motives and 
means.169 
Submitted in February 1939, Fosdick’s dissertation was accepted and she was 
awarded a doctorate in Public Law.  That same year she accepted an offer from her alma 
mater, Smith College, to teach political theory and government.  Returning to Northampton 
in the fall of 1940, Fosdick busied herself with preparing her reading lists for her courses.  
Before returning to Massachusetts, however, she confided in her uncle Raymond that she 
would like to do something to further the American war effort.  Somewhat taken aback, the 
elder Fosdick replied that she would at least have to wait until America was at war.  She 
didn’t, as it turned out, have long to wait.170 
 
Going to Washington: Pacifism, the War Effort and the Post-War Order 
As she began her teaching career at Smith in the fall of 1940, Fosdick was compelled 
to think deeply about the relationship between morality and international relations.  The 
catalyst for this line of thought was a falling-out with her father over the war in Europe.  In 
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several sermons, Rev. Fosdick inveighed against the very concept of war, telling his 
parishioners that “Men cannot have Christ and war at the same time.”  He had come to this 
realization, he told his congregation, through the guilt that he felt for his service as a chaplain 
during the First World War.  He particularly regretted that he had “stimulated raiding parties 
to their murderous tasks.”  As a result of his experiences on the Western front, Rev. Fosdick 
declared that that he could no longer conceive of any moral grounds to justify war.   
Although she was not overly disturbed by her father’s pacifism, Fosdick was quite 
unsettled by Rev. Fosdick’s declaration that he perceived a degree of “moral equivalence” 
between the regimes in Italy and Germany and the Western democracies.  The conflict 
between the fascist states and the Western democracies was at its core a clash of equally 
immoral imperialisms.  “We see clearly,” Rev. Fosdick asserted, “that a war for democracy is 
a contradiction in terms, that war itself is democracy’s chief enemy.  Pacifism as a national 
strategy would pursue a policy not of appeasement but of reconciliation.”  Although Fosdick 
did not reproach her father directly for his views, she authored two pro-war tracts, “Justice to 
the German People,” “Socialist Christians,” and an article, “Ethical Standards and Political 
Strategies,” that echoed Niebuhr’s emerging views of the Nazi regime as illegitimate and 
evil.  She also confided in Niebuhr that she believed that Rev. Fosdick was wrong.  “He is 
quite mistaken,” she wrote, “to believe that any rapprochement is possible with the Hitler 
regime.”171   
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In addition to these articles, she also refined the ideas she had explored in her 
dissertation in a substantial introduction to John Stuart Mill’s On Social Freedom.  
Discovered among Mill’s papers in 1907, some 44 years after his death, On Social Freedom 
appeared to be a follow-on work to his earlier On Liberty.  According to Fosdick, the newly 
discovered work represented a significant revision of Mill’s conception of liberty as put 
forward in his earlier writings.  Whereas Mill’s earlier work had defined liberty “negatively” 
(i.e., as the absence of legal, economic and/or religious restrictions against one’s actions), his 
revised conception extolled an extreme form of “positive” liberty (i.e., the freedom to take 
action in pursuit of self-actualization or a greater good) that could theoretically serve as a 
foundation for international relations.172 
Fosdick’s Mill edition garnered some attention from political theorists and legal 
scholars, including Dr. Leo Pasvolsky.  Pasvolsky, a Russian émigré economist who was 
Special Assistant to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, wrote to Fosdick to compliment her on 
the work.  During a brief exchange of letters, Pasvolsky and Fosdick discovered that they 
shared a mutual interest in international law and in the history of the League of Nations in 
particular.  As a young man, Pasvolsky had worked as a journalist and had closely covered 
the formation of the League in Paris in 1919. 
In July 1941, Pasvolsky contacted Fosdick again.  This time, he asked if she would be 
interested in a position with the State Department.  The position that he had in mind, 
Pasvolsky explained, was in a little-known organ of the State Department called the Division 
of Special Research (DSR).  If she could arrange to come to Washington D.C. over the 
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summer, he would explain the job and they could iron out the details.  Fosdick replied that 
she would arrive in Washington on August 12.173  
Fosdick soon learned that the vaguely named Division of Special Research, which 
had been in operation since 1938, was tasked with conducting a “thorough-going, far-
reaching study of what the problems would be in the postwar world.”  Fosdick, given her 
interests and academic background, would focus on postwar international organization.  
Given her affinity with the Wilsonian ideals that had given birth to the League, and the fact 
that she now had the opportunity to gain some practical experience in international relations, 
she accepted the position on the spot.  She would begin her new job that very month as legal 
assistant to Alger Hiss.174 
DSR’s mission was to help shape and organize the supranational organization(s) that 
the Roosevelt Administration believed would be necessary to maintain postwar collective 
security and to mediate trade, financial and monetary issues.  Secretary of State Cordell Hull 
was particularly concerned with avoiding the legal and organizational weaknesses that had 
plagued the League of Nations.  Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, however, believed 
that any new international organization would rise or fall on the strength of U.S. domestic 
support.  Hull argued that it was not within the State Department’s purview to become 
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(Smith), Norman Padelford (Fletcher), Llewellyn Pfankuchen (Wisconsin), Lawrence Preuss (Michigan), Henry 
Reiff (St. Lawrence), Durward Sandifer (Eureka), W.R. Sharpe (City College), Harold Sprout (Princeton), Ivan 
Stone (Beloit), B.H. Williams (Pittsburgh), Bryce Wood (Swarthmore), and Quincy Wright (Chicago). 
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involved in U.S. politics by “selling” the idea of the United Nations to Congress and the 
American people. 175 
Roosevelt, it seems, was not willing to discard any tool in his effort to promote the 
idea of the United Nations.  While not explicitly siding with Welles, FDR ordered the 
formation of the Presidential Advisory Commission on Postwar Foreign Policy in February 
1942.  Chaired by Hull and Welles, with Pasvolsky as Executive Director and Alger Hiss as 
senior counsel, the Commission was directed to advise and inform Congress on the 
administration’s efforts.  The president’s order also created a Subcommittee on International 
Organization within the Commission that was responsible for formulating and drafting the 
new organization’s charter.  Fosdick was assigned to both the Commission staff and the 
Subcommittee.176 
The Subcommittee staff, drawn from DSR, moved quickly.  By March 1943, they had 
formulated a proposal for a new international organization that the Advisory Commission 
could formally present to the Congressional leadership and the British and Soviet allies.  
Consultations with Congress and the allies continued through the summer and by August the 
outline of a charter had been hammered out.  Fosdick and Durward Sandifer were assigned to 
draft the charter.  Their deadline was a conference scheduled for August 1944 at a 
Washington estate called Dumbarton Oaks. 
Fosdick also made significant headway in her alternate position as DSR’s ad hoc 
public relations specialist.  She organized informal “informational meetings” for members of 
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Congress, with DSR employees addressing various topics on a rotating basis at various fora 
around the country.  From 1942-1945, over 500 of these meetings were held.  Fosdick took a 
personal interest in converting the most recalcitrant members of Congress, particularly 
isolationist Republicans of the sort that she believed had foiled Woodrow Wilson’s bid to 
bring America into the League in 1919.  Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI), renowned for 
his isolationism, was a frequent target of Fosdick’s foreign policy evangelism.  Vandenberg 
took a liking to Fosdick and they would often discuss international relations long into the 
evening.177  
The public was also a target of Fosdick’s public relations campaign.  After the 
Dumbarton Oaks conference between the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Great 
Britain, Fosdick edited several guides to understanding the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, the 
United Nations Charter and the U.S. proposal for the organizational structure of the United 
Nations.  Over 200,000 of these pamphlets were printed and distributed and they generated a 
tremendous amount of mail from people all over the world.  Hull gave orders that every letter 
should be perused and some yielded suggestions that the Office of International Organization 
and Security Affairs—as DSR was now known—incorporated into its planning. 
Fosdick’s experiences during the war were to prove invaluable in her later efforts to 
affect U.S. foreign and security policy.  Her lobbying of members of Congress allowed to her 
to build an extensive database of contacts and taught her how valuable influential friends 
could be in official Washington.  Her work with DSR also seems to have taught her the value 
of marketing and salesmanship in promoting policy.  Public support for Dumbarton Oaks 
was, by the time of the conference, extraordinarily high and her personal rapport with 
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Vandenberg greatly eased the way for the administration’s post-war planning.  Fosdick, 
however, still lacked direct experience in making and implementing foreign policy.    
The Truman Administration’s preparations for the launch of the United Nations 
provided her with an opportunity for direct involvement in foreign policy.  The public 
relations effort that she had led ended in February 1945, and she was assigned to relatively 
new Office of Special Political Affairs (OSPA) under Alger Hiss.  The following month she 
learned that she would be traveling to San Francisco for the United Nations Conference on 
International Organization in April.  Hiss was slated to serve as Secretary General of the 
conference, while Fosdick was to serve in the dual role of Special Assistant to the Secretary 
General and as Technical Legal Expert for the American delegation.178   
Change was also afoot in her personal life.  In March of 1945 she met the man who 
would be the great love of her life—a married, 45-year-old lawyer from Illinois named Adlai 
Stevenson.  The former counsel to Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, Stevenson had been 
brought into the State Department in March 1945 by Undersecretary of State Archibald 
MacLeish.  Although Stevenson’s official title was Special Legal Assistant to the Secretary 
of State, Archibald MacLeish (who had replaced Welles), intended Stevenson to serve as the 
Truman Administration’s political spokesman in San Francisco.  Because the president was 
determined to include a number of Republicans in the American delegation, MacLeish feared 
that some of them, particularly John Foster Dulles, would feed the press corps an exclusively 
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Republican version of the proceedings.  MacLeish, therefore, wanted someone who could 
hold his own with the press corps against Dulles and Stevenson was his choice.179   
The bright, articulate and charismatic Stevenson did not disappoint.  Before the 
delegation left Washington, Stevenson quickly and intentionally gained a reputation as a 
“talker;” or someone so eager for journalists’ attention that he could be counted on to leak 
information.  All that was needed to complete the planning for “Operation Leak” (as it 
became known within OSPA), was for Stevenson to be brought up to speed on the legal and 
political problems that were expected to be at issue in San Francisco.  Fosdick was assigned 
to brief Stevenson.  Before they left for San Francisco, they had become lovers.180  
Arriving in San Francisco on April, the day before the conference officially opened, 
Stevenson and Fosdick set about their respective tasks separately.  While Stevenson dashed 
from venue to venue, calling on various diplomats, attending luncheons and meeting with the 
press, Fosdick sat at Hiss’s side as the general assembly argued interminably over various 
legal questions.  To relieve her boredom, Fosdick collected the various “doodles” left on the 
note pads of Hiss and Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius during the mid-morning, lunch 
and afternoon breaks.  
Not all of Fosdick’s time in San Francisco, however, was spent on bureaucratic 
drudgery.  She was able, during the course of several social events aboard the Soviet ocean 
liner, Smolnii, to meet several top Soviet officials and take their measure up close.  
Ostensibly meant to serve as a floating hotel for the Soviet delegation in crowded San 
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Francisco, the Smolnii also allowed the Soviet security detail to closely monitor their 
officials.  Loaded with vodka, caviar, American and European cigarettes, French pastries and 
wines (and presumably, listening devices), the “Party ship” as it came to be called by the 
press, quickly become the after-hours social center of San Francisco.  While most of the 
American and British delegates shunned the ship, Stevenson apparently had no such 
reservations, and his visits were memorable.  On board the Soviet ship, Stevenson not only 
managed to hold his own in drinking with the Soviets—much to the horror of the Baptist 
minister’s daughter—but in the process he also captivated the Soviets with a round of joke-
telling at their expense.  One particular joke had to do with the daily roll-call at the U.N. 
general assembly: 
 
Sergeant-at-arms: “Mexico!” 
Mexican delegate: “Present!” 
Sergeant-at-arms: “Belgium!” 
Belgian delegate: “Present!” 
Sergeant-at-arms: “USSR!” 
Gromyko awakening suddenly: “NYET!”181  
 
Despite the good feelings that usually characterized evenings aboard the Smolnii, 
Fosdick’s opinion of the Soviets was increasingly negative.  She believed Molotov to be 
“Machiavellian,” while Gromyko seemed to her to be “a scruple-less character.”  Fosdick’s 
contact with Soviet diplomatic staffers and various U.S. military and Foreign Service officers 
also yielded grim details of life under Stalin and reinforced her growing dislike.  Given these 
feelings, Fosdick was probably not overjoyed to learn that she would have to continue to deal 
with the Soviets.  Upon her return to Washington she was ordered to travel to London for the 
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first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers (scheduled to begin on September 11, 
1945), and the inaugural meeting of the U.N. General Assembly (scheduled for January 10, 
1946).  The ministerial conference was slated to address the peace treaties to be signed 
among the various European combatants.  The new Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, 
however, also wanted to revisit a number of lingering issues with the Soviet Union that had 
been discussed at previous meetings.  Vandenberg, now chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee was in ill health and asked John Foster Dulles to serve as his 
representative.  On the way to the conference on the Queen Elizabeth, Fosdick began to 
doubt the delegation’s prospects for success and developed an active dislike for Byrnes, 
whom she found “stodgily unimaginative . . . and likely no match for Molotoff,” and for 
Dulles, whom she found “pompous” and “insufferable.”182 
Once the conference was underway, Fosdick’s premonitions about the conference 
seemed to be accurate.  The accommodations were limited, from the bomb damage to the 
city, and some of the delegates were housed in private homes.  Moreover, the British—much 
to Stevenson’s disappointment—made no effort to duplicate the social atmosphere that had 
prevailed in San Francisco.  Indeed, Col. George Codington, the Foreign Office’s dour 
organizer, warned all delegations not to expect “ostentatious entertaining.”  During the 
negotiations proper, Byrnes was so badly outmaneuvered by the Soviets that the British, 
whose diplomats were not given to public statements, complained publicly about the 
Americans not “standing their ground.”  Dulles’s performance was such that Vandenberg 
ordered him to the Balkans on a rather vague fact-finding mission.  For Fosdick herself, the 
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high point of the conference was an incident in which she kicked off her shoes to chase down 
a purse-snatcher.183   
Although the Council of Foreign Ministers conference broke up on October 2, 1945, 
Fosdick was ordered to remain behind as head of the drafting committee of the Preparatory 
Commission to the United Nations.  On October 22nd, she was joined in London by 
Stevenson who had been appointed Deputy Delegate of the Preparatory Commission to the 
United Nations.  The president, however, seems to have expected Stevenson to follow up 
with the Soviets on some of the more pressing questions left over from the previous 
conference, such as how much Italy and Germany would pay in reparations to the Soviet 
Union.  Stevenson had shown himself in San Francisco to be adept at handling the Soviets’ 
maddening style of diplomacy.  Plodding and mechanistic, Molotov, Gromyko and the other 
Soviet diplomats drove many of their negotiating partners to anger and despair.  According to 
Fosdick, Stevenson was consistently firm with the Soviets, and would sometimes act as if he 
had not heard some particularly outlandish Soviet proposal.184   
Leaving London for Washington in December 1945, Fosdick was not in good spirits.  
Although the initial meeting of the Preparatory Conference was deemed relatively successful 
in Washington, and she had enjoyed her reunion with Stevenson, she was “beset with 
pessimism about the future.”  Part of her pessimism may have been a result of Byrnes’s 
dismissal or transference of many of friends and colleagues, such as Pasvolsky and 
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MacLeish.  She may have also been disturbed by certain “rumors about town,” most likely 
about Stevenson and Newsday publisher, Alicia Patterson Guggenheim and/or the wealthy 
socialite, Pamela Harriman.   
A great deal of Fosdick’s malaise was also due to her pessimism about the U.N.’s 
prospects.  She had ever been the Wilsonian idealist and seems to have invested a great deal 
of her professional identity in the idea of a new international order based on collective 
security.  Soviet recalcitrance, however, now threatened to undermine the strength of the 
central constituent of the new order, the U.N.  Indeed, by the time she left London, Fosdick 
seems to have concluded that the very nature of the Soviet state and its objectives precluded 
any meaningful degree of international cooperation.  Soviet “aims diverge so sharply from 
the majority of states,” she wrote to her uncle Raymond that “I doubt if cooperation with 
them will ever be possible.”185 
Upon her return to Washington, Fosdick’s view of Soviet behavior was further 
colored by her new assignment.  The head of the newly created Policy Planning Staff (S/P) 
detailed Fosdick to assist William Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic 
Affairs, in his efforts to uncover and calculate the true costs of American relief operations.  
The harsh winter of 1946 had prompted a series of American “rescue operations,” in which 
large amounts of fuel and foodstuffs were rushed to Europe through the United Nations 
Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA).  Not all the aid, however, appeared to be 
reaching the assigned storage and distribution points.  Clayton suspected that the Soviets 
were diverting some of the aid.  Fosdick’s task, therefore, was to compare what was turned 
over to UNRRA with what was actually being meted out to various European authorities.  
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In June, Fosdick personally presented her report to Clayton.  It showed a significant 
portion of U.S. assistance was being diverted to various Soviet satellites, and recommended 
distributing American aid by some other mechanism than the UNRRA.  Clayton and Kennan, 
in turn, recommended to the newly installed Secretary of State George C. Marshall that all 
aid flowing through UNRRA be discontinued.  Marshall agreed, and over the six months, 
OSPA labored to construct the legal framework for the Economic Cooperation 
Administration (ECA) which would deliver American goods and services to Europe. 186 
In January 1948, with the organizational structure of ECA in place, Marshall 
disbanded OSPA.  Many of the employees that had comprised the original Division of 
Special Research had retired, returned to civilian life after the war or transferred to other 
agencies or divisions of the State Department.  Fosdick received a personal invitation from 
Kennan to join the S/P.  On March 1, 1948, thirty-four year old Dorothy Fosdick became the 
fourth member, and the first woman—and the only woman for the next twenty years—to 
serve on the Policy Planning Staff.187   
Fosdick’s four years on the S/P were eventful, and her work reflected her growing 
interest in human rights and national security policy.  In December 1948, for instance, she 
asked to be assigned to assist Ralph Bunche and Eleanor Roosevelt (whom she had met in 
San Francisco), in drafting United Nations Resolution 217, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.  From 1949-50, Fosdick was assigned to the interdepartmental study group 
working on the planning document that would become National Security Council directive 
68 (NSC-68).  She enthusiastically embraced the document and reprised some of the 
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techniques that the old DSR had used to promote the United Nations to “sell” policy 
recommendations detailed in NSC-68 to key members Congress whose support would be 
crucial should the president approve.  Fosdick and other members of the S/P submitted an 
article and held informal information sessions with journalists and members of Congress in 
order to prepare the ground for huge increases in defense spending. 188   
In the summer of 1952, Fosdick took a leave of absence in order to serve as foreign 
policy advisor to Adlai Stevenson’s presidential campaign.  As Deputy Campaign manager, 
she headed up a group of researchers and writers called “the Elks,” after their office in the 
Elk’s Club in Springfield, Illinois.  Despite almost four years apart, they re-kindled their love 
affair.  The renewed affair was to prove intense, but short-lived.  During the campaign 
Republican campaign operatives began circulating rumors that Stevenson was a homosexual.  
Democratic operatives responded by leaking details of his relationship with Fosdick, as well 
as ones he had been carrying on simultaneously with the very wealthy and very married 
Boston socialite, Marietta Tree.  Details also began to emerge about Stevenson’s romantic 
involvements with Brooke Astor, the wife of real estate magnate Vincent Astor, the political 
activist Mary Lasker and Ruth Field, the widow of Chicago department store magnate, 
Marshall Field.  Fosdick, undoubtedly embarrassed and hurt, left the campaign before 
election day.189   
After the election, Fosdick did not return to the State Department.  She joined a 
number of other State Department employees in the “great exodus of ’52,” and resigned.  The 
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impetus for the wave of resignations was, of course, the uncertainty associated with any 
change in presidential administrations.  For Fosdick, however, she was motivated by her 
personal dislike for Dulles, who was to become Secretary of State.  She resigned rather than 
work in the “intellectual and moral slum that anything headed by John Foster Dulles would 
become.”  “I cannot bear the thought,” she wrote in her diary, “of working for that man” 
[underscore in the original].190 
By the time of Fosdick’s resignation from the State Department, her views about the 
shape and direction of American foreign and security policy had hardened considerably.  The 
Wilsonian idealism that had fueled her youthful enthusiasm for collective security had been 
replaced by a much more somber view of international affairs.  She now seems to have come 
round to the view that the Soviet Union was the main obstacle to peace and justice in the 
world and that America should undertake vigorous and sustained American action to roll 
back the Soviet empire.  “The world,” she wrote, “has moved from a Greek period, in which 
we could afford to argue about our ideas, to a Roman period, in which we must fight to make 
them effective.”191    
Fosdick’s metaphor allows us some insight into the philosophical currents beneath 
her increasingly militant political views.  The Greek-Roman metaphorical dichotomy is a 
Heideggerian philosophical trope that refers to the search for the Good (Justice and Truth) 
through two methods, Reason (Greek) and practical experience (Roman).  Although Fosdick 
probably encountered this trope via Horkheimer, her use of it is closer to Heidegger’s in that 
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it implies that the intellectual pursuit of Good must be for the moment subjugated to the more 
practical concerns, i.e., the Cold War.  Her reference, however, must also be considered in 
light of the anti-modernists’ Aristotelian and Thucydidean innovations in which Good may 
be pursued and the regime transformed through concrete action at home or abroad.192   
 
Introducing the Neoconservative View: Scoop Jackson 
Casting about Washington for work in the spring of 1953, Fosdick was hired as a 
foreign policy consultant to the staff of Senator Henry M. “Scoop” Jackson (D-WA) by 
Jackson’s chief of staff and boyhood friend, John Salter.  Professionally, Fosdick’s 
experience and contacts in the foreign policy community helped make up for a severe dearth 
of foreign policy expertise on Jackson’s staff.  A new senator in 1953, Jackson had gained 
almost no foreign policy experience during his career in the House from 1941-1952.  His 
small staff, comprised of Salter, administrative assistant Sterling Munro and publicist Brian 
Corcoran, was equally unschooled in the intricacies of U.S. foreign relations.  Jackson also 
harbored presidential ambitions and his lack of knowledge and experience in foreign 
relations represented a significant handicap to a presidential bid.  It also seemed as if Jackson 
would have little opportunity to gain experience in foreign affairs during his first senatorial 
term.  Part of the reason for this was his assignment to the Permanent Investigations 
Subcommittee of the Government Operations Committee.  Rarely in open session and its 
proceedings dominated by its chairman, Senator Joseph McCarthy, (R-WI), the 
subcommittee offered little opportunity for a junior, minority-party senator to make 
                                                 
192
 Max Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 21, 169, Dawn and 
Decline, Notes, 1926-1931 and 1950-1969 (New York: Seabury, 1978).  See also Gail Soffer, “Heidegger, 
Humanism, and the Destruction of History,” Review of Metaphysics 49, 3 (March 1996): 547-576; Anson 
Rabinbach, “Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism as Text and Event,” New German Critique 62 (Spring-Summer 
1994): 3-38. 
 161 
headlines.  Moreover, Jackson was to resign his seat in July in protest over an article by 
McCarthy executive staff director J.B. Matthews that called Protestant clergymen “the largest 
single group supporting the Communist apparatus in the United States today.” 193 
In addition to the foregoing difficulties, the Democratic leadership assigned Jackson 
to the party’s senatorial campaign committee.  While serving on the campaign committee, 
Jackson was almost guaranteed to be absent from Washington for long stretches while 
speaking on the Democratic “rubber chicken” circuit and fundraising for the mid-term 
elections in 1954.  Although his tenure on the campaign committee was successful, with the 
Democrats winning control of Congress in 1954, and Jackson being rewarded with a seat on 
the Senate Armed Services and Joint Atomic Energy Committees, the avenues for 
establishing his credentials remained limited.  The activities and statements of the members 
of the Armed Services Committee were tightly controlled by its powerful chairman, John C. 
Stennis of Mississippi.  The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was relatively more open, 
but met infrequently, dealt only marginally with foreign policy and was, by and large, 
unfamiliar to the public.194 
Although little is known about Fosdick’s work over the 1953-1955 period, she seems 
to have spent most of her time engaged in two tasks.  The first of these tasks involved 
replying to constituents about foreign policy issues.  Letters from wealthy donors to the 
Democratic Party, such as Frank Altschul (Wohlstetter’s early mentor), Stanley Golub, and 
Jerry Hoeck seem to have been reserved for her exclusive review and response.  The 
remainder of Fosdick’s time seems to have been spent writing for articles and a book 
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4.1 Dorothy Fosdick 
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4.2 Family, Friends and Mentors 
 
 
                                                               
 
                                      Rev. Harry E. Fosdick             Reinhold Niebuhr 
                                    Dorothy’s father and a dedicated           “Reinie’s” Christian anti-Communism  
                                    pacifist, he fell out with Dorothy           influenced Dorothy as a young woman. 
                                    over U.S. involvement in WW II.                                
 
 
                           
 
                                                  Max Horkheimer                         Adlai Stevenson 
                                   Dorothy’s teacher at Columbia, his           Dorothy’s lover, his campaign operatives 
                                   anti-modernist philosophy deeply            exposed their long affair to counter  
                                   influenced her view of politics.                                                 Republican rumors that he was                           
                                                             homosexual. 
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  4.3 Career Moments 
 
Fosdick, second from the left, with President and Mrs. Truman at the Women’s 
Democratic Service Awards Banquet at the National Press Club, 1949. 
            Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson, an unidentified Chinese official and Fosdick, in Beijing, 1981 
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L-R: Fosdick, Richard Perle, Jackson and Adm. James Linder aboard the USS Forrestal, 1972 
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that reflected Jackson’s foreign policy views.  She also wrote several speeches and drafted a 
monograph for attribution to Jackson.195 
In November, 1955 Jackson, wanting to step up his efforts to establish himself as an 
expert in foreign and security affairs, made Fosdick his full-time Chief Foreign Policy Aide.  
A notoriously dull and long-winded speaker, Jackson gave Fosdick responsibility for all of 
his speeches and articles on foreign policy. On New Year’s Day, 1956, Jackson launched a 
writing and speaking campaign that criticized the Eisenhower Administration in a distinctly 
Fosdick-esque manner.  Jackson, for instance, characterized Defense Secretary Charles 
Wilson’s management ability as limited to an “ability to keep his foot in his mouth most of 
the time.”  Secretary of State Dulles, however, was the preferred target, with Jackson 
characterizing Dulles (in unmistakably Fosdick-esque language), as a “salesman rather than a 
statesman,” and “the original misguided missile.”196 
In 1956 Fosdick also began to make a name for herself on Capitol Hill.   As Jackson’s 
alter ego on all matters pertaining to foreign and security policy, many senators and their 
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staff employees variously described her as “brainy,” “brilliant,” and “peppery.”  Many also 
discovered that she seemed more of an uncompromising Cold Warrior than Jackson himself.  
Francis Valeo, a Foreign Relations Committee staffer who had known both Dorothy and her 
father Harry, recalled, “She had this absolute one-track mind on anything involving the 
Russians.  She almost seemed to be apologizing for his [her father, the Rev. Fosdick’s] 
pacifism by her vigorous embracing of a militaristic approach to containment.” 197     
 In addition to her duties as chief researcher and speechwriter, Fosdick began building 
a “brain bank” of individuals with expertise in foreign and security matters.  RAND 
Corporation analyst Albert Wohlstetter and Harvard historian Richard Pipes, for instance, 
were added to Fosdick’s list of experts that the senator could call on to advise him on nuclear 
strategy and Soviet affairs, respectively.  Indeed, Jackson called on Pipes to brief him on 
Russian culture prior to an extensive tour of the Soviet Union in the summer of 1956.  Upon 
returning to the United States in the fall of 1956, on the eve of the presidential election, 
Jackson and his staff resumed the rhetorical offensive against the Eisenhower Administration 
with a vengeance.198   
After the election, however, Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson (D-TX), and 
Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn (D-TX), put Fosdick on notice that bipartisanship (at 
least in regard to foreign policy), would be the order of the day when the Congress 
reconvened in January 1957.  The attacks on the Eisenhower Administration’s foreign and 
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security policy prior to and during the election had been unrestrained, uncoordinated and 
wide-ranging, making it impossible for the public to perceive a Democratic alternative 
amidst the cacophony.  Now, in the aftermath of the election, Johnson sought to limit 
criticism of the administration’s foreign and security policies lest continued partisanship hurt 
Democrats in the 1958 and 1960.  Indeed, aware that every significant poll in the country 
showed an overwhelming Republican advantage in foreign affairs and defense matters, the 
leadership favored moving the Democrats closer to the administration’s positions.199 
Fosdick was not amenable to the leadership’s bipartisan approach and Jackson’s tone 
became much harsher after October 4, 1957.  On that day, the Soviet Union placed the 
world’s first man-made satellite, Sputnik, into orbit.  The implications of the Sputnik launch, 
of course, meant that the Soviet Union could reach the United States with similar missiles—
missiles carrying nuclear warheads rather than satellites.  Jackson was joined  by Stuart 
Symington (D-MO), Hubert Humphrey (D-MN), John Flanders (D-VT), John Sherman 
Cooper (D-KY),  and Joseph Clark (D-PA) in charging the administration with complacency 
and ineptitude. 200 
The Eisenhower Administration’s initial response to Sputnik and the Democratic 
attack was to downplay the significance of the Soviet launch.  On October 5, the day after the 
Sputnik, press secretary James Hagerty said that the satellite launch “did not come as any 
surprise” to the United States, while foreign affairs advisor Clarence Randall described the 
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Soviet satellite as a “silly bauble.”  On the 8th, former Defense Secretary Charles Wilson, 
now retired, characterized Sputnik as “a nice technical trick.”  The same day, presidential 
assistant Sherman Adams ventured that the purpose of the American space program was to 
“serve science, not achieve high score in an outer space basketball game.”  The next day, on 
October 9, Eisenhower himself stated in a press conference that the main value of Sputnik lay 
in “what they [the Soviets] learn about “temperatures, radiation, ionization, pressures and so 
on.”  When pressed by a journalist about Sputnik‘s military significance, the president 
allowed that it did demonstrate that the Soviets possessed some very powerful rockets, but 
“until you know something about their accuracy, it is militarily meaningless.”201 
For Fosdick, the Eisenhower Administration’s dismissive response to Sputnik 
represented a political opportunity to paint the administration and the Republicans as soft on 
defense.  Senate Majority Leader Johnson and Speaker of the House Russell, however, were 
not ready to forego all cooperation with the administration.  In November, Johnson 
announced that his Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Armed Services 
Committee would hold extensive hearings on the state of American military programs, and 
that he did not see any need for any parallel investigations.  Johnson’s subcommittee, in 
session from November 1957 through February 1958, generated very little substantive 
criticism of the administration other than that which emanated, unsurprisingly, from various 
defense contractors.202  
Jackson and Fosdick, however, were prepared to take another tack.  In the summer of 
1958, Fosdick prevailed upon the chair of the Government Operations Committee, Senator 
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John McClellan (D-AR), to authorize a new subcommittee, the Subcommittee on National 
Policy Machinery to study the Eisenhower Administration’s policymaking processes, with a 
focus on the operations of the National Security Council.   In the spring of 1959, in a speech 
at the National War College, Jackson proposed a study of “whether a free society can so 
organize its human and material resources as to outthink, outplan and outperform 
totalitarianism.”  He then introduced a resolution—S.R. 115—that proposed a study into the 
executive branch’s ability to formulate and execute “national policy for survival in the world 
contest with Communism.”  Fosdick hoped that such an organizational study, conducted 
under the auspices of the Government Operations Committee (of which Jackson was a 
member), would appear relatively benign to Johnson.  Similarly, she believed that an 
organizational study would not appear to impinge on the prerogatives of the Armed Services 
and Foreign Relations Committees.  Fosdick and Jackson, however, seem to have anticipated 
that the White House would react which, in turn, would generate publicity for their 
venture.203   
For the most part, Fosdick’s calculations proved correct.  After quieting some initial 
objections from the Senate leadership and assuring the White House that Jackson intended to 
launch a “study” (rather than an investigation) that would be limited to “procedures and 
machinery and not substance,” Jackson’s “study” was approved.  By June, the new 
subcommittee was formed with Jackson as chair and its staff headed by Fosdick.  Fosdick 
installed two old friends from the NSC-68 study group, Helen Hill and Robert Tufts as senior 
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researchers.  Richard Neustadt, a political scientist from Columbia, was hired as a consultant 
to the subcommittee.204 
The Jackson Subcommittee began operations in July.  In a departure from most 
congressional investigations, the subcommittee did not immediately schedule a lengthy slate 
of hearings.  Rather, J. K. Mansfield, Jackson’s long-time chief of staff, went about 
Washington interviewing dozens of low-to-mid level bureaucrats.  Although most of the 
interviewees cooperated, some of the subjects either refused to be interviewed or limited their 
responses.  These recalcitrant subjects would be visited by Fosdick and/or Tufts and assured 
that unless they were more forthcoming, they would be subpoenaed and questioned by 
Jackson under oath in front of the subcommittee. 
The subcommittee also departed from convention by conducting its discussions in 
fora outside of Congress.  In the summer of 1959, the subcommittee sponsored an open 
forum at the Council of Foreign Relations and a seminar at the American Political Science 
Association’s annual meeting.  In both instances, the Eisenhower Administration’s position 
was defended by National Security Advisor, Gordon Gray.  Rather than addressing himself to 
Jackson’s real charge that the administration lacked a coherent and credible national security 
strategy, Gray’s defense consisted of a ponderous description of how the NSC system was 
supposed to operate.  A rather more effective defense was mounted by the Yale political 
scientist, Paul Y. Hammond, who argued that the NSC had never operated as a policymaking 
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body, but rather as a “coordinator.”  Gray’s and Hammond’s efforts, however, were 
incidental to the real purpose of the seminars—publicity.205    
The debate and discussion over the Eisenhower Administration’s security became 
much more substantive once the subcommittee began to hold formal hearings.  Testimony 
and interviews were given by an A-list of experts ranging from George Kennan, Averell 
Harriman and General Matthew Ridgeway to Admiral Arthur Radford, Christian Herter, 
Thomas Gates, General Maxwell Taylor to Bernard Brodie, Henry Kissinger, Albert 
Wohlstetter, Henry Luce, Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, and Herbert York.  By and large 
the testimony did not favor the administration.  Moreover, the officials dispatched to defend 
the administration’s policies often did more harm than good, with Defense Secretary Thomas 
S. Gates proving to be particularly inept.206 
 
Chief of Staff: Fosdick and the Advent of Counterforce   
The Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery officially concluded operations and 
submitted its final report in the fall of 1961.  The final report, a massive distillation of several 
that had been produced during the investigations, was drafted by Fosdick.  Although the 
report made dozens of recommendations as to how the national security “machinery” should 
be organized, its central theme was that foreign and security policy should be entrusted to a 
small permanent cadre of specialists in political, military and scientific planning.  This policy 
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elite—the “joint career staff”— would be carefully selected for their “dedication to the cause 
of liberty,” as well as expertise in their particular field.  These career bureaucrats would be 
organized in small, autonomous groups within the White House, Pentagon and State 
Department, “following the general model of the RAND Corporation.”  They would also be 
insulated from partisan politics as much as possible and, as a result, would be available to 
serve under presidents of either party.  
Here, then, was the central objective to all the months of interviews, hearing and 
bureaucratic-political maneuvering: the creation of a small, ideologically committed band of 
“guardians” as the permanent overseers of American national security.  Although there was 
no mention in the report as to who, precisely, would manage the selection process, the 
reference to RAND could be taken to imply that Wohlstetter and his followers were the 
prime candidates.  In addition, there was no mention of any chain of command or any clear 
delineation of the decision-making process.  This frightening lack of specificity did not, 
however, preclude the report from recommending that this group be formed 
“immediately.”207     
Politically, the subcommittee’s investigations proved a mixed success.  The publicity 
generated by the hearings had done much to establish Jackson as an expert on defense issues 
and to portray the Eisenhower Administration as moribund and over-bureaucratized.  The 
hearings and testimony had also gone some way toward convincing many of Jackson’s 
colleagues on both sides of the aisle that Massive Retaliation was neither credible nor 
strategically desirable.  There was a widespread consensus that U.S. national security policy 
was on the verge of a significant re-orientation.     
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On the debit side of the ledger, the Jackson camp, however, had been unable to 
capitalize directly on perceptions of Republican ineptitude.  While Jackson’s staff churned 
out a series voluminous and highly technical hearings and reports, the Kennedy forces 
adroitly distilled the steady drumbeat of criticism into the single, incendiary accusation of a 
“missile gap.”  Moreover, the ill-feelings that Fosdick and Jackson had engendered among 
fellow Democrats seem to have rebounded and prevented Jackson from securing even the 
Democratic vice-presidential nomination, even though he had been Kennedy’s first choice.208 
The blame for the political failure settled on Mansfield.  In April, the senator re-
organized his staff and Mansfield was let go.  Salter and long-time administrative assistant 
Munro were asked to focus on domestic political affairs and constituent services in the 
senator’s home state of Washington.  Tufts and Hill were secured positions with the RAND 
Corporation and the CIA, respectively.  Fosdick was appointed chief of staff, and given 
almost complete control over all matters except those pertaining to Washington electoral 
politics.   
As chief of staff, Fosdick turned toward building influence within the new Kennedy 
Administration.  Before his inauguration, President-Elect Kennedy said publicly that he had 
been “much impressed by the constructive criticism of the Jackson Subcommittee,” and that 
he intended to move quickly to adopt a number of the subcommittee’s organizational 
recommendations.  Kennedy backed up this talk by appointing Richard Neustadt, late of the 
Jackson subcommittee, to manage the presidential transition and to make recommendations 
on planning for the first “hundred days,” including staff and Cabinet appointments.  These 
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recommendations were presented to Kennedy in a series of memos, some of which Neustadt 
first sent to Fosdick for comment and approval.209  
Once in office, Kennedy installed a number of Jackson allies in important 
bureaucratic positions.  Kennedy did ignore a suggestion from Fosdick that Nitze and Tufts 
be appointed Secretary of Defense and Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, 
instead choosing Robert S. McNamara and McGeorge Bundy.  Nitze, however, was 
appointed chairman of an ad hoc committee tasked with outlining a basic national security 
policy.  Jackson staffer, Howard E. Haugerud, was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for 
International Security.  General Maxwell Taylor, a long-time friend of both Kennedy and 
Fosdick was appointed personal military advisor to the president.  His presence, though not 
due to Fosdick’s influence, nevertheless served as yet another conduit of communication 
with the White House.   
A number of men from Fosdick’s “talent bank” were also given positions within the 
new administration.  The analysts from Albert Wohlstetter’s Strategic Air Power Research 
Group (SAPR) at the RAND Corporation were brought en masse into the administration.  
Henry S. Rowen was appointed Deputy Secretary for International Security Affairs, Alain C. 
Enthoven became Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis, and William 
Kaufmann was made Deputy Director of the Air Force Science Advisory Board.  Wohlstetter 
and his protégés, Frank Trinkl, David McGarvey, Andrew Marshall, Fred Hoffman, Herbert 
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Goldhammer, Fred Iklé and Daniel Ellsberg, became consultants to the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD).210 
These appointments had a significant impact on the Kennedy Administration’s 
national security policy.  While Taylor set about building new, “unconventional” anti-
guerilla capabilities designed to combat Communist-inspired insurgencies in the Third 
World, the SAPR Group examined nuclear strategy.  The confluence of these efforts resulted 
in a strategy called “Flexible Response.”  Emerging from criticisms of Massive Retaliation as 
a an “all-or-nothing” strategy, Flexible Response was intended to allow the president to more 
easily and precisely calibrate military responses to various Communist incursions and 
“respond in each case with a use of force appropriate to the threat.”  On the level of strategic 
nuclear conflict, planning commenced for limited war scenarios to “improve the war’s 
outcome by terminating it under favorable military conditions and by limiting damage to our 
allies and ourselves.”211   
In order to support this new strategic doctrine, McNamara recommended a substantial 
expansion of the U.S. strategic arsenal.  Over the next five years, McNamara proposed 
increases in the B-52 bomber force, the KC-135 aerial fuel-tanker fleet, the Hound Dog and 
Skybolt air-launched missile programs, the Atlas and Minuteman ICBM programs, and the 
Polaris SLBM program.  There was also an anti-vulnerability campaign that reflected 
Wohlstetter’s influence.  A force-wide hardening and dispersal program was slated for 
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Minuteman underground silos and a development program begun for a mobile version of 
Minuteman.  All told, the total U.S. nuclear megatonnage was expected to rise from 1,530 in 
1961 to 7,620 by 1967.212   
The new administration also adopted the Jackson Subcommittee’s recommendations 
for overhauling the Pentagon’s budget processes.  Gen. Taylor had argued that there was an 
urgent need to control redundancies and “pet” programs pushed by the armed services.  To 
overhaul the Pentagon’s processes, McNamara appointed Wohlstetter’s old patron from 
RAND, Charles Hitch, to the post of Assistant Secretary and Comptroller of the Department 
of Defense.  Hitch subsequently developed a comprehensive forecasting and budgeting 
system called “Planning, Programming and Budgeting” (PPBS), in which funding requests 
were tightly linked to operational requirements.   
Although this reform seemed rather innocuous, in practice the new system made it 
much easier to gain legislative approval for large funding requests.  In response to a large 
request, for example, the Congress only had to authorize and appropriate “down payments,” 
or annual outlays, in any given year, not total cost.  As a result, it also became much more 
difficult to forecast and determine the total cost of weapons systems.  Total costs, from 
development, through deployment, were calculated as part a “moving” grand total called 
“total obligational authority.”  Over the next two years, the Kennedy Administration was to 
exploit this characteristic of the new budgeting system to launch one of the largest military 
buildups in American history.213 
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Yet another effect of the Jackson Subcommittee report on the Kennedy 
Administration was the increased power of the Special Assistant for National Security, or 
National Security Advisor.  Upon assuming office, Kennedy abolished the National Security 
Planning Board (NSPB), and the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB).  Functioning much 
like Ike’s wartime staff sections for logistics and intelligence, the two boards coordinated the 
activities of approximately fifty inter-agency and inter-departmental working groups, which 
disappeared also.  In place of this tangled bureaucratic morass, Kennedy installed six inter-
agency groups overseen by the staff of  the Special Assistant for National Security.  The 
office of the Special Assistant was also physically moved from the old Executive Office 
Building to the White House.  The increased power of this single adviser, served by a large 
staff and not subject to the advice and consent of the Senate, greatly enhanced the ability of 
Kennedy and his successors to translate their ideological and political preferences into 
policy.214 
Fosdick’s part in setting these changes in American strategy and capabilities in 
motion further enhanced her reputation in official Washington.  Indeed, in the course of 
barely five years, Fosdick had become one of the most influential figures in Washington.  
Experienced, informed, well-connected to both the Old Guard of the Democratic Party, as 
well as the Kennedy Administration, Fosdick was a force to be reckoned with.  National 
Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, in particular, seems to have been eager to count her as 
an ally.  In the early days of the administration, for instance, Bundy took care to keep her 
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informed as to how closely the new administration was following the subcommittee 
recommendations.  Later, during the Cuban Crisis, she was one of a handful of advisors 
called in by Bundy from outside of the administration.  Raymond Garthoff, at the time a 
member of the CIA’s Office of National Estimates (ONE), recalls that at one advisory 
meeting, Fosdick calmly made an exceptionally strong case for the “eradication” of the 
Castro regime.215 
Fosdick did not hesitate to oppose the president when she thought his decisions 
misguided.  In 1961, she and Jackson strongly opposed the creation of the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency (ACDA).  The ACDA, as well as the Peace Corps, the Agency for 
International Development, the International Agricultural Development Service and other 
subsequent Kennedy and Johnson Administration initiatives, appeared to Fosdick as 
distasteful manifestations of the behavioralist “peace studies” sub-field that had begun to 
proliferate in academia.216 
There were also some conflict between Fosdick and the Johnson Administration.  
Partly personal, partly professional, the rivalry between Jackson and Johnson was 
longstanding and did not improve with age.  Although Jackson’s staff and the administration 
generally made common cause over the war in Vietnam, even here there was friction.  
Increasingly frustrated over the conduct of the war, Jackson and Fosdick were particularly 
concerned with the decision to spare the northern port of Haiphong from intensive bombing.  
Despite repeated inquiries about the operational rationale behind the U.S. bombing 
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campaign, Jackson and Fosdick were stonewalled by the Johnson Administration.  Although 
Jackson generally refrained from criticizing the president in public, he privately informed 
McNamara and Walt Rostow that he would raise his concerns publicly in the Armed Services 
Committee if the administration was not more forthcoming.    
Aside from what they tell us about the politics of the time, these conflicts with the 
Kennedy and Johnson Administrations illustrate the degree to which nascent 
neoconservatism was beginning to coalesce into a discrete point of view.  Although still 
confined to the Senate and the national security bureaucracy, this view was most 
recognizable by its view of the Soviet Union as a force for evil and disorder in the world.  
Politically, the neoconservatives’ dark view of the Soviets translated into an unremitting 
advocacy for the re-orientation of foreign and security policy away from containment and 
coexistence and toward roll back and a strategic war-fighting capability.  Indeed, their 
advocacy for a more confrontational stance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union was such that, by 
1968, the neoconservatives were at odds with pro-war Democrats, such as Acheson and 
Symington, just as often as with anti-war Democrats.  This “maverick” quality, along with 
their growing reputation for expertise and competence in military and foreign policy matters 
also made them appear as potential allies to the incoming Nixon Administration.217    
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Chapter 5 
Coalescence: Neoconservatism, Détente, and the Soviet Strategic Buildup 
 
When Richard Nixon assumed the presidency in 1968, he expected that some of his 
strongest allies in the Congress would be Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson and his staff.  On a 
personal level, Nixon appears to have genuinely respected Jackson and, if he did not actually 
like the senator, he did not speak of Jackson in the tone and terms he reserved for the other 
Democrats or fellow Republicans like Nelson Rockefeller.  Indeed, Nixon said on more than 
one occasion that Jackson was his “favorite Democrat,” and had gone so far as to offer 
Jackson the position of Secretary of Defense.  Kissinger also admired Jackson and had 
sought to hire Jackson staffer Richard Perle for his own NSC staff.218   
A mere four years later, however, the White House’s relationship with Jackson and 
his staff had changed drastically.  The Nixon Administration was at war with Jackson and his 
staff over the arms control agreements concluded with the Soviets in May 1972.  Jackson’s 
name now appeared on the president’s “enemies list,” while Kissinger now held Perle to be 
“a ruthless little bastard,” and “a son of Mensheviks who believes all Bolsheviks are evil.”  
Why and how did such enmity arise in such a short span of time?  What was the source of 
their conflict?  What is its significance in the history of neoconservatism?     
The answer to the first two questions is détente.  The Nixon Administration’s policy 
of engagement and negotiation with the Soviet Union, détente was seen by the
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neoconservatives as morally and strategically dangerous.  From a moral perspective, the 
neoconservatives believed that negotiating with the Soviet Union was a tacit of admission 
that it was a state like any other state and, as such, the moral equivalent of the United States.  
The danger in this morally relativist view, they held, was that it would degrade and 
delegitimize the values and ideas upon which much of Western civilization rested.  Moral 
equivalence could also help create a false image of the Soviet Union that would enhance its 
standing abroad, while undermining America’s claim to the Cold War moral high ground.   
Strategically, the neoconservatives feared that in the rush to staunch the arms race the 
Nixon Administration would leave America vulnerable to a Soviet nuclear strike.  The focus 
on quantitative limits, in particular, seemed to imply that the administration was planning to 
rely on mutual assured destruction to maintain deterrence.  As Wohlstetter had purportedly 
demonstrated, this was an extremely undesirable state of affairs.  Not only was the threat of 
mutual suicide not credible, but it also left the door open for the appearance of new 
technologies that might suddenly disrupt the strategic “balance” and allow the Soviets a first-
strike capability. 
These considerations appeared all the more dire against the backdrop of the Soviet 
strategic buildup.  For Fosdick, Wohlstetter and many other neoconservatives, the fact that 
the Soviet Union was now engaged in the largest strategic buildup in the history of the world 
seemed to confirm everything that they believed about Soviet aims.  Viewed through the 
prism of the regime, the unprecedented effort appeared as the outward manifestation of the 
militant, irreconcilable nature of the Soviet Union and its desire for world domination.  
Reinforcing this view was the almost complete paucity of any defensive justification for the 
buildup.    
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In regard to neoconservatism, the initiation of the campaign against détente and arms 
control marks the beginning of the coalescence of neoconservatism as a discrete political 
movement.  While Wohlstetter and his RAND men had made common cause with Fosdick 
and Jackson against the Eisenhower Administration, this effort had been but one aspect of the 
general Democratic opposition.  Now, however, as the nascent neoconservatives mobilized 
and maneuvered against détente and arms control, they came to be defined by their 
opposition to it.  Already estranged from their Democratic brethren on the Left over Vietnam, 
the neoconservatives found that their anti-détente position also divided them from more 
centrist elements in the Congress.  Many of Jackson’s colleagues, such as William F. 
Fulbright (D-AK), Hubert H. Humphrey (D-MN), Jacob Javits (R-NY) and John Sherman 
Cooper (R-KY), not only had serious reservations about many of his positions, but also 
moved to actively oppose him.  Indeed, the neoconservatives’ sense of isolation became so 
pronounced that by 1972 they began to refer half-jokingly to Jackson’s office as “the 
Bunker,” reflecting the siege mentality that had developed as they waged bureaucratic-
political war against the administration.  Despite their isolation, they neither wavered nor 
became demoralized.  Rather, the shared sense of battling against the odds in a crusade 
against the forces of Darkness seems to have instilled a sense of purpose and espirit de corps, 
which was critical to the coalescence of the neoconservatism. 
 
The Soviet Strategic Buildup, 1965-1967 
When the new Soviet missiles began to appear in 1965, there was a rather pronounced 
lack of urgency among American officials.  “I can assure you, and I can assure the American 
people,” said Defense Secretary Robert McNamara confidently at a news conference in April 
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1965, “that the USSR has no—I repeat, no—long-range, solid-fuel missiles comparable to 
our Minuteman missile system.”  Less than one month later, however, the Soviet Rocket 
Forces unveiled the RT-2 (or SS-13 “Savage,” as the weapon was codenamed by the CIA and 
NATO), intercontinental ballistic missile at the annual May Day Victory Parade in Moscow.  
Comparable in size to the American Minuteman ICBM, the SS-13 was also a solid-fuel 
weapon, which made it faster, safer (as ground crews do not have to contend with dangerous 
leaks of highly volatile liquid fuel), and launched quickly.  In addition, the Soviets exhibited 
a naval missile that bore a striking resemblance to the American Polaris submarine-launched 
missile and another weapon that was referred to as an “anti-missile missile.”  Even more 
ominous, the Soviets exhibited an example of what appeared to be the largest and most 
powerful intercontinental missile in the world, the SS-9.219 
The appearance of the giant SS-9 missile was particularly ominous.  Under 
development since 1962 by the Yangel Design Bureau in Dnepropetrovsk, and first test-
flown on January 14, 1965, the SS-9 was 113 feet long and capable of carrying a payload of 
approximately 10,000 lbs.  By way of comparison, the U.S. Minuteman II, just entering 
service at the time, was 59.9 feet long and had a payload capacity of approximately 1,000 lbs.  
This enormous payload capacity of the SS-9 meant, the CIA estimated, that it could deliver a 
20-25 megaton nuclear warhead (Minuteman carried the 1 megaton W-67 warhead).  The SS-
9’s size also made it a likely platform for the future development of multiple independently-
targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs).  In either configuration, a single SS-9 appeared capable 
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of destroying a large American city or, with slight improvements to its accuracy, 
underground Minuteman silos.220   
Wohlstetter watched the development of the SS-9 with alarm.  Able to destroy 
American ICBMs while still in their silos, the SS-9 represented just the sort of counterforce 
weapon that he had warned against in his 1958 article, “The Delicate Balance of Terror.”  
According to Wohlstetter, the possession of such a powerful counterforce capability by either 
side could, in a crisis situation, push the opponent into an attack before his weapons were 
destroyed in the ground.  This “use it or lose it” problem was compounded by other political 
and moral considerations.  In the wake of a surprise counterforce attack, for instance, an 
American president would have few options other than to sue for peace or order the 
destruction of millions of Soviet citizens by U.S. submarine-launched missiles and bombers.  
A U.S. attack on Soviet cities (or countervalue strike) would, of course, be followed by a 
retaliatory Soviet strike on American cities.221   
The SS-9 was not the only worry for the U.S. defense establishment.  In late 1965 
another new missile appeared quite suddenly: the SS-11.  Similar in its dimensions to 
Minuteman, the Korolev-designed SS-11 was also associated with some rather unorthodox 
testing programs at the Tyuratam Space complex.  The nature of these tests led some U.S. 
intelligence analysts to speculate that the Soviets had launched a MIRV-development 
program.  By mid-1966, however, the new the U.S. KH-4A and Argos satellites revealed that 
the SS-11 was a rather crude, liquid-fueled missile and that it was probably armed, like 
Minuteman, with a single 1 megaton (MT) warhead.  Extrapolating from the number and 
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type of missile silos under construction, the CIA also forecast that the Soviets would deploy 
approximately 112 ICBMs per year in over the next three years.  The majority of these 
deployments, it appeared, would be SS-11s.  By the end of 1966, the Soviet silo starts (for 
missiles to be deployed in 1967), were almost exactly on pace with the CIA estimate at 111.  
Between December and February 1967, however, the number of new silo 
construction starts suddenly skyrocketed.  This development prompted the Director of 
Central Intelligence (DCI) Richard Helms to inform President Johnson and McNamara that a 
major strategic buildup appeared to be under way and that the Agency was revising the force 
projections for 1967 and 1968 sharply upward.  The Soviets, according to the CIA, would 
deploy something on the order of 160-200 ICBMs per year over the next two years.  At the 
CIA’s projected rate, the Soviet strategic force would stand at between 423-484 ICBMs in 
1967.  By 1968, the CIA expected the Soviet missile force to number between 670-765 
ICBMs, roughly three-quarters of which would be the smaller, less-threatening SS-11.222 
The revised projections not only proved to be too low, but the Soviets also appeared 
to have made some significant advances in the SS-9’s performance.  By the fall of 1967 the 
Soviet strategic force numbered no less than 700 deployed missiles, 101 of which were SS-
9s.  The CIA also determined that the Soviets had, incredibly, been able to increase the SS-
9’s payload capacity from 10,000 to 13,500 lbs.  Moreover, there was solid evidence that the 
SS-9 was so accurate that it could strike within could 0.5-0.75 nautical miles (n.m.) of its 
intended target—its “Circular Error Probable,” or CEP.  This degree of accuracy, together 
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with the SS-9’s huge payload capacity gave the giant missile an even greater counterforce 
potential than first projected against Minuteman.223   
The picture was further complicated by Soviet efforts in other areas.  The SS-13 that 
the Soviets had exhibited in 1965 was finally flight tested, and the Agency determined that it 
was indeed a solid-fueled missile.  Construction of the Galosh anti-ballistic missile system 
that had begun in 1961 around Moscow had been stepped up, and testing began on a mobile 
missile, the SSX-15 (RT-20P).  The tests at the Tyuratam Space Complex that the Agency 
had been so concerned about in 1966 turned out to be tests of two new and innovative 
warhead systems.  The first, termed a “fractional orbital bombardment system,” (FOBS), was 
similar to the American MIRV system then under development.  Like the MIRV system, the 
FOBS consisted of a single missile and a container (or “bus”) that held several warheads.  
Unlike the U.S. system, however, the warheads did not immediately re-enter the atmosphere 
to strike individual targets.  Rather, the FOBS warheads would orbit the Earth until given a 
command to re-enter the atmosphere.  Incapable of hitting a pre-programmed target like the 
U.S. MIRV, the FOBS warheads would simply bombard the area over which they were 
passing when the re-entry command was received.  The second system was a “depressed 
trajectory” ICBM which could potentially re-enter the Earth’s atmosphere over central 
Mexico.  The primary advantage to both systems over convention ICBMs was that either 
could avoid the U.S.’s northward-facing Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) 
radars. 
Despite these developments, the CIA and the Johnson Administration did not 
perceive an imminent threat to Minuteman.  Part of the reason was that there was no 
evidence that the Soviets were very far along in the development of a MIRVed warhead.  
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Indeed, the Soviets’ efforts to develop a depressed-trajectory ICBM and FOBS seemed to be 
stop-gap measures designed to overcome an inability to develop a reliable on-board targeting 
mechanism.  Moreover, neither system appeared to be accurate enough to destroy “hard” 
targets such as a Minuteman silo.   
There also seems to have been an expectation that the Soviet force structure was 
developing along lines similar to that of the U.S. strategic force.  This meant that the smaller, 
cheaper SS-11 would be the mainstay of the Soviet force and that Soviet targeting would, 
like the U.S., emphasize cities, or “countervalue,” rather than the opponent’s weapons, or 
“counterforce.”  The evidence for this development was strong.  Total silo starts for the SS-9 
in the first part of 1968 were down to 30, bringing the total deployments to 131.  If the 
missile programs were being developed and deployed under the typical Soviet five year plan, 
they could be expected to conclude by 1970 with a total of 600-900 missiles.  This would 
give the Soviet Union “rough numerical parity” with the United States, but 300 SS-9s would 
not be nearly enough to knock out the 1,000-missile strong Minuteman force.224 
There were, however, informed observers that viewed the Soviet programs with much 
more alarm than the CIA and the Johnson Administration.  Wohlstetter, in particular, felt that 
the sheer size and scope of the Soviet programs presaged an effort that could only result in a 
major shift in the strategic balance.  Among the U.S. military services, the Army’s view of 
the Soviet threat was closest to Wohlstetter’s, and lobbied the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD) and Congress heavily for approval of its ABM system, Sentinel, to protect 
U.S. cities against a Soviet attack.  Senator Henry M. Jackson, now chairman of the Military 
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Appropriations subcommittee of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, urged the Johnson 
Administration to approve the ABM as part of a substantial response to the Soviet buildup.225 
For its part, the Pentagon was not anxious to approve the ABM system.  Aside from 
its massive expense—approximately $40 billion—neither McNamara nor his successor, 
Clark Clifford, was convinced that it would work as advertised.  Although it had been in 
development since the early 1960s, McNamara had become convinced as early as 1966 that 
Soviet capabilities had grown beyond Sentinel’s capacity to protect U.S. population centers.  
The Army and some powerful congressional Democrats were, however, not prepared to 
simply discard Sentinel.  As a result, McNamara approved a scaled-down version, ostensibly 
to protect the U.S. homeland against an emerging Chinese nuclear threat.226 
 
Closing the Window of Vulnerability Together: The Partnership for Safeguard 
The hawkish view held by Wohlstetter and Jackson was shared by the Republican 
presidential candidate, Richard Nixon.  Campaigning on a “security gap” plank, Nixon 
charged that the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations had allowed American military might 
to deteriorate in a vain hope for “peace in our time.”  “This ‘parity’ concept,” Nixon charged, 
referring to the 1967 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), “means superiority for potential 
enemies.”  He expressed his doubts about the anti-Chinese rationale and derided the Johnson 
Administration’s proposal for a scaled-down version of Sentinel as “penny-pinching.” 
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5.1 Comparison of U.S. and Soviet ICBMs 
 
                                         L-R: Minuteman II, SS-11, SS-9, Minuteman III 
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5.2 The Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile System 
  
The Spartan interceptor missile was the                                 Safeguard radar at Grand Forks, N.D. 
heart of the Safeguard ABM system 
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The ABM, Nixon must be capable of protecting Americans against Soviet missiles.  If 
elected, he promised to restore U.S. strategic superiority and “root out the whiz kid 
approach” that he said had “taken hold at the Pentagon.”227 
Once the election was over, Nixon found the ABM system decision literally waiting 
on his desk.  He also seems to have found it much more difficult than he had anticipated to 
abandon the number-crunching, “whiz kid approach” he had railed against during the 
election.  Like McNamara and Johnson before him, Nixon discovered that the cost for a full-
scale system capable of protecting one large American city to be prohibitive:  $9 billion 
initially, and some $40 billion over ten years.  Unlike McNamara and Johnson, however, he 
did not have the option to cancel the ABM system or choose a limited deployment.228   
Thus entangled by his own rhetoric, Nixon ordered Secretary of Defense Melvin 
Laird in February to halt all work on the ABM until he could review the program.  In the 
interim, Nixon avoided mentioning “strategic superiority.”  Rather, the new president began 
to talk of maintaining “strategic sufficiency.”  When asked what “strategic sufficiency” 
meant in operational terms, the new Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard (a close friend 
of Wohlstetter’s) responded: “It means that it’s a good word to use in a speech.  Beyond that, 
it doesn’t mean a goddamned thing.”229 
On March 14, 1969, the Nixon Administration announced its decision: it would 
deploy the ABM—now re-named Safeguard.  It was also announced that the system would 
be deployed as a force protection system for the Minuteman sites at Malmstrom Air Force 
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Base in Montana and Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota.  This new rationale was 
much more consistent with Wohlstetter’s thesis that protection of the U.S. retaliatory force 
should have priority over all other targets, even American population centers.  The plan to 
deploy the ABM in a so-called “hard-point” defense mode also made much more sense in 
terms of the ABM’s actual capabilities.  As a defensive system for Minuteman against the 
SS-9, the ABM now had only to defend several square miles, rather several hundred square 
miles around an American city.230   
Packard was dispatched to Capitol Hill to explain the shift in strategy to the Senate 
Armed Services Committee.  The former electronics industry executive, however, seems to 
have been over-anxious to make the sale and overstated his case.  Packard also cited the 
growing Soviet capability in submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and the on-
going Soviet FOBS testing, even though the latest NIE discounted both as a threat to 
Minuteman.  For good measure, Packard also threw in the old (and hitherto discarded), 
Johnson Administration rationale that some sort of ABM system was needed to protect 
against an eventual Chinese missile threat. 231   
Packard’s overdone testimony set the tone for what would prove to be a series of 
inept moves by administration officials.  Hard on the heels of Packard’s appearance in the 
Senate, Secretary of State William P. Rogers publicly questioned the need for Safeguard.  
The administration’s case was further compromised by Laird’s curious insistence on 
periodically repeating the by-now-rather-transparent argument that Safeguard was needed as 
a shield against Chinese missiles.  There were also leaks from “informed sources” within the 
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administration that claimed Safeguard was to serve primarily as a bargaining chip in the 
upcoming arms talks with the Soviets.  The confusion became so great that AFL-CIO 
President George Meany, a key ally in the administration’s public relations effort for 
Safeguard, told National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger that he would support the ABM 
only if the president could prevent his Cabinet members from publicly contradicting him.  
Exasperated, Nixon fired a memo to Laird and Rogers stating that he would “cannot tolerate 
any further undercutting of the Administration’s policy.”232 
The administration also found that many members of Congress—including several 
prominent Republicans—had serious doubts about the ABM.   Most were concerned that 
Safeguard would endanger the upcoming arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union.  
Others harbored concerns about the system’s costs and efficacy.  At the end of April, 1969, a 
group of congressional Republicans led by Republican Sen. John Sherman Cooper of 
Kentucky proposed a moratorium on further debate on Safeguard until after the first round of 
the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviets had begun in November.233 
Also at the end of April, Sen. William Fulbright (D-AR), the chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, had invited Helms to conduct a briefing behind closed doors. 
Between May 1-10, Helms, accompanied by CIA analysts, told senators that while the 
Soviets had conducted two test firings of SS-9s (August 23 and September 11, 1968) that 
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were not completely inconsistent with a MIRV development program, the RVs were multiple 
re-entry vehicle warheads (MRVs), and were not independently-guided.  This conclusion was 
apparently based on the large, ungainly design of the RVs, as well as the relatively small 
“footprint” of the RVs’ impact.  Indeed, the Soviet RVs’ aerodynamic performance was such 
that the CIA concluded that the use of these multiple warheads “would degrade the accuracy 
and reliability of the SS-9 system.”  The general consensus within the intelligence 
community, Helms explained, was that the MRV system tests were part of a Soviet effort to 
enhance the effectiveness of a countervalue strike.234  
In the face of these mounting troubles, the administration turned to Jackson.  Jackson 
was, in many ways, the administration’s natural ally.  A defense “hawk,” Jackson was also an 
acknowledged expert on strategic issues.   His opinions therefore carried significant weight in 
the Congress.  He also possessed a loyal, knowledgeable, disciplined staff who could be 
trusted to stay “on message” without volunteering information.  Moreover, a partnership with 
Jackson would lend administration policy the luster of bipartisanship.  In a country and 
congress already deeply divided over Vietnam, the appearance—if not the substance—of 
bipartisanship could be an important political asset.   
Taking up the administration’s banner, Jackson’s staff sprang into action.  Fosdick 
asked DCI Helms to review the data gathered by the CIA about a series of re-entry vehicle 
(RV) tests that the Soviets were conducting.  The CIA had concluded that the Soviets were 
testing multiple re-entry vehicles (MRVs), or warheads which fanned out across a general 
area as a result of the aerodynamic properties, rather than MIRVs, which could strike widely 
separated targets.  Although the CIA’s main analytical section, the Office of National 
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Estimates (ONE) felt that the request was “a subtle and indirect effort to alter the national 
intelligence judgment,” Helms agreed to revisit the data.235 
Simultaneously the Jackson staff enlisted Wohlstetter to rebut an anti-ABM report 
being prepared by Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA).  The report catalogued where various 
administration statements about Soviet capabilities differed with the NIEs, giving particularly 
close scrutiny to Packard’s statements to the Senate in March, and subsequent statements by 
Laird.  It also offered a separate analysis of Soviet capabilities by two MIT professors, 
George Rathjens and Ralph Lapp, both of whom had formerly served with the Atomic 
Energy Commission (AEC).  In this effort, Wohlstetter was assisted by a young protégé, Paul 
D. Wolfowitz, a recent Political Science Ph.D. who had studied under Leo Strauss and 
Wohlstetter at the University of Chicago.    
There was also an effort to lobby undecided members of Congress with a letter-
writing and fund-raising campaign by a group called the “Committee to Maintain a Prudent 
Defense Policy.”  This group, headed by former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, sought to 
promote a “balanced . . . carefully reasoned debate” over Safeguard.  It boasted a bi-partisan 
membership that included Wohlstetter, Paul Nitze (former head of the Policy Planning Staff 
and chairman of the Advisory Board of the John Hopkins School of Advanced International 
Studies), Frederick Eaton and Arthur Dean (successive heads of the U.S. delegation at the 
Geneva Disarmament Conference of 1958-1961), Robert Lovett (Secretary of Defense under 
Eisenhower), Eugene Wigner (Nobel-winning physicist) and Charles Herzfeld (first chief of 
the Advanced Research Projects Agency and a Wohlstetter colleague at RAND).  Richard 
Perle, who had attended Hollywood High School with Wohlstetter’s daughter Joan, and was 
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now studying international relations at Princeton, was hired as the group’s chief researcher.  
In its mailings, the Committee supplied congressmen with copies of Wohlstetter’s writings, 
as well as analyses from RAND alum Herman Kahn’s Hudson Institute and the American 
Security Council.236 
The Jackson efforts were generally successful.  Wohlstetter sharply and convincingly 
rebutted the book-length Kennedy Report testimony in front of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee with a twenty-one page analysis prepared by Wolfowitz.  The lobbying effort by 
the Acheson group effort also managed to raise $15,000 (half of which was put up by Nitze 
personally) and to gain some support for Safeguard.  As the summer of 1969 wore on, most 
of the “undecideds” seem to have lined up with the pro-ABM forces, bringing the balance in 
the Congress to roughly 50 percent for the ABM, and 50 percent against.237 
The main problem for Safeguard’s proponents was the 1969 NIE.  The CIA’s review 
of the data from the Soviet RV tests had not produced any evidence that a MIRVed SS-9 was 
imminent.  Indeed, the only new insight was that the SS-9 was much less accurate with the 
new RV system, than with its original single warhead.  The 1969 NIE, however, was not to 
be issued until November and both sides sought to exploit this “intelligence gap’ by 
disseminating their own interpretation of Soviet missile capabilities.  On July 17, Sen. Stuart 
Symington managed to gain a closed session of the entire Senate to present summaries of 
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third-party analyses conducted for the Pentagon on Safeguard.  These analyses, prepared by 
the quasi-governmental Institute for Defense Analyses and the Aerospace Corporation, had 
both relied heavily on draft sections of the 1969 NIE—a point Symington repeatedly 
emphasized in his presentation.238  
Fosdick was not to be outmaneuvered the anti-ABM forces.  During the closed 
session, Jackson dramatically announced that he had obtained “last minute intelligence” 
about Soviet capabilities.  Drawing (in all probability) from the same sources as Symington, 
Jackson produced overlays to Symington’s charts, prepared by Wolfowitz, which produced 
opposite results.  In addition, Jackson claimed that there had been an unexpected and rapid 
increase in the number and capabilities of Soviet ballistic missile-launching submarines, and 
that they were planning to introduce yet another new intercontinental bomber was imminent.   
The two sides appeared to have arrived at a stalemate.  Fulbright, after observing as 
much, asked Jackson:  “Has my good friend had a chance, yet, to digest the remarks of the 
Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, in Warsaw last week, in which the Soviet 
Foreign Minister said that the Soviet Union wanted to reach a new era of détente—of 
cordiality with the United States?  And doesn't my friend from Washington think that before 
we rush pell mell into this unproven missile system, we should give just some little credence 
to the words of the Russian Foreign Minister?”  Drawing himself up from his desk, Jackson 
related a story about how President Kennedy in October 1962 had asked Gromyko, if there 
were any Russian missiles in Cuba.  When Gromyko replied that there were not, the 
president asked if any missiles been transported on Russian ships to Cuba?  “No,” Gromyko 
had replied.  Kennedy then asked: “Are there any Russian troops in Cuba assembling 
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missiles?”  After Gromyko replied negatively a third time, the president opened the drawer of 
his desk, took out a folder full of photographs taken by U.S. U-2 spy planes, and threw them 
in front of Mr. Gromyko.  The photos, according to Jackson:  
. . . showed the missiles, showed the ships—the pictures were so good that 
you could see the chevrons on the sleeves of the Russian troops in Cuba 
assembling the missiles.  Andrei Gromyko left that room an acknowledged 
liar.  If my friend from Arkansas wants to rest the security of this country on 
the truthfulness and credibility of Andrei Gromyko, that's his business.  I 
would not ask a single American to sleep safely tonight based upon the 
credibility of Andrei Gromyko.  
 
Later that afternoon, the Senate approved Safeguard, 51 – 50, with Vice President Spiro T. 
Agnew casting the deciding vote.  Fulbright voted aye. 239 
 
The Partnership Strained: Realistic Deterrence  
The Nixon Administration’s victory in the ABM debate was, in some ways, to prove 
a Pyrrhic one insofar as it drew new attention to Minuteman’s increasing vulnerability.  The 
loud and dramatic first-strike warnings had dragged the issue of Minuteman’s vulnerability 
out of the shadowy esoterica of nuclear strategy and into the political light and lent it an 
urgency that had not heretofore existed.  As a result, various hardliners within the 
administration, such as Nitze, Seymour Weiss (the State Department’s Deputy Director of 
Policy Planning) and Defense Secretary Laird, began to press for a major U.S. strategic arms 
buildup and a review of U.S. strategic doctrine.  In the Congress the effort was led by 
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Fosdick and Jackson, while outside of government Wohlstetter, the American Security 
Council, and the Hudson Institute were the most prominent voices.240   
The issue of Minuteman’s vulnerability first re-surfaced during Laird’s annual 
posture statement to the Congress in February and March 1970.  In appearances before the 
Senate and House Armed Services Committees, Laird resurrected the hoary Chinese missile 
threat, and described the ongoing Soviet ICBM and SLBM programs with data culled from 
NIE 11-8-69.  The Secretary’s shocking piece de resistance, however, did not come from the 
1969 NIE.  Drawing on an analysis prepared by Wohlstetter in his capacity as a consultant to 
the Pentagon, Laird warned that the Soviets could be “expected to have their first MIRVs by 
1971, and a very formidable hard target kill capability by the mid-1970s.”241 
As the campaign gathered steam in the wake of Laird’s testimony, a fuller picture of 
what the neoconservatives were proposing began to emerge when Wohlstetter, in Senate 
testimony, outlined a new strategic doctrine called Realistic Deterrence.  Designed by 
William W. Kaufman (a former member of Wohlstetter’s SAPR Group, now at the 
Pentagon), Realistic Deterrence would replace Assured Destruction as the doctrinal criterion 
for the adequacy of U.S. retaliatory power.  McNamara’s decision to freeze the American 
strategic force at 1,054 ICBMs, for instance, was based on the requirements of the Assured 
Destruction doctrine.  Given the increase in Soviet strategic power over the past few years, 
however, it was no longer reasonable to assume that the U.S. missile force would deter the 
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Soviet Union in all instances.  Just as had been the case with Massive Retaliation, the threat 
of the complete, apocalyptic assured destruction of Soviet society had lost credibility once 
the Soviet Union obtained strategic parity with the United States.  What was needed, 
according to Wohlstetter, was a new strategic doctrine—Realistic Deterrence—that planned 
for deterrence across an entire “spectrum of conflict.”242 
It is, of course, not difficult to see a similarity between the new concept of Realistic 
Deterrence and the Flexible Response of the Kennedy era.  At the core of both strategies, for 
instance, was the idea that strategic conflict was not “unthinkable,” as many Charles River 
theorists presumed.  In addition, both strategies envisioned “limited” strategic conflict, with 
both sides would, of course, initiate a “relative increase” in the U.S. “baseline of 
capabilities.”  As outlined by the Pentagon, the new doctrine would require a massive arms 
buildup heavily weighted toward strategic systems: 41 new nuclear submarines; a new naval 
missile system; accelerated development of a MIRV system for Minuteman; a new ICBM 
guidance system (the Draper Labs-developed NS-20); a program to improve the “hardening” 
all Minuteman silos; a mobile-basing system for Minuteman; two new strategic bombers, (B-
1 and F-111); a new nuclear aircraft carrier (DVAN-70); a naval “floating command post” 
system; an airborne warning and control system (AWACS); an entirely new over-the-horizon 
radar system (OTHR); a cruise missile development program, and an expansion of Safeguard 
from two to twelve sites.  All told, the first year price tag of the buildup represented an $8-10 
billion increase in the defense budget over the previous year.243    
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Even more significant than the massive buildup prescribed by the new doctrine was 
the inclusion of contingencies for what were called, “new offensive concepts.”  This phrase 
was a euphemism for a “generated alert options” or pre-emptive nuclear strikes of varying 
sizes.  These options were, understandably, not advertised widely by the Pentagon.  Indeed, 
the Pentagon was so close-lipped about the details of the new doctrine that NSC staffer 
Laurence Lynn warned Kissinger that Laird and his assistant William Baroody, Jr. (the son of 
Goldwater campaign manager and American Enterprise Institute founder, William Baroody), 
were being “misleading to the point of being dishonest” in their representations of the new 
doctrine.   
From Kissinger’s perspective, Realistic Deterrence represented a significant danger to 
the arms control process.  As NSC staffer Larry Lynn warned, the “veiled threats and crude 
and misleading use of intelligence data” emanating from Jackson’s office and the Pentagon 
were creating the impression that the administration had “virtually suspended our strategic 
programs” in the interests of concluding a SALT agreement.  This perception could, as 
Kissinger knew, could dampen enthusiasm for arms control and lend support the hardliners’ 
arguments.  Conversely, asking Congress for funding to accelerate the MIRV and ABM 
programs—let alone monies for a major American arms buildup—would involve the 
administration in another bruising, Safeguard-type fight with the Congress.  Moreover, the 
administration would be “handing the Soviets additional excuses for engaging in their own 
propagandizing and/or abandoning SALT altogether.” 244    
Kissinger reacted to this quandary by attempting to undermine the rationale for a U.S. 
buildup.  Taking a page from Fosdick’s book, he enlisted the CIA’s help.  In May he 
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arranged with Helms for CIA analysts to brief a select group of congressional staffers.  In a 
preview of the 1970 NIE, the CIA analysts refuted the claim that a Soviet MIRV was 
imminent.  They also delivered a rather sunny assessment of the likely directions of Soviet 
security policy in the context of SALT, maintaining that the negotiations would most likely 
have a restraining effect on future arms programs.  
The White House also pressed Laird to scale back the Pentagon budget request by 
$20 billion.  After much back and forth, the budget was submitted at $71 billion, some $17 
billion less than originally requested.  It was also agreed that the administration would seek 
funding to expand Safeguard (from two sites to four), under a supplemental request 
shepherded through the Senate by Jackson.  Even with the pared down budget, however, the 
Senate Armed Services Committee—chaired by the hawkish Sen. Stennis—took the 
extraordinary step of cutting an additional $1.3 billion, while the House Armed Services 
Committee removed a further $1.9 billion, and the Senate Appropriations Committee cut 
$300 million.  Realistic Deterrence, it seemed, was a non sequitur. 245 
 
At Odds: The Bunker Versus the White House 
The demise of Realistic Deterrence signaled the beginning of the end of the Jackson 
camp’s tacit partnership with the Nixon Administration and the beginning of a new 
adversarial relationship.  Although Jackson, Wohlstetter and Fosdick had made common 
cause with the administration in the interests of enhancing the U.S. strategic position, the 
dissembling over Safeguard, coupled with Nixon’s unwillingness to re-orient American 
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strategic doctrine away from minimal deterrence and toward war-fighting through Realistic 
Deterrence was simply too much for the neoconservatives’ patience.  By the summer of 
1970, the alliance between the neoconservatives and the White House had collapsed. 
Indeed, as détente gathered steam, the ideological differences between Jackson’s 
office—“the Bunker,” as its denizens referred to it—and the White House began to manifest 
themselves ever more clearly.  Believing the Soviet Union to be a incorrigibly evil regime, 
bent on the destruction of America, Jackson and Fosdick became increasingly alarmed at the 
administration’s “apparent readiness to assume Soviet good will,” even as the Soviet buildup 
continued apace.  Rather than the “era of negotiation” anticipated by Nixon and Kissinger, 
Jackson and Fosdick believed that the United States should be formulating strategies to roll 
back Soviet power.246 
Conversely, from Nixon and Kissinger’s realist perspective, the Soviet Union 
appeared similar to many of the Great Powers of the past.  While Communist ideology might 
tactically and rhetorically inform Soviet policy, Nixon and Kissinger were convinced that 
Soviet leaders were motivated by desires for prestige, economic gain and national security.  
As a result of this realist view, there was almost no mutual foreign policy ground to be shared 
by the neoconservatives and the Nixon Administration.  Only arms control remained as a 
possible area of cooperation.     
In the summer of 1970, that possibility disappeared.  The precipitating event in the 
struggle between the Bunker and the White House was the appearance in the summer of 1970 
of a SALT negotiating proposal called “Option E.”  An attempt to meet the Soviet position to 
limit ABMs, Option E proposed that Soviet missiles would be limited to a total of 1,900 
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strategic missiles and bombers, with a to-be-determined sub-limit on the SS-9s.  It also called 
for a ban on silo enlargement and a provision that allowed less threatening SLBMs to be 
substituted for decommissioned ICBMs, but not the reverse.  In regard to defensive 
capabilities, Option E would ban or severely limit ABM systems.  No limitations were 
included on MIRVs, although it is unclear why.247  
As Kissinger was undoubtedly aware, Option E could be more difficult to sell to 
Safeguard supporters in the United States than to the Soviets.  Jackson, Stennis and a number 
of other powerful Democrats who had supported the administration through the Safeguard 
fight on the grounds that it was essential to U.S. security would now be asked to support a 
treaty that curtailed or eliminated ABMs altogether on the same grounds.    Such a request 
would imply that the administration’s entire ABM effort had been aimed a securing a 
“bargaining chip” for use in the negotiations.  
There were also more serious military considerations.  Kissinger’s own staff members 
warned him in January 1971 that Option E would “leave Minuteman vulnerable.”  The 
remaining SS-9 force would pose the main threat.  Even if the Soviets could be induced to 
reduce the number of SS-9s deployed, the NSC staff concluded that remaining “Soviet 
forces, without cheating or abrogation, can be improved qualitatively enough to seriously 
threaten Minuteman.”  While this vulnerability, the NSC staff conjectured, could possibly be 
mitigated practically and politically in several ways, no agreement likely to be signed would 
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completely foreclose the possibility of Soviet cheating or the attainment of a counterforce 
capability.248 
The NSC staff’s grim assessment of Option E was corroborated by Wohlstetter.  
Asked to comment by Fosdick, he concluded that Option E’s focus on limiting defensive 
measures and numbers of bombers and launchers was misguided.  The qualitative aspects of 
the weapons—accuracy, MIRV capability, and the lifting capacity of missiles, or “throw-
weight”—should be the central focus of the negotiations, rather than the sheer numbers.  
Failure to consider throw-weight, for instance, would leave the Soviets with an enormous 
advantage insofar as the SS-9 could potentially carry up to ten warheads.  Over time as the 
Soviets increased the accuracy of their missiles and developed MIRV technology, even the 
275-350 SS-9s that Kissinger was willing to allow under Option E would represent a 
significant counterforce threat to Minuteman.  Summing up his assessment of Option E, 
Wohlstetter judged it “a complete disaster and worse than no agreement at all.” 
Unsurprisingly, Jackson and Fosdick shared Wohlstetter’s view of Option E.  They 
were not, however, irrevocably opposed as long as an allowance for a hard-point defense 
could be negotiated in conjunction with a freeze on offensive weapons.  Along these lines 
Wohlstetter asked the NSC working group in charge of formulating the U.S. position, the 
Defense Programs Review Committee (DPRC), to consider an alternative, the so-called, 
“Option F.”  Option F would allow unlimited ABM deployments west of the Mississippi and 
in Siberia and an immediate freeze on all offensive missile deployments.  Wohlstetter’s 
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alternative was rejected by the DPRC on the grounds that the Soviets could covertly transfer 
their ABM systems west in a crisis. 249 
As for Kissinger, he was hesitant to consider allowing any ABMs at all.  His dialogue 
with the Soviets through the back channel indicated that a complete ABM ban might be the 
only agreement that could be had.  Nixon, however, was growing increasingly concerned 
about the domestic political fallout that would ensue if Safeguard were to be traded away too 
blithely.  As a result of the president’s concerns, Kissinger proposed in March a plan 
whereby the Soviets would keep their Galosh ABM system deployed around Moscow, and 
the U.S. would be allowed four Safeguard installations around selected Minuteman missile 
fields.  This so-called “4 to 1 solution” was rejected by the Soviets, who wondered why a 
new proposal was appearing after there had already been “substantial agreement” on a plan to 
only allow ABMs around Moscow and Washington.250 
Aware of these deliberations through leaks from the NSC staff, Jackson and Fosdick 
decided to fire a shot across the Nixon Administration’s bow.  Seeking to press the 
administration to insist on the linkage of offensive and defensive weapons, the Jackson forces 
stated their case in series of public appearances.  During the first of these, an appearance on 
the CBS news program “Face the Nation,” Jackson grimly announced that U.S. intelligence 
satellites had detected some newly-constructed ICBM silos capable of containing missiles 
even larger than the gigantic SS-9.  The silos, Jackson warned, were for “huge new missiles . 
. . as big or bigger than the SS-9.”  He also revealed that the silos had been discovered in 
                                                 
249
 Ibid. 
 
250
 “Memorandum of Conversation between Henry A. Kissinger and Anatoly F. Dobrynin,” January 28, 1971, 
Henry A. Kissinger, “Memorandum for the President: National Security Council Meeting on SALT,” March 25, 
1970, U.S. SALT Delegation, “Memorandum of Conversation between Ambassador J. Graham Parson and 
Deputy Minister Pleshakov,” March 26, 1971, [online] National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 60, 
William Burr, ed., http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB60/index.html [June 15, 2006]. 
 208 
early February, prior to the president’s foreign policy report to the Congress on February 25.  
The presidential report had not, needless, to say, mentioned the new silos.251 
The reaction to Jackson’s announcement was swift from all quarters.  Senator 
Symington, a leader of the senate faction that favored a freeze or moratorium on both Soviet 
and American arms, accused Jackson of revealing classified information.  An unidentified 
“intelligence source” at the Pentagon echoed Jackson and speculated that the silos presaged 
“the deployment of an altogether new missile system.”  The administration’s reaction was to 
dispatch Admiral Thomas Moorer, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to calm the 
congressional waters by appearances in front of the Senate and House Armed Services 
Committees.  Aside from a vague comment by Nixon that Jackson was “very close to right” 
about the size of the new holes, the White House was silent.252 
The silence was broken on May 20, 1971.  In a surprise radio address in the middle of 
the afternoon Nixon announced that, in order to break the almost year-long stalemate at 
SALT, the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to “concentrate on curbing anti-
ballistic missiles” in 1971.  As for Soviet and American ICBMs, both sides would “seek to 
agree on certain measures” to limit offensive capabilities.  A diplomatic communiqué, issued 
simultaneously was only slightly more encouraging.  The United States, it stated, would not 
be satisfied with an “ABM-only” agreement, but would seek an “ABM-plus” agreement.  At 
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this point, the Jackson faction seems to have taken the decision to go into all-out opposition 
to SALT.253 
The point-man of the anti-SALT effort was the youngest member of the senator’s 
staff, twenty-nine year old Richard Perle.  A protégé of Wohlstetter, Perle had initially come 
to Washington to pursue a job with Kissinger in 1968, but took the job of executive director 
of the pro-Safeguard lobbying group, The Committee for a Prudent Defense Policy.   After 
the ABM vote, Perle had accepted a job in the market research department of the 
Westinghouse Corporation in Waltham, Massachusetts.  Fosdick, however, was hesitant to 
let the young man leave Washington.  Impressed with his intelligence and drive, she 
introduced him to Jackson.  Greatly impressed with the senator, Perle was convinced by 
Fosdick to remain in Washington.  Almost immediately she was forced to defend him when, 
in April 1970, an FBI wiretap intercepted a conversation between Perle and an unidentified 
person at the Israeli Embassy in Washington.  Although the journalist Seymour Hersh later 
maintained that Perle’s conversation included mention of classified information, Perle was 
never indicted or prosecuted.254 
Aside from this inauspicious beginning, Perle proved to be a valuable addition to 
Jackson’s staff.  Like Jackson and Fosdick, he was well-versed in national security issues 
through his long apprenticeship to Wohlstetter which stretched back to his high school days.  
He was also a staunch anti-Communist, and well-connected within the business community.  
Like Jackson and Fosdick, Perle also regarded Kissinger’s realist approach to foreign affairs 
as amoral.  Perhaps Perle’s greatest asset, however, was his talent for gathering confidential 
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information.  He had, for instance, established close relationships with prominent members 
of Kissinger’s staff, such as Hal Sonnenfeldt, John Lehman and Peter Rodman.  Even 
General Alexander Haig, whom Perle described as “quite easy to talk to,” was on his 
Rolodex.   Indeed, these relationships were in all likelihood the means whereby Jackson 
learned of the NSC’s internal deliberations regarding the SALT negotiations.   
Perle’s generalship of the effort to de-rail SALT was subtle and imaginative.  In 
dealings with the White House, Jackson and Fosdick maintained relatively cordial relations.  
Behind the scenes, however, Perle led the effort to de-rail the arms control process.  Working 
his way through the Senate offices, Perle harangued staffers and senators alike on the dangers 
of any Soviet-American treaty that banned or limited the ABMs.  He also served as 
something of a “speech broker,” collaborating with the staffs of 20-25 senators to get anti-
SALT speeches and statements written.  Many of these speeches relied on facts, analyses and 
information gathered by Perle from Fosdick’s “database” of experts, such as Wohlstetter, 
University of Chicago alums Bernard Lewis (Princeton) and Michael Ledeen (University of 
Washington), China expert Charles Horner (University of Chicago), international relations 
specialist William Van Cleave (University of Southern California), and the historian of 
imperial Russia, Richard Pipes (Harvard University).  Perle also became quite adept at 
“leaking” or “planting” stories in the press.  “He is unquestionably one of our town’s greatest 
leakers,” one journalist ventured.  Perle’s usual partners in this endeavor were the 
conservative journalists, Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, authors of the syndicated 
column, “Inside Report.”  Indeed, “Inside Report’s” stories became such a thorn in the side 
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of the Nixon Administration that Evans’s and Novak’s names were, they were to learn later, 
added to the president’s infamous “enemies list.”255 
On May 26, 1972, Nixon and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev signed the two 
basic SALT instruments in Moscow: the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty.  The 
Interim Agreement, which dealt with offensive weapons and was to be valid for five years, 
limited the United States to its existing 1,054 ICBMs already deployed and the Soviets to 
1,618 ICBMs, not all of which were deployed as of the signing of the agreement.  The Soviet 
figure encompassed 209 older SS-7s and SS-8s (most of which were believed to be targeted 
on China), 970 SS-11s (the missile most comparable to Minuteman), 60 SS-13s (the follow-
on to the SS-11 that the Soviets intended to deploy in the smaller of the new silos constructed 
in 1970-71), 66 missiles for the larger of the new silos, and a sub-ceiling of 313 SS-9s (288 
of which were deployed at the time).  There were also protocols to the agreement in which 
the U.S. parties would be allowed an additional 710 SLBMs on 42 submarines and the Soviet 
Union by 950 missiles on 66 submarines.  On the defensive side, both the United States and 
the Soviet Union were limited to two 100-missile ABM sites, one of which could be 
deployed around the respective national capitals, and one around any other city or military 
installation.256  
The Jackson forces’ public reaction to these agreements was muted disappointment.  
“Our people caved in, let’s face it,” Jackson told Kissinger.  Behind the scenes, however, 
there was incredulity at the administration for signing such an agreement.  There was, for 
instance, much concern over the advantage the agreements gave the Soviets in ICBM throw-
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weight versus that of the United States: 6,845,500 lbs. vs.  1,855,675 lbs.   Although the 
Soviet’s almost 4:1 advantage was partly offset by a higher number of U.S. warheads (5,700 
vs. 2,500), with greater accuracy, a decided U.S. advantage in manned bombers and a slight 
advantage in SLBM throw-weight (848,000 lbs. to 624,000 lbs.), the total disparity was 
expected to increase still further in the Soviet’s favor as the SS-9 sub-ceiling was met, older 
ICBMs were replaced with newer models and the Soviet submarine force increased and 
technological advancements increased the weight-to-yield ration of individual warheads.  All 
told, the numbers were, in Perle’s words, “esthetically displeasing.”257 
As the Senate prepared to take up the matter of ratifying the arms control agreements, 
the focus shifted from the asymmetry of the number of launchers to those aspects of the 
agreement governing the modernization provisions, particularly the limitations on missile 
silo volume.  Silo volume, as measured by satellite photos, was the most—if not the only—
reliable way to assure which types of missiles were deployed where.  Silo volume had, in 
fact, been a quite thorny issue throughout the entire SALT round, at every level.  Indeed, 
Nixon, Kissinger, Brezhnev, Gromyko and Dobrynin had quarreled, bargained and counter-
proposed over the definitions and silo-size limits up until the very day the Interim Agreement 
was signed on May 26.  They had settled upon a complex set of interlocking provisions 
(Article 2 of the agreement, Agreed Statement C, Common Understanding A, and Unilateral 
Statement D) which banned converting “light” missile silos to accommodate “heavy” 
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missiles by limiting any increase in silo size to no more than 15 percent of its present 
dimensions.258     
Jackson, in particular, was uneasy at the potential implications of the thicket of 
protocols that accompanied the Interim Agreement.  While it was clear that the restrictions 
on silo size increases had been enacted to restrain Soviet deployment of the follow-on to the 
SS-9, the SS-19, Jackson was disturbed that Unilateral Statement D expressed the U.S. 
delegation’s “regret” that “the Soviet Delegation has not been willing to agree on a common 
definition of a heavy missile.”  The Soviet refusal to agree to a simple definition of terms 
was, of course, just the sort of maneuver likely to arouse the senator’s suspicions.  Pressing 
the issue during a briefing by Kissinger in June, Jackson received Kissinger’s assurance that 
the silo size modification limit of 15 percent was an “adequate safeguard against a substantial 
substitution of heavy missiles for light missiles.”259   
Jackson, however, was not reassured.  He was even less so when Perle learned from 
the columnist Jack Anderson that, during the Moscow summit, U.S. intelligence had 
intercepted a radio-telephone between Brezhnev and a senior Soviet military official 
confirming that the 15 percent silo size limit would not prevent the deployment of the SS-19.  
Although it was not clear at the time how the Soviets would accomplish this, or even that 
Kissinger had been made aware of the intercept while in Moscow, it seemed highly unlikely 
to Jackson that he would not have known.  Given the nature of the information and the way 
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in which it had been obtained, Jackson could not readily employ it against the administration.  
Fosdick, of course, did let Kissinger know in her own inimitable way that she and the senator 
knew about the intercept and what she thought about Kissinger’s failure to act on the 
information.260 
Hard on the heels of this development, Jackson also learned that Nixon and Brezhnev 
had concluded a secret agreement at the Moscow summit in May.  Although it was unclear as 
to what the precise terms of the agreement was, it was known that it had to do with the 
provision that allowed each side to build more SLBMs as they retired older ICBMs.  Jackson, 
apparently feeling no more confident about the veracity of this information than he had about 
the radio intercept, did nothing with it.261 
Jackson, of course, recognized that the administration held the upper hand at the 
moment.  The arms control agreements were very politically popular with the American 
people, and subsequently, their representatives in Congress.  The White House also did its 
utmost to reinforce the general public perception of arms control as a “good thing,” with 
some very adept public relations work.  In his public briefings or congressional testimony 
Kissinger would, for instance, invariably present the numbers arrived at in Moscow alongside 
some very creative projections of Soviet force levels without an arms control agreement.  
This technique also proved to be effective against waverers in the House and Senate, insofar 
as it indirectly supplied them with talking points to defend their vote for SALT.  “The 
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question to ask in assessing the freeze,” Kissinger told the Senate Armed Services Committee 
in July, “is not what situation it perpetuates but what situation it prevents.”262 
The SALT accords had also, somewhat surprisingly, suddenly become quite popular 
with Laird and the military.  As late as June, Laird could be found telling the Senate Armed 
Services Committee that he could not support the just-concluded Interim Agreement unless 
Congress agreed to a ten year strategic modernization program.  The same month, the 
Defense Secretary reiterated his position to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and 
added that he believed that the Soviets “have tested a MIRV,” and were only “twelve to 
fourteen months away” from deploying a MIRVed warhead.  Unless the United States could 
“bargain from a strong position,” Laird maintained, he would recommend “scrapping” the 
Interim Agreement.  By July, however, Laird and the military service chiefs were effusive in 
their praise for SALT.  At one point the cognitive dissonance engendered by this abrupt 
volte-face caused Jackson to snap at General John D. Ryan, the Air Force Chief of Staff:   
You can’t come up here when you are demanding a weapons system with one 
line and then when you are trying to justify a treaty take an opposite line . . . I 
am fed up with getting one kind of answer under one set of circumstances and 
exactly the reverse under another.263  
 
The explanation for Laird’s sudden reversal was that the White House had “struck a 
deal” with the Pentagon and the JCS, although neither the White House nor the Pentagon 
would immediately confirm an arrangement.  Jackson, however, managed to get General 
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Bruce Palmer, the Army Chief of Staff, to admit that there was a quid pro quo.  To add insult 
to injury, Palmer also reluctantly admitted that the service chiefs had only considered the 
implications of the SALT agreements for “a few hours” before they were signed in Moscow.  
Whatever the circumstances, the defection of the Pentagon weakened the anti-SALT forces 
considerably.264   
The Bunker was also hamstrung by a procedural issue.  Specifically, the 
administration had submitted the Interim Agreement as an “executive agreement,” rather than 
as a treaty.  This meant that the agreement required only a simple majority vote within the 
House and Senate.  While a single senator could still bring the chamber’s business to a 
standstill, it was much less easy to do in this instance.  The agreement did not, for instance, 
have to pass through any committees as would a bill of law.  Furthermore, because the 
agreement was expected to be first submitted to the House, where support for it was strong, 
any delay within the Senate would be that much more glaring.  There was, however, no 
delay.  Both accords were recommended for approval on September 30, 1972.265   
 
Outcomes 
In the immediate aftermath of the conclusion of SALT, the Jackson forces did, 
however, manage to extract a single concession from the White House: the so-called Jackson 
Amendment (Public Law 92-448).  The only modification made to the SALT accords before 
ratification, the Jackson Amendment required that all future arms control agreements result 
in “essential equivalence” between the United States and Soviet Union.  Left undefined in the 
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text of the amendment, “essential equivalence” was to prove a significant obstacle (or a 
safeguard, depending on one’s point of view), to future negotiations.  Ironically, the 
amorphous phrase was inserted by NSC staffer John Lehman whom Kissinger had delegated 
to assist Perle and Fosdick in drafting the amendment.  Ostensibly inserted as a means of 
forcing consideration of qualitative factors (such as throw-weight), Kissinger had left the 
phrase in, intending to use the ambiguity against the Soviets in the next stage of arms control 
talks.  Only “gradually and very reluctantly” did he come to realize that the purpose of the 
amendment was not to provide him with leverage over the Soviets but to restrain U.S. 
negotiators from making any concessions that did not meet with Jackson’s approval.266 
From a wider perspective, there were other significant outcomes of the struggles over 
Safeguard, Realistic Deterrence and SALT I that had to do with the future direction of the 
strategic debate within the United States.  First and most importantly, the series of 
controversies—particularly the one surrounding the Interim Agreement—had served to drive 
home the fact that, despite all the benefits that Kissinger claimed would accrue from SALT, 
Minuteman was becoming increasingly vulnerable.  As Wohlstetter had predicted in 1970, 
the focus on the number of launchers would leave the Soviets with significant advantages in 
throw-weight.  This development, in turn, highlighted the Nixon Administration’s apparent 
failure to respond in kind to the Soviet buildup.  Although this was not entirely true, the deep 
secretiveness and long lead-times involved in most strategic development programs made it a 
charge that the administration found difficult to refute.   
The issue of Minuteman’s vulnerability also all but guaranteed that future debates 
would include arcane and complex discussions of strategy and the performance 
characteristics of individual weapons systems.  From Kissinger’s perspective, the “technical 
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controversies” that would hereafter accompany arms control negotiations were exasperating 
insofar as they “submerged the arms control process in minutiae.”  Although this was 
undoubtedly true to a certain extent, it was also true that Kissinger at his inability to continue 
to “blind with science.”  After almost three years of unremitting debate over strategic issues, 
the Congress and the public were becoming educated about strategic matters.  In the wake of 
the arguments over ABM and SALT, technical issues that had formerly seemed hopelessly 
esoteric began to be discussed and debated as a matter of course in the Congress and among 
the educated public.267 
Kissinger’s disdain of the details also prepared the ground for neoconservative 
charges of Soviet cheating.  In 1974, for instance, U.S. intelligence learned precisely how the 
Soviets intended to fit their heavy SS-17 missiles in SS-11 silos governed by the Interim 
Agreement’s size restrictions.  The Soviets, it turned out, had developed a “cold-launch” 
technique where the missile was “popped” out of its silo with compressed air before the 
engines ignited.  Although this so-called “cold-launch” technique required some modification 
of the existing silo diameters, the modifications remained within the 15 percent limit 
established by the Interim Agreement.  Extra space, however, was secured by removal of the 
heat shielding that was normally necessary to protect the silo against hot exhaust gases.  
While the Soviets could claim that technically they were not in violation of the SALT 
agreement, many on the U.S. side felt betrayed by their failure to adhere to the spirit if not 
the letter of the agreement.268 
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For Jackson and his staff and followers, the most significant development was the 
hubris that success engendered in their opponents.  Impressed with their own unprecedented 
accomplishments in foreign and security policy, Nixon and Kissinger refused to believe that 
the neoconservatives would break definitively with the White House over SALT.  When 
Jackson began to openly oppose the president in 1972, Nixon ascribed their differences to 
“tactical differences,” believing that the relationship could and would revert to what it had 
been during the halcyon days of 1969.  After all, Jackson was becoming increasingly 
unwelcome within his own party and, proceeding from their cynical view of human nature, 
Nixon and Kissinger fully expected the senator to want to be associated with the next phase 
of their innovative and successful foreign policy.  They were, of course, quite mistaken, and 
their failure to understand that they were dealing with more than an irascible and ambitious 
senator led them to underestimate the neoconservative challenge to détente.  
Nixon and Kissinger were, in fact, dealing with a political and philosophical 
movement for whom opposition to détente had become a rallying cry.  Years later Kissinger 
admitted that he had not fathomed the implications of the coalescence of neoconservatism 
and confessed that, “it took me over a decade to understand it.”  By then, of course, it was 
too late.  Indeed, by the end of 1972, the ground had been prepared for its 
institutionalization.269 
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Chapter 6 
The Attack: The Neoconservative Assault on Détente and Arms Control 
 
 On the morning of November 5, 1976 fifty of America’s senior intelligence officials 
gathered in the main conference room at CIA headquarters, an igloo-shaped building 
nicknamed “the Bubble,” for a presentation by two analytical teams.  These two teams, 
designated Team A and Team B, were the principals in an unprecedented “experiment in 
competitive intelligence analysis.”  Approved nine months earlier by President Ford, the 
“experiment” consisted of bringing in a team of outside experts, all known for their hawkish 
views on the Soviet Union, giving them access to the same raw data as the intelligence 
community’s professional analysts, and allowing them to construct a counterpart to the CIA’s 
annual assessment of Soviet intentions and behavior for 1977.  Now, with the competing 
analyses complete, the two teams had assembled to present their findings in front of the 
Director of Central Intelligence, George H.W. Bush.   
 At 9:00 a.m. sharp, the leader of Team A, Howard Stoertz, a career CIA analyst and 
the National Intelligence Officer in charge of Soviet intelligence estimates, rose to begin his 
presentation.  After a brief recap of some of the current year’s developments and a summary 
of the Agency’s forecast for 1977-1978 by Stoertz, members of Team B were given the floor.  
Nitze, Pipes and the other members of Team B began peppering the Team A analysts—many 
.
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of whom were not long out of graduate school—with questions.  Unable to respond 
forcefully to men with decades of experience in strategic military issues, the Team A analysts 
were soon reduced to shocked silence. 270 
While certainly one of the more bizarre and little-known events in American history, 
the Team B episode was a prominent manifestation of a neoconservative effort to re-orient 
U.S. strategic doctrine away from deterrence and towards nuclear war-fighting.  This effort 
was driven by the neoconservatives’ belief that the executors and supporters of détente did 
not understand the true nature of Soviet intentions.  Rejecting the realist view of international 
relations, the neoconservatives maintained that the Soviet Union had neither mellowed nor 
abandoned its ultimate goal of world domination.  Rather, the Soviets were using détente as a 
“breathing space” to improve their economy, acquire advanced Western technology and build 
a strategic arsenal capable of prevailing in a nuclear war.  In order to meet this threat, the 
neoconservatives believed, the United States would also need to plan to fight and win a 
nuclear war.   
The target of the neoconservative project to re-orient U.S. security policy and 
strategic doctrine was the CIA.  As the prime broker of strategic intelligence on the Soviet 
Union, the CIA was a significant voice within the national security bureaucracy.  The CIA 
was also one of Kissinger’s most powerful bureaucratic allies.  If the CIA could be 
marginalized or discredited and Kissinger weakened, the neoconservatives could more easily 
promote their views and policy formulations within the national security establishment.   
Although the neoconservatives were only partially successful in their attempts to alter 
U.S. security policy, their project is not without significance in the history of 
neoconservatism.  An examination of the efforts to interject and institutionalize the concept 
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of nuclear war-fighting into U.S. strategic doctrine allows us some insight into state of 
neoconservatism in the mid-1970s.  In one sense, the events studied here illustrate the 
extreme rigidity of neoconservative thought.  Even as neoconservatism moved forward in its 
mission to re-orient U.S. policy, even as the arguments became more sophisticated and the 
attacks more focused, the underlying philosophical tenets that gave rise to neoconservatism 
seem to have remained intact and relatively unchanged.  The sense of crisis, the veneration 
for and reliance on the esoteric text, and the faith in transformation through moral clarity are 
all in evidence. 
In another sense, the events under examination here demonstrate that after 1972, 
neoconservatism was increasingly a force with which to be reckoned.  The sophisticated 
bureaucratic-political strategies, the new lines of attack against détente and arms control, and 
the sheer relentless dedication to influencing policy and shaping perceptions are all 
characteristic of a determined and vigorous political and intellectual movement—a 
movement that would help bring down détente and form the intellectual foundation of the 
first Reagan Administration    
 
Purge: The Neoconservative Assault on Intelligence and Arms Control   
In the wake of the 1972 election Richard Nixon ordered every administration 
employee to submit a resignation to the president.  Although such a gesture was not entirely 
unheard of, or completely out of character for Nixon, it was somewhat unexpected.  The 
president had, after all, just won re-election in the biggest landslide in American history and 
most of his policies—with the notable exception of his handling of Vietnam—were widely 
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popular.  As a result, there seems to have been an expectation within official Washington that 
the president would “keep a winning team together.”271   
The presidential axe fell heaviest at the CIA and the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency.  The principal target at the CIA was the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) 
Richard Helms, who was simultaneously fired as DCI and nominated as Ambassador to 
Iran.272  At ACDA, the entire senior staff, including the director, Gerard C. Smith, the 
assistant director Spurgeon Keeny, the head of the analysis section, Raymond Garthoff, and 
fifteen others was forced to resign, retire, or take other positions within the bureaucracy.  The 
chief military representative to the SALT delegation, Air Force General Royal B. Allison, 
was also fired and forced into retirement.  All told, one-third of ACDA’s budget was also cut, 
and 50 of its 250 employees fired or transferred.273 
As was generally well-known in Washington, Nixon had a long-standing grudge 
against the CIA.  He blamed CIA assessments of Soviet behavior, the National Intelligence 
Estimates (NIEs) for his defeat in the 1960 presidential contest.  The “goddamn estimates” 
had been the source of one of the main issues used against him by John F. Kennedy in the 
election: the non-existent “missile gap.”  Now, as president, Nixon was convinced that the 
“Ivy League liberals” at the CIA would never be “on board” with his policy agenda.  Helms, 
in particular, irritated the president with his unwavering dedication to the Agency and his 
chronic pessimism about Vietnam.  Although it was not common knowledge at the time, 
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Helms had also refused to assist the administration in blunting the FBI investigation into the 
burgeoning Watergate scandal. 
While the president may have harbored ill-will toward Helms and the CIA, the 
targeting of the ACDA is much more difficult to explain.  The agency’s position on détente 
and arms control was almost identical to that of the administration.  Smith and his colleagues 
represented no bureaucratic-political threat to Kissinger.  Moreover, the arms control agency 
had given Kissinger invaluable support during the SALT negotiations.  Allison, for his part, 
had been personally selected for the job by Kissinger. 274  
There is, of course, no dearth of theories.  The most likely reason for the purge is that 
Jackson and Fosdick wished to rid the bureaucracy of officials with a favorable view of the 
SALT process in order to clear the way for a more militant views.  There is certainly little 
doubt that that the neoconservatives perceived the arms control bureaucracy, Allison and the 
CIA as holding a more optimistic view of Soviet intentions than they preferred.  The CIA, in 
particular, had long been regarded by the neoconservatives as the most “liberal” of the 
intelligence agencies (with the exception of the State Department’s intelligence arm, INR).  
The CIA, they believed, had an institutional bias for arms control.  This bias, according to 
Pipes, stemmed from the relativism that the American academia instilled in analysts during 
their graduate careers:  
The analytic staff [of the CIA], filled with American Ph.D.s in the natural and 
social sciences, along with engineers, inevitably share the outlook of U.S. 
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academe, with its penchant for philosophical positivism, cultural agnosticism 
and political liberalism.275 
 
One theory holds that Fosdick threatened to reveal two secret understandings between 
the Kissinger and the Soviets to the Congress and the press.  The first of these agreements 
had to do with the SALT allowance for trading ICBMs for newer, SLBMs.  Although the 
treaty gave both sides the right to do so, Kissinger signed a secret note assuring the Soviets 
that the U.S. would not exercise its trade-in rights.  The second was a vague understanding 
between Kissinger and the Soviets that the United States would not protest the replacement 
of the SS-11 with larger SS-17s and SS-19s, despite holding an official position that it 
"would consider any ICBM having a volume significantly greater than that of the largest 
light ICBM now operational on either side to be a heavy ICBM."276 
Although there is at present no documentary evidence for blackmail, there is 
testimony.  John J. McCloy, a long-time public servant who had served as advisor to 
Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson and Nixon, testified that “a certain senator” “conspired” 
to orchestrate an ideological “purge” of the U.S. foreign policy and defense establishment of 
bureaucrats that favored détente and arms control.  This unnamed senator had threatened to 
reveal that Kissinger had in fact made secret “commitments beyond SALT” to the Soviets.  
McCloy’s claims were corroborated by his deputy director, Adrian Fisher, who maintained 
that Fosdick had referred to the blackmail campaign as “Operation Compliance.”  Further 
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corroboration exists in the recollections of Robert Hopkins Miller, a Foreign Service officer 
assigned to ACDA after the alleged purge. 277  
Whatever Nixon’s motivation, the purged officials were replaced with men with 
views much closer to those of the neoconservatives.  Smith’s replacement at ACDA, for 
instance, was Fred C. Iklé.  A former member of Wohlstetter’s working group at RAND, 
Iklé’s views on nuclear conflict reflected those of his mentor.  He was, for example, a 
staunch opponent of the assured destruction doctrine, and based his opposition on the 
contention that assured destruction was immoral.  Assured destruction, Iklé maintained, 
“rests on a form of warfare universally condemned since the dark ages—the mass killing of 
hostages.”  This, of course, was a quite curious opinion for an ACDA director to hold, 
particularly considering that the arms control process rested on the proposition that as long as 
the U.S. and the Soviet Union could maintain an assured destruction capability, they could 
make do with fewer nuclear weapons.   
Iklé was a curious choice for other reasons.  More specifically, he had no prior 
management experience and no experience in arms control or foreign relations.  Despite 
these professional shortcomings, almost all of the remaining appointments at ACDA were 
left to Iklé, who went out of his way to recruit staff members from outside of the 
bureaucracy.  Iklé drew heavily from his former RAND colleagues, as well as Acheson’s 
Committee to Maintain a Prudent Defense Policy.  From this group, Iklé recruited Paul 
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Wolfowitz, a Wohlstetter protégé and a recent consultant to Jackson’s staff who specialized 
in nuclear non-proliferation issues.278 
As CIA director, Nixon, at Jackson’s urging, nominated James R. Schlesinger.  The 
nomination appeared to have much to recommend it.  Schlesinger had a reputation as 
creative, insightful thinker and was acceptable to most of the congressional committee 
chairmen.  Recruited and brought to Washington by Fosdick in 1969, Schlesinger first 
distinguished himself as the author of a major study of the intelligence community’s 
management and organization conducted under the auspices of the Office of Management 
and the Budget.  Schlesinger’s study had greatly impressed Nixon, particularly his suggestion 
that the president create a Director of National Intelligence.  Summoning Schlesinger to the 
White House to discuss his recommendations, Nixon was treated to a long-winded and 
somewhat condescending lecture that prompted him to tell Haldeman: “I don’t want that guy 
in my office ever again.”  Despite Nixon’s personal dislike of Schlesinger, on February 2, 
1973, the 43-year old Schlesinger arrived at Langley as the youngest DCI to ever serve.  
From Kissinger’s perspective, Schlesinger’s main asset was that he was not Melvin 
Laird or Richard Helms.  A Harvard-trained economist whose favorite pastime was bird-
watching, Schlesinger appeared to lack any talent for bureaucratic-political warfare.  He was 
open and direct, and shunned the Washington social circuit where a great deal of the 
bureaucratic-political infighting took place.  Schlesinger was also not given to the sort of 
rhetorical Sturm und Drang favored by Laird, but preferred calm and meticulous argument.  
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Indeed, Schlesinger’s penchant for detail led NSC staffer Larry Lynn to quip that he 
“appeared to have a real instinct for the capillaries.”  All told, Kissinger probably did not 
expect much to change at the Agency.279  
Schlesinger did, however, have a deep interest in foreign policy—both ancient and 
modern that he had acquired from the master of his Harvard house (Eliot House), John 
Houston Finley, Jr.  Finley, a professor of philology and classical literature, echoed many of 
the same anti-modern themes as Strauss, particularly in his studies of the Athenian general, 
Thucydides.  In his book, Thucydides, Finley argued that ancient Athens’s imperialism was a 
natural human reaction against the debilitating effects of democracy and “consumerism” 
(which he regarded as an ancient forerunner of modernity), and a manifestation of the human 
impulse to seek power for its own sake.  Because the imperial impulse flowed naturally from 
the Athenian “national character,” and because Natural Law decrees that the strong have a 
natural right to rule the weak Finley argued, Athenian policy should not be subject to moral 
condemnation. 
For his part, Schlesinger appears to have internalized a great deal of Finley’s 
teachings.  Indeed, he identified so strongly with Finley personally that he renounced 
Judaism and converted to Finley’s familial Presbyterianism.  His absorption of Finley’s ideas 
was so complete that during his time at Harvard, Schlesinger began to describe himself as a 
“Thucydidean historian.”  Schlesinger's retention of this singular self-characterization 
presumably raised more than a few eyebrows in official Washington.280  
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Schlesinger was also quite familiar with modern strategic affairs.  Accepting a 
position at the RAND Corp. in 1963, he worked with Wohlstetter and the missile guidance 
expert, Hyman Shulman, in the Strategic Studies office, the cradle of the war-fighting thesis.  
Rising rapidly through the ranks, Schlesinger had become Director of Strategic Studies after 
Wohlstetter’s departure in 1967.  As a Wohlstetter protégé, Schlesinger came to subscribe to 
Wohlstetter’s thesis that deterrence based on the threat of mutual suicide was immoral.  
When newly arrived in Washington in 1968, he had been highly critical of the 
administration’s decision to seek funding for the B-1 bomber.  The bomber, Schlesinger 
argued, was weapon suitable only for destroying cities.   
Schlesinger also shared Wohlstetter’s belief that the U.S. focus on retaliation was a 
strategically unreliable stance.  The U.S. military, he believed, held a number of unfounded 
and illogical assumptions about how a nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union might actually 
unfold.  A massive, all-out strike, he maintained, was highly unlikely.  Soviet nuclear 
doctrine, he believed, was oriented toward nuclear war-fighting.  As a result, Schlesinger 
believed that a limited Soviet strike, against what he considered to be a vulnerable U.S. 
strategic force, was a much more likely occurrence.  Moreover, in the wake of such a strike, 
the U.S. military would find it much more difficult to retaliate than they believed.  Soviet 
strategic weapons were much more accurate, powerful and numerous, Schlesinger held, than 
the CIA estimated.  Thus, a Soviet first-strike would be much more devastating than the Air 
Force assumed.281 
In Schlesinger’s view, the main reason for this misperception of Soviet intentions and 
capabilities was the realist view that pervaded the U.S. intelligence community and the 
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National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs).  Comprehensive assessments of Soviet intentions and 
capabilities, the NIEs were the responsibility of the CIA’s Office of National Estimates 
(ONE).  That a realist view prevailed within ONE is not surprising given the professional 
training of ONE’s founding members.  All were historians, steeped in the traditions of 
European Realpolitik: William Langer (Ph.D., Duke, European diplomatic history), Sherman 
Kent (Ph.D., Yale, European diplomatic history), Raymond Sontag (Ph.D., University of 
Pennsylvania, German diplomatic history), DeForest Van Slyck (Ph.D., Yale, European 
diplomatic history and political economy), and Ludwell Montague (Ph.D., Duke, European 
diplomatic history).   
As an organization, ONE tended to believe that Soviet intentions, policy, capabilities 
and objectives were not too dissimilar from those of the United States.  Like the United 
States, the Soviet Union was primarily interested in maintaining and expanding its economic 
and political power and prestige.  Also like the United States, the Soviet Union maintained a 
large and powerful strategic arsenal as a deterrent against attack.  While it did not deny that 
Communist ideology informed Soviet policy, ONE tended to consider ideology as primarily 
a political tool; a rationale for the legitimacy of the Soviet state, and a vehicle for Soviet 
appeals to the dispossessed of the Third World and Marxist groups in the West.  Ideology did 
not, in ONE’s view, appear to play a major role in determining the goals of Soviet policy.282  
In the view of the neoconservatives, this realist perception of the Soviets was 
extremely dangerous.  To regard the Soviet Union as a state like other states, with interests 
and intentions similar to that of the United States, led to a phenomenon called “mirror-
imaging,” in which intelligence analysts ascribe their own nation’s intentions and objectives 
                                                 
282
 Ludwell Montague, General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence, October 1950-February 
1953 (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1992), p. 69; Stoertz; Ford interview. 
 231 
to an adversary.  As a result, the authors of the NIEs were unable to discern the true nature of 
Soviet intentions and policy.  Animated by a militant and irreconcilable ideology, the Soviet 
Union did not seek to maintain peace.  Rather, its national objectives involved the destruction 
of the United States and the conquest of the world.   
The realist perspective that pervaded ONE, Schlesinger realized, was also the basis of 
the Agency’s alliance with Kissinger.  A Harvard professor of diplomatic history, Kissinger 
shared ONE’s realist view of international politics.  Kissinger also appreciated the estimating 
process for his own bureaucratic-political reasons.  Unlike Nixon, Kissinger was an avid and 
close reader of intelligence reports.  As a result, all CIA intelligence products—including the 
President’s Daily Brief—were submitted to him rather than the president.  If they did meet 
his expectations or the opinions expressed in them did not coincide with his, Kissinger would 
return them to the CIA with questions, comments and criticisms scrawled in the margins.  
This give-and-take not only afforded Kissinger an opportunity to act as the president’s chief 
intelligence officer, but also reinforced the marriage of convenience between the CIA and the 
National Security Advisor’s office against their mutual foes in the Defense Department.283 
Together, the pervasive realist perspective within the intelligence community, as well 
as the Kissinger-CIA alliance, represented the bureaucratic-political foundation of détente 
and arms control.  The commonality of outlook and interests between the most powerful man 
in the foreign policy establishment and the most powerful member of the intelligence 
community constituted a formidable barrier within the defense establishment to any alternate 
view of the Soviets.  The interjection of another view—much less its institutionalization—
would require the breaching of this barrier.  While Jackson, Fosdick and Perle attacked 
Kissinger, Schlesinger opened another front within the intelligence community.  
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In order to disrupt the realist perspective, as well as the Kissinger-CIA alliance, 
Schlesinger set about reorganizing the intelligence community with a vengeance.  Cutting 
manpower and altering management processes in almost every agency of the U.S. 
intelligence community, particularly in those offices that he felt were too supportive of 
détente and arms control.  The ax, however, fell hardest on CIA.  Telling his new CIA 
subordinates that, “This place has been run like a gentleman’s club, but I’m no gentleman.”  
Schlesinger fired or forced into retirement almost 10 percent of the Agency’s total staff.  
Schlesinger next turned his attention to the Agency’s actual spying capabilities.  Believing 
that the value of human intelligence collection and covert operations was overrated and 
overly expensive, Schlesinger targeted the clandestine section, the Directorate of Plans, for 
most of the work-force reductions.  Re-named the Directorate of Operations, the clandestine 
section saw its budget slashed and the monies diverted to projects intended to enhance the 
Agency’s technical intelligence collection capabilities.  To oversee the new, down-sized 
clandestine service, Schlesinger appointed veteran field officer, William E. Colby, as the 
Director of the Directorate of Operations.284 
Schlesinger’s overhaul of the CIA’s analytical capability was even more extensive.  
He disbanded ONE and its board of senior advisors and completely re-worked the estimating 
process.  Previously, the process began with the collection of raw intelligence from various 
CIA departments or other agencies within the intelligence community by the working staff of 
the ONE and distributed to the various working groups that produced NIEs in specific areas 
of concern.  After drafting, the NIEs were reviewed by the senior analysts that comprised the 
governing board of ONE, the Board of National Estimates.  After approval by the Board, the 
estimates were sent to the U.S. Intelligence Board and the President’s Foreign Intelligence 
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Advisory Board (PFIAB) for a final—and often political—review.  While the Intelligence 
Board was comprised of experts from all of the intelligence agencies, the PFIAB was a semi-
official largely ceremonial body.  There were members who were large political contributors 
like Clare Booth Luce, but some experts like the physicists Edward Teller and John Foster, 
and the satellite photography expert, Edward Land.  The main voice was the chairman, Adm. 
George Anderson, who was closely connected with Jackson’s staff.   
At any point along this process, disputes over the NIE’s conclusions could send the 
estimate back to ONE for editing or to a particular agency or department for further research.  
If the dispute remained unresolved, the dissents would be noted in lengthy footnotes in the 
text of the NIE.  The footnote convention, also instituted by Kent, had been adopted to not 
only allow the intelligence consumer to see the areas of disagreement, but also to force 
dissenters to dissent within the context of a generally agreed-upon discussion rather than in 
ex parte papers circulated separately.285 
Schlesinger discarded this process and moved the distribution of raw intelligence into 
the purview of the Director.  The main support apparatus for the Director, the Intelligence 
Community staff was, however, staffed almost exclusively with CIA men.  Seeking to reduce 
the CIA’s influence on the community staff, Schlesinger fired the chief of staff, Bronson 
Tweedy, and a number of other long-time employees.  Their replacements consisted largely 
of men from the RAND Corp. that Schlesinger knew personally.  The replacements raised 
eyebrows within the intelligence community because of the appointees’ general lack of 
experience in intelligence work.  Schlesinger then revised the review process for the NIEs.  
Now, before the estimates were sent to the Intelligence Board for review and discussion, they 
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were reviewed by a new body, the Intelligence Resource Advisory Committee.  To oversee 
the Committee, Schlesinger hired the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Gen. 
Daniel O. Graham, and Gen. Lew Allen, head of Air Force satellite programs.  Over the 
course of his career, Allen had usually been in the fore of the chronic CIA-Air Force battle 
over funding and responsibility for various airborne spy systems.  The appointment of 
Graham was even more alarming for CIA veterans.  Deemed by the journalist Joseph Alsop 
as the “most pungent and persistent critic of the CIA’s estimating-analyzing hierarchy,” 
Graham was known throughout the intelligence community for his consistent, vehement 
objections to CIA assessments of National Liberation Front and North Vietnamese Army 
troop strength, which he regarded as too high.286 
As for the actual production of the NIEs, Schlesinger proposed creating twelve 
National Intelligence Officers (NIOs), each of whom would be experts in a particular 
functional or geographic field, and would report directly to the DCI.  The NIOs were to have 
no permanent staff, but were expected to recruit individual analysts from various agencies 
and departments on a temporary basis to assist in the preparation of NIEs.  These changes 
were intended to “liberate” the NIEs from the cultural influence of the CIA, and reflect a 
wider variety of views.  The NIOs were also expected to leave Langley and “mix it up” with 
policymakers in official Washington order to better gauge their intelligence needs.287 
Although Schlesinger’s reforms were now almost complete, he had only partially 
succeeded in undercutting the CIA’s influence and severing the alliance with Kissinger.  
While he had succeeded in reducing the CIA’s institutional power vis-à-vis the other 
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agencies through the disbandment of ONE and the installment of his own loyalists, the realist 
view was still very much in evidence.  Schlesinger’s decision to re-assign rather than fire 
many former ONE staffers ensured that the Kent-Langer realism would continue to inform 
the NIEs.  In addition, while the de-centralization of the estimating process created many 
new points of access for the interjection of alternate views, it also made it easier for 
Kissinger and his NSC staff to influence the NIEs’ conclusions.     
Whether or not Schlesinger realized this, he did not get the opportunity to fine-tune 
his reforms.  On April 30, the burgeoning Watergate scandal forced the resignation of 
Attorney General Richard Kleindienst.  On May 1, 1973, Nixon announced that he was 
nominating Defense Secretary Elliot Richardson for Attorney General and Schlesinger for 
Secretary of Defense.  The White House did not name a successor for Schlesinger at CIA 
until May 11, when it was announced that William Colby would be the next Director.288   
 
Schlesinger and the Institutionalization of Nuclear War-Fighting Doctrine  
Although he was not sworn in as DCI until September 4, 1973, Colby, CIA veteran, 
immediately set about trying to mitigate the damage done to the CIA’s institutional power.  
Although he technically had no authority to alter any of the changes instituted by Schlesinger 
until confirmed by the Senate, between Schlesinger’s departure in July and Colby’s 
swearing-in on September 4, the Deputy DCI, Vernon Walters, allowed him to issue a set of 
pending directives through his office.  In one of the more notable of these directives, Colby 
named George A. Carver, Helms’s former Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs, to oversee 
the NIOs.  A smooth, diplomatic, career CIA officer, Carver was experienced in field work 
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as well as intelligence analysis.  Even more importantly from Colby’s standpoint, Carver was 
known as quite an effective bureaucratic-political fighter.  
For the post of National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs, Colby appointed 
Howard Stoertz, Jr.  The son of first-generation German Jewish immigrants, Stoertz had 
completed his undergraduate work in political science at Swarthmore College.  Later, as a 
graduate student in history, Stoertz had studied under Sherman Kent at Yale.  Before 
completing the requirements for his Master’s degree, however, Kent brought him to the 
newly formed ONE in 1950, where he served as its executive secretary from 1951- 1972.  In 
1972, Stoertz had assumed the hastily-constructed position as head of the SALT support 
staff.  Like Carver, Stoertz was a veteran of dozens of bureaucratic-political battles with the 
Pentagon.  Outspoken and blunt, Stoertz had, somewhat surprisingly, established an 
exceedingly smooth relationship with Kissinger.  This relationship was, undoubtedly, an 
asset that Colby apparently hoped to leverage to the Agency’s advantage.289 
Schlesinger, too, took advantage of the long period between Colby’s nomination and 
confirmation to introduce the war-fighting thesis into the NIEs and into U.S. strategic 
doctrine.  He saw an opening in a study commissioned earlier in the year by Kissinger to 
explore ways to increase the “flexibility” of the U.S. strategic force.  Flexibility had long 
been used by national security officials to refer to an ongoing and heretofore fruitless effort 
to re-design U.S. strategic doctrine in such a way as to limit nuclear warfare to a small 
exchange.  Kissinger, however, was not really interested in flexibility.  Knowing that the 
search for flexibility amounted to an intellectual wild goose chase, he had ordered the study, 
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National Security Study Memorandum 169 to forestall the promulgation of any new doctrine 
that could be used to justify the retention or acquisition of any specific weapons systems.290   
Schlesinger now resolved to take advantage of this study.  He discovered that the 
State Department had requested “an exposition of Soviet nuclear doctrine as deduced from 
Soviet literature, statements and actions over the past few years.”  In response, the CIA’s 
Office of Strategic Research had prepared a report which was completed in June.  After 
reviewing the document, Soviet Nuclear Doctrine: Concepts of Intercontinental and Theater 
War, Schlesinger, who did not agree with its conclusions, insisted with Walters that his 
RAND protégé (and Pipes’s student), Fritz Ermarth, be allowed to revise the estimate before 
submission to the White House.  Although the post of DCI was still technically vacant, 
Walters did not wish to run afoul of Schlesinger and complied.  The re-worked report was 
also given a new designation as Special National Intelligence Estimate 11-4-73 to imply that 
it superseded the regular Series 8 NIE, NIE 11-8-73. 
Released to the White House in September, the re-worked special estimate, Soviet 
Strategic Arms Programs and Détente: What Are They Up To?, was notable for its promotion 
of strategic war-fighting.  The estimate maintained that Soviet military writings of the 
preceding ten years “reflect a clear concern with for warfighting capabilities.”  Also, unlike 
most American theorists, Soviet strategists seemed to “reject the notion that the 
destructiveness of nuclear weapons renders strategic war ‘unwinnable.’”  Rather, the estimate 
asserted, a significant number seemed to believe that it was possible to develop “the ability to 
actually to wage strategic war to the point of some form of victory.”   
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While there was some evidence (according to the special estimate) that some Soviet 
political and military leaders did not believe that strategic victory was possible and advocated 
parity with the United States, it was unlikely that their voices would be heeded.  The 
incorrigible and implacable nature of Soviet ideology meant that the majority of the political 
and military leadership would never settle for parity with the United States.  Parity would 
mean setting aside “power aspirations” deeply ingrained in Communist ideology, and 
embracing an “explicit and indefinite condition of vulnerability for their society.”  Indeed, 
the internal ideological pressures for strategic superiority were so strong that the Soviets 
appeared ready to push the limits of the Interim Agreement to the fullest, if not beyond.291 
Simultaneously with the release of the special estimate, Schlesinger took another 
action that was to go some way toward institutionalizing the war-fighting thesis.  This was 
the creation of the Office of Net Assessment.  Net assessment, or the comparison of U.S. 
capabilities to those of adversaries, had traditionally been performed by the military services.  
There had also been a brief effort to create a central office for net assessment in the 1950s, 
but had been rejected by Eisenhower.  Now, however, Schlesinger not only resolved to re-
create that net assessment capability, but also widened its purview to include potential 
threats, rather than existing capabilities.  Recruiting Andrew Marshall, who was at the time 
working as a consultant to the NSC, Schlesinger formed an Office of Net Assessment within 
the Pentagon.  Once ensconced in the new department, Marshall wasted no time in producing 
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a series of reports that purported to demonstrate that Soviet strategic doctrine was oriented 
toward war-fighting.292  
Schlesinger now moved to interject war-fighting into American strategic doctrine    
with the drafting of National Security Decision Memorandum 242 (NSDM-242).  This 
singular document outlined how U.S. operational planning for a nuclear war should proceed.  
American forces and doctrine, the memo argued, should be structured in such a way as to 
allow options for the “limited employment” of strategic forces.  These options should, the 
document continued, “hold some vital enemy targets hostage” and “permit control over the 
timing and pace of attack execution in order to provide the enemy opportunities to reconsider 
his actions.” The aim of these options was to allow the United States the capability to win a 
nuclear war, or in the words of the memo, “to seek war termination on terms acceptable to 
the United States.”293 
The appearance of NSDM-242 was the first significant manifestation of the war-
fighting doctrine designed by Wohlstetter almost two decades earlier.  At its core was the 
conviction that the incorrigible and militant nature of the Soviet Union would one day cause 
them to attack the United States.  In order to blunt this attack, the memorandum declared that 
the U.S. should prepare a list of targets to attack and counterattack and provide for the 
“destruction of the political, economic and military resources critical to the enemy’s postwar 
power, influence and ability to recover at an early time as a major power.”294 
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Schlesinger was now faced with the task of explaining the implications of this new 
strategy to the Congress.  Rather than focus on the transformative nature of the NSDM, 
Schlesinger cast the new doctrine in terms of the search for “flexibility” and assigned the 
new doctrine the vague name of “Selective Options.”  In taking advantage of the 
administration’s avowed search for flexibility, Schlesinger would not only effectively 
camouflage Selective Options, but would also gain a measure of protection against Kissinger.  
Kissinger could not now, after four years, argue that flexibility was not needed.  To do so 
would require explaining what had changed.  Similarly, Kissinger was unable to denounce 
Selective Options as a war-fighting doctrine without alarming the Soviets and undermining 
arms control.  Opposing Selective Options also risked drawing congressional attention to the 
fact that the Soviets now had no less than four separate ICBM development programs 
underway, including the most powerful ICBM ever built, the SS-18 Warlord (Voivode).295 
Faced with these considerations, Kissinger tried to keep NSDM-242 and any 
discussion of it confined to the NSC.  Received in the NSC in September, he allowed the 
memo to languish until January.  When it was sent to the president on January 7, it was sent 
under a cover that instructed all concerned agencies that they would regard the new doctrine 
“as an evolution and refinement of U.S. policy and not as a sharp new departure in strategy.”  
Simultaneously, he initiated a series of follow-on studies to be conducted by the State 
Department and the CIA.296   
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Kissinger’s efforts, however, were in vain.  On January 10, Schlesinger gave an 
impromptu news conference in which he announced that, as part of a new strategic doctrine, 
the U.S. would begin re-targeting part of the ICBM force on Soviet missiles.  Although 
Schlesinger denied that these changes portended a U.S. first-strike capability, he undercut his 
reassurances by also warning the Soviets that the new doctrine would require new weapons 
systems, such as improved guidance systems and more powerful warheads, and that he 
intended to request them in the new defense budget.297 
Nixon’s signing of NSDM-242 on January 17, 1974 represented the 
institutionalization of the neoconservative view of the Soviet Union in U.S. national security 
policy.  NSDM-242 also addressed the need for the counterforce-heavy strategy 
recommended by Wohlstetter in the 1950s.  Counterforce targeting and employment planning 
did not, however, fully allow for war-fighting.  America still lacked the capabilities to fight 
and prevail in a nuclear war.  The Nixon Administration was unlikely to approve any major 
weapons programs in the context of arms control.  Moreover, approval would not guarantee 
deployment.  Any new systems risked becoming bargaining chips in the next round of SALT 
negotiations.  This state of affairs was unacceptable to the neoconservatives and Wohlstetter 
set out to alter it. 
 
Into the Attack: Wohlstetter and the Myth of the Arms Race 
 The murmur of conversation in the Beverly Hills Hotel Conference Center began to 
fade as the chairman of the California Arms Control, William Bader of the Ford Foundation, 
arose and introduced the keynote speaker of the conference, Albert Wohlstetter.  As 
Wohlstetter rose from his seat and began making his way to the speaker’s podium, some in 
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the crowd were impressed by his bearing; tall, impeccably dressed and confident.  Others 
noticed that he carried no notes.  Almost everyone assembled, however, looked forward to 
hearing the thoughts of one of the architects of American nuclear strategy.  Taking his place 
behind the podium, Wohlstetter wore a serious expression as he began to speak: “Ladies and 
gentlemen, the arms race is a myth!”  Pausing to survey the perplexed faces of the audience, 
Wohlstetter continued:  “There are weapons—both the U.S. and the USSR have nuclear 
weapons aplenty—but there is no arms race!  There can be no race between parties moving in 
different directions!”298   
Over the next three and one-half hours, Wohlstetter—oblivious to all subtle and not-
so-subtle signals from the chair to conclude his marathon presentation—built a detailed and 
wide-ranging case to support the thesis that, since the 1960s, the United States and the Soviet 
Union had not been engaged in a strategic arms race.  The popular conception of the arms 
race (which according to Wohlstetter was also shared by most of official Washington), was 
of the two superpowers locked in an endless cycle of action and reaction, forever responding 
to the other side’s deployment of multi-million dollar weapons systems by building more 
multi-million dollar weapons systems.  Objective analysis, however, showed quite a different 
picture.  According to Wohlstetter, U.S. strategic forces (and the attendant costs) been on the 
decline since the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations.  All of the various strategic metrics; 
megatonnage, number of warheads, number of launchers and warhead yields he maintained, 
had followed a downward trend since 1960-64.   
The myth of the arms race, Wohlstetter claimed, was fueled by another myth—“the 
myth of invariable overestimation.”  Whereas the conventional wisdom held that the U.S. 
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defense establishment consistently overestimated Soviet weapons deployments, Wohlstetter 
argued that analysis did not bear this out.  Instead of overestimating, Wohlstetter’s analysis 
purportedly showed that, between 1962 and 1972, the U.S. intelligence community 
persistently underestimated Soviet strategic weapons deployments.  Moreover, the 
underestimation seems to have gotten worse after 1966, despite significant advances in 
American spy satellite technology.299 
Although he never uttered the word “détente” during his grand soliloquy, Wohlstetter 
had fired the opening salvo of a new line of attack.  More specifically, Wohlstetter was 
attempting to undercut the argument that the only alternative to détente was a dangerous and 
fabulously expensive arms race.  Since the conclusion of the first SALT agreements in the 
spring of 1972, this argument had been made frequently by Kissinger in briefings, news 
conferences and congressional testimony.  It had been a quite effective argument as polls 
consistently showed that support for détente depended heavily on the carefully fostered 
perception that there was no good alternative to détente.  After 1972, as the bloom began to 
go off détente, Kissinger seemed to make the argument more frequently and vehemently: 
We cannot expect to relax international tensions or achieve a more stable 
international system should the two strongest nuclear powers conduct an 
unrestrained arms race.  Thus, perhaps the single most important component 
of our policy toward the Soviet Union is the effort to limit strategic weapons . 
. . The American people can be asked to bear the cost of a race which is 
doomed to stalemate only if its is clear that every effort has been made to 
prevent it.300 
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Following up on his address in Los Angeles, Wohlstetter published a series of articles 
that expanded on the argument that he had advanced at the California Arms Control Seminar.  
Drawing on unclassified statements by various Secretaries of Defense, as well as portions of 
classified posture statements, Wohlstetter constructed an extremely detailed case for his 
contention that the intelligence community was guilty of underestimation.  Overlaying the 
estimated numbers with the actual numbers after deployment, Wohlstetter showed that 
throughout the decade of the 1960s, the intelligence community had substantially 
underestimated Soviet deployments.  He also purportedly demonstrated that U.S. strategic 
power, in both absolute and relative terms, had been steadily declining since the mid-
1960s.301 
The effects of Wohlstetter’s work were immediate and dramatic.  His articles ignited 
an intense debate inside and outside of government.  Among the expert community, Morton 
Halperin and Jeremy Stone, Michael Nacht, Johan Holst and Bernard Brodie responded 
critically to Wohlstetter in print, while Paul Nitze and Joseph Alsop concurred.  Kissinger 
showed his displeasure by deleting Wohlstetter’s name from a list of invitees to a Soviet-
American conference of academics on SALT.  Even in Iowa, the Des Moines Register 
published a lengthy discussion of Wohlstetter’s thesis.  
As might be expected, there was significant consternation within the intelligence 
community.  Colby’s deputy, Gen. Daniel O. Graham opined that, while “artful” data 
selection can make estimates appear too high or too low, people outside of the intelligence 
community would not be interested in any explanations involving the more arcane details of 
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the estimating process.  The political utility of Wohlstetter’s argument would be formidable.  
Colby, Graham warned, should take Wohlstetter’s work “very seriously.”302 
Colby did in fact take Wohlstetter’s work seriously.  While the official position of the 
CIA was not to comment publicly, Colby commissioned no less than two internal studies. 
The results were ambiguous.  One study found Wohlstetter’s charges to be largely accurate, 
while the other reached just the opposite conclusion.  Colby also asked Stoertz for comment.  
He pointed out that Wohlstetter’s numbers were drawn from the NIEs of the 1960s, and that 
many of the deficiencies that had plagued CIA analyses had been corrected by the time the 
Soviet missile-building programs gained their greatest momentum in the 1970s.   
Stoertz also pointed out that CIA analyses had improved substantially with the 
discovery that the Soviets were “piggy-backing” the testing and production phases, thus 
speeding up the time it took a missile to leave the drawing board and enter service.  
Previously, the Agency had used American missile contractors’ methods as a model to arrive 
at an approximate time frame for Soviet design, testing and production.  In 1972, however, 
the CIA learned that once a design was approved, the Soviet bureaus often went directly into 
production, bypassing the expensive and time-consuming testing phase mandated by U.S. 
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government contracting regulations.  Quality control in the Soviet system consisted of 
pulling random units off the assembly line for testing.303 
Partly as a result of Wohlstetter’s insinuations of incompetence and partly as a result 
of Soviet behavior, NIE 11-3/8-74 differed substantially from earlier estimates in its range 
and scope.  Produced in two volumes, it combined a forecast of Soviet intentions and 
capabilities through 1985.  The 1974 NIE was most notable for its grim discussion of Soviet 
strategic doctrine. The NIE posited the possibility of “waging and winning a nuclear war 
should deterrence fail.”  Although this argument had been made definitively the previous 
year in a special NIE prepared by Schlesinger’s deputy, Fritz Ermarth, the 1974 estimate was 
the first statement of the Soviet war-fighting thesis by a “director’s estimate,” or an NIE 
delivered under the DCI’s imprimatur.  As such, the 1974 NIE is indication of how strongly 
the neoconservative view of Soviet strategic doctrine was now institutionalized within the 
intelligence community.  Indeed, by 1974 it had become politically dangerous to dispute the 
war-fighting thesis. 
Nevertheless, the 1974 NIE qualified its assessment of Soviet doctrine by asserting 
that the “relevance and nature” of victory in a nuclear conflict “remains ill-defined and 
probably contested” within the Soviet defense establishment.  The NIE also concluded that 
achieving a war-fighting capability was not the only or even the primary consideration 
driving Soviet strategic programs.  The vigorous arms programs of the last several years 
were, according to the estimate, seen by the leadership as enabling détente.  From the 
perspective of the Soviet leaders, the strategic programs had enhanced Soviet prestige abroad 
and brought the United States to the negotiating table.  Simultaneously, the buildup had also 
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assured the Soviet military that national security would not be compromised as the arms 
control process unfolded.   
Against this backdrop of caution and opportunism, the NIE argued that the real 
danger for the United States lay in the very phenomenon Wohlstetter had inveighed against 
so vehemently in his articles: the action-reaction cycle.  As each side continued to develop 
more and better weapon systems, the strategic environment would become increasingly 
uncertain and unstable.  The best solution, the NIE implied, was a political one:  
Unless such a strategic environment is significantly changed by arms 
limitation agreements, it is likely that the Soviet leaders will continue to 
believe that the acquisition of more and better strategic armaments is their best 
course.304 
Unsurprisingly, the 1974 NIE was not well received by the President’s Foreign 
Intelligence Advisory Board.  The Board’s chairman, Adm. George Anderson, objected to 
the NIE on the grounds that the estimate was too optimistic the number and types of missiles 
likely to be deployed by the Soviets.  The reference to the action-reaction cycle, the portrayal 
of the Soviet leadership as opportunists rather than ideologues and the implicit endorsement 
of arms control also seemed calculated to raise neoconservative temperatures.  The Board, 
however, took no immediate action when the estimate was submitted in November 1974.  
Rather, Anderson dispatched Foster, late of the Pentagon’s Department of Defense Research 
and Engineering (DDRE), to California in January 1975 to discuss the estimate with 
Wohlstetter.    
The neoconservatives, however, were in no mood for explanations.  In August of 
1975, the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), a semi-official body 
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charged with the final review of the NIEs, suggested to Kissinger that equal consideration 
ought to be given to “opposing views and alternative interpretations.”  At Wohlstetter’s 
suggestion, the chairman of the PFIAB, Adm. George Anderson, proposed to Kissinger the 
establishment of a “competitive analysis group composed of experts drawn from outside of 
the intelligence community to produce an “alternate estimate.”  Kissinger deferred to Colby, 
who rejected this suggestion on the grounds that it would interrupt the 1975 NIE presently 
underway.   There, for the moment, the matter rested.305 
 
The Attack Pressed: The Birth of Team B 
In the fall of 1975, the political winds were not blowing favorably for the Ford 
Administration and détente.  Polls showed that approximately half of the American public 
was indifferent or opposed to détente.  Soviet meddling in Angola, Portugal, and the Middle 
East seemed to many Americans to run contrary to the spirit of détente.  There was also a 
growing perception—reinforced by the neoconservatives at every turn—that the Soviets were 
cheating on their SALT obligations.   
Among the president’s fellow Republicans, there was also very little support for 
détente.  Obliged to defend an unpopular president and an unpopular policy with the 1976 
elections looming, Republicans took a variety of positions.  Some Republican leaders, such 
as the House Minority Leader Rep. John J. Rhodes (R-AZ) urged Ford to take a tougher line 
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with the Soviets to increase his election year appeal to conservatives.  Other Republicans, 
such as the former chairman of the JCS, Elmo Zumwalt and former Defense Secretary 
Melvin Laird sniped at the administration in the pages of various conservative publications.  
Still other Republicans, such as Sen. Jesse Helms (R-NC), advocated jettisoning détente and 
the president in 1976.  Chairing a fundraising group called the Committee for Conservative 
Alternatives, Helms and many other conservative Republicans favored former California 
governor and vocal détente critic, Ronald Reagan.  Reagan, a persistent critic of détente and 
arms control, had kept up a steady drumbeat of criticism since completing his term as 
governor in 1974.  He made his views known through a syndicated newspaper column, a 
weekly radio show and literally hundreds of appearances on the Republican “rubber chicken” 
dinner circuit.306 
The focus of much of this anti-détente bile was, of course, Kissinger.  Besides 
conservative Republicans, calls for his resignation were heard from several quarters, from 
erstwhile presidential candidate George Wallace to AFL-CIO leader George Meany to the 
Veterans of Foreign Wars, the American Legion and the National Association of 
Manufacturers.  Even the long-suffering Chinese saw fit to pile on, with the deeply anti-
Soviet Vice Premier Deng Xioaping telling Kissinger in the wake of the Helsinki Conference 
that American appeasement of the Soviet Union was endangering Sino-American relations.  
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Deng’s complaints prompted Reagan to note publicly that “even the Chinese are disappointed 
in us.”307    
Less public but more serious for Kissinger, was the neoconservative effort to question 
him under oath about Soviet heavy missile deployments.  Upon submitting the Interim 
Agreement to the Senate in 1972, Kissinger had assured senators that the silo restrictions and 
the unilateral statement regarding heavy missiles would preclude deployment of “heavy” 
missiles.  Although Jackson and Fosdick had known since 1972 that Kissinger’s assurances 
to the Congress were wildly inaccurate, the administration’s political weakness prompted 
them to now press the issue.  Colby, in a classified preview of the 1975 NIE, had also 
confirmed that ten single-warhead (or “Mod 1”) SS-18s had been deployed and that flight 
testing was complete for two multiple warhead versions, the Mod 2 and Mod 3.  Jackson, 
upon learning of the new deployments, demanded that Kissinger appear before his Arms 
Control Subcommittee to explain his previous statements.  In a letter that read very much like 
a subpoena, Jackson left little doubt that the old days of “Scoop” and “Henry” were long 
gone:  
Dear Mr. Secretary: Your persistent failure to appear before the subcommittee 
in the face of Soviet missile deployments is inconsistent with your assurances 
to the Congress (about the SALT I Agreement) and raises serious doubts 
about the manner in which that agreement was negotiated.  As the only 
member of the administration present at the negotiations of the SALT I 
Agreement . . . you alone are in a position to tell the subcommittee. . .why the 
administration has chosen to ignore its pledge to regard the deployment of the 
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new SS-18 as a heavy missile . . . one whose deployment contravenes the U.S. 
interpretation of the agreement.308  
The Ford Administration’s initial response to the building antipathy toward détente 
was to present the president as above the domestic political fray.  Stealing a page from the 
Nixon playbook, Ford attempted to bolster his image with a high-visibility diplomatic tour of 
Europe prior to the European Security Conference in Helsinki, Finland.  Upon arriving home, 
Ford found that his image had not only not improved, but had also deteriorated somewhat.  
Although Ford’s overall approval rating had begun to level off at 47 per cent before his 
European trip, it had dipped slightly as conservatives of both parties began hammering at the 
Helsinki Agreements as a legitimization of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe.  Worse, the 
Gallup Poll, as well as the White House’s own private polling indicated that Reagan had 
pulled ahead of the president among all likely Republican voters.  Ford, frantic to reverse his 
slide in the polls, turned to his advisors.309  
The president’s advisors were all young and/or inexperienced in national politics, but 
with ties to the neoconservatives.  They included the thirty-eight year old Special Assistant to 
the President, William J. Baroody, Jr., and his thirty-four year old Deputy, Richard “Dick” 
Cheney, forty-three year old Donald Rumsfeld, the White House Chief of Staff, and forty 
year old Richard Wolthius, the Legislative Assistant to the President.  There was also fifty-
three year old Robert Goldwin.  Bearing the ambiguous title, Special White House 
Consultant, Goldwin was a Strauss-trained professor of political philosophy who had been 
brought into the White House by Rumsfeld.  A self-professed “outsider on the inside,” 
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Goldwin’s only discernible tasks were to deliver periodic philosophy lectures to the president 
and White House officials, and serve as an “idea broker” and advisor to Rumsfeld. 
Of this varied collection of advisors, Rumsfeld, a former four-time representative 
from Illinois’ 13th congressional district, was generally regarded as the most powerful.  
Brought to the White House by Nixon, Rumsfeld’s forceful, direct style led Nixon to 
characterize him as “a ruthless little bastard.”  Assuming the job as White House Chief of 
Staff in September 1974, Rumsfeld almost immediately set about jettisoning older, more 
experienced Nixon and Ford associates.  The shrewd and able Counselor to the President, 
Anne L. Armstrong, was removed from the inner circle by appointing her chair of the 
National Bicentennial Committee.  Alexander Haig was appointed Supreme Commander of 
NATO and exiled to Brussels.  CIA analyst Dave Peterson, who had personally briefed Ford 
since he was a congressman, was relieved of his White House badge and sent back to 
Langley.  Even Philip Buchen, the president’s closest friend and former law partner was 
marginalized by a temporary appointment at the Department of Justice.  Given this pattern of 
behavior, it is not surprising that when Ford asked Rumsfeld for advice, his answer was true 
to form: fire everyone.310 
On November 1, 1975, Ford followed through on Rumsfeld’s advice.  In what the 
press soon dubbed the “Halloween Massacre,” Ford attempted to placate the right wing of the 
Republican Party by firing Colby and relieving Kissinger of his post as National Security 
Advisor.  Schlesinger was also relieved as Defense Secretary, although he was quite popular 
with détente’s opponents.  Rather, his firing seems to have had more to do with Ford’s and 
Kissinger’s personal dislike of Schlesinger, as well as Rumsfeld’s ambition.  Indeed, 
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Rumsfeld himself replaced Schlesinger, while Cheney became White House Chief of Staff.  
Kissinger’s deputy, Gen. Brent Scowcroft became National Security Advisor, and the chief 
liaison officer to China, George H.W. Bush, was nominated to replace Colby. 
In a move that he would later come to regret, Ford asked his moderate Vice-President, 
Nelson Rockefeller, to withdraw his name from the 1976 election slate.  Although there were 
rumors that Rumsfeld was angling for the vice presidential slot on the 1976 ticket, 
Rockefeller himself seems to have believed that the Jackson forces were behind his political 
demise.  Talking off the record in January with Time editors about the upcoming election, 
Rockefeller expressed this very opinion, and added that Jackson’s staff had been “infiltrated” 
by Communists, and implied that Perle had at one time been a Communist.  A few weeks 
later at a cocktail party in Atlanta, he repeated the Communism charge and alluded to 
Fosdick’s work at the San Francisco U.N. conference in 1945 for Alger Hiss.  After an irate 
Jackson demanded an apology, Rockefeller recanted.  Although a small incident, it was just 
the sort of embarrassing misstep that had begun to plague the administration.311 
 
The Battle Joined: Team B and the Alternate View 
It was, therefore, against this backdrop of desperation and disarray that the 
President’s Intelligence Advisory Board renewed its request to conduct an experiment in 
competitive analysis.  Although the 1975 NIE was much grimmer in its tone—partly as a 
result of Soviet behavior and partly a result of more pessimistic forecasts—the Board 
believed that the estimate failed to convey a “sufficient sense of anxiety.”  Colby, despite his 
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lame duck status, rejected the new request as one of his last official acts.  In January, as the 
new DCI, George H.W. Bush, took the helm of the intelligence community, the Board 
pressed him to approve the exercise.  Bush, whose experience in the world of intelligence 
was limited, heeded this advice and on May 26, approved the “experiment.”312 
Upon Bush’s approval, the outlines of the experiment quickly took shape.  Two teams 
would be formed, given access to the same data and the teams would produce an estimate of 
Soviet strategic capabilities and intentions.  Stoertz, and his team—designated Team A—
would produce the regularly scheduled NIE for 1976 according to the established procedures.  
Team B would be comprised of a group of outside experts, selected by the DCI in 
consultation with the PFIAB and Scowcroft, and divided into four panels.  Each panel would 
be given access to the same raw intelligence as Team A and produce an analyses of Soviet 
strategic objectives and three technical areas, Soviet missile accuracy, air defense, and anti-
submarine warfare (ASW).  Upon completion of the two estimates, the teams would be 
allowed to comment on the opposing view and present their case to the PFIAB.   After the 
presentations, a review of both estimates would be conducted by the Deputy DCI John 
Lehman and the National Security Advisor’s office. 
The teams now began to assemble.  Stoertz, as was the procedure, assembled a 
number of analysts from across the intelligence community to serve on Team A.  Upon a 
recommendation from Richard Perle of Jackson’s staff, Bush appointed Richard Pipes of 
Harvard as the chair of Team B.  Once ensconced as chairman, Pipes invited Gen. John Vogt 
(former commander of the Seventh Air Force), Paul Wolfowitz (a senior analyst at the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency), Gen. Daniel O. Graham (former DIA director and IC 
staff chief), Paul Nitze (Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs), Gen. Jasper 
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Welch (Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff for Systems Analysis) and Thomas Wolfe (RAND 
Corp.).  The three technical panels were manned by active duty officers and employees of 
various military contractors.  Thus constituted, the teams began work in June of 1976.313 
Completing their work in late October, the teams submitted their documents to 
Lehman.  The 1976 NIE was, for the most part, very similar to the 1975 NIE in its 
characterization of the Soviet leadership as prudent and opportunistic.  In regard to Soviet 
strategic objectives, the NIE also reflected the earlier estimate.  The Soviet Union, the NIE 
argued, could be expected to continue to seek economic development, international prestige, 
and political influence through its military power.   
There was, however, an unprecedented level of concern over the number and scale of 
the Soviet programs, particularly the new ICBM programs.  Team A’s assessment was that 
the Soviets would probably accelerate a few critical programs and maintain the rest at current 
levels.  Only arms control, Team A held, offered any hope of slowing the Soviets’ progress.  
Moreover, a new agreement might induce the Soviet leadership to delay or cancel some 
future programs. 
Team B’s document was quite different in tone and scope.  The Team B Report was 
not only an assessment of Soviet strategic capabilities and intentions, but also a scathing 
critique of the realist view of foreign affairs and American culture.  According to Team B, 
the “unspoken assumptions of the U.S. intelligence community and, one may add, the U.S. 
political, intellectual and business communities as well” were at the root of all American 
misperceptions about Soviet behavior and objectives.  These assumptions, Team B 
maintained, derive from three pervasive, culturally-embedded Western “traditions” that 
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“permeate American society and culture: the commercial, democratic and insular traditions.”  
Reviewing the NIEs from the previous ten years, Team B found that the NIEs “are filled with 
unsupported and questionable judgments” that derived from the three cultural traditions.  The 
commercial tradition, for example, predisposes Americans to see “peace and the pursuit of 
profit as ‘normal,’” and war as “an aberration.”  Similarly, the democratic tradition leads to 
the expectation that as long as there are negotiations, the Soviet-American relationship could 
and would be conducted on a mutually beneficial basis.  The insular tradition, meanwhile 
predisposes Americans toward the belief that any large-scale destruction of life and property 
is “something entirely outside the norms” of policy and military planning.314 
In order to understand the essential nature of the “Russian national character” Team B 
asserted, it was necessary to understand the Russian culture and history as well as 
Communist ideology.  The Russians’ history of expansionism, for instance, required that the 
military play a significant role in the political life of the nation and impelled to conceive of 
national security in zero-sum terms.  As a result, threats, coercion and war were seen as the 
central instruments of policy, rather than as “aberrations,” as in the United States.  Their 
historical experience—as both a victim of foreign invasions and as “the aggressor who 
absorbed entire countries”—had also imbued the Russians with a sense of stoic fatalism in 
the face of enormous human and material losses. 
Considered against this cultural and historical backdrop, Soviet behavior and 
objectives were likely to be quite different than that posited by the NIEs, claimed Team B.  
Détente was seen by the Soviets as less a mutually beneficial relationship than a multi-
faceted strategy.  One facet of this strategy called for the avoidance of any provocations of 
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the United States, while exploiting the various political, economic and cultural contacts to 
acquire technology, improve the Soviet Union’s image with Americans and, if possible, 
weaken anti-Soviet politicians.  Other aspects of the strategy of détente involved an effort to 
isolate the United States both from its allies and Third World.  The reduction of tensions 
would allow the Soviets to increase their economic relationships with Europe by supplying 
energy and entering into various cooperative arrangements and incurring high levels of debt.  
In the Third World, the Soviet Union could be expected to support socialist political parties, 
provide military assistance and loans and, where possible, provide support for socialist 
revolution.   
The détente strategy, Team B maintained, also had a significant military facet.  While 
the Soviets would probably continue to engage in the arms control process, they could be 
expected to continue to focus on the limitation of weapon technologies where America held 
an edge, as had been the case with the ABM treaty of 1972.  Team B forecast that they would 
remain reticent about negotiating limits in areas where they were superior, such as in 
conventional arms and counterforce weapons, such as the massive SS-18.  As for the CIA’s 
theory that the Soviets wished to divert resources from the military sector to the civilian, 
Soviet war-planning made this an unlikely occurrence.  The Soviet leadership feared that if 
the population were to become “addicted to the pursuit of consumer goods,” it would rapidly 
lose its sense of patriotism and “sink into a mood of self-indulgence that makes it extremely 
poor material for national mobilization.” 
According to Team B, it was also unlikely that the Soviets would continue their 
strategic buildup.  Their efforts, however, would not continue willy-nilly.  Rather, Team B 
predicted, they would continue to focus on structuring their strategic forces for nuclear war-
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fighting.  This effort would include improving their counterforce capabilities of their 
strategic forces and a whole range of secondary defensive programs without analogue in the 
United States.  These programs, Team B contended, included civil defense, particle and laser 
beam research and development of anti-satellite and anti-submarine capabilities.  
All of the Soviets Union’s massive military capability, Team B concluded, existed to 
attain a number of objectives.  In the short-term, the Soviets sought to guarantee its own 
security and to deter an American attack or a joint Sino-American attack.  It also served as a 
means of persuasion and coercion.  The ability to intimidate smaller, weaker nations was, in 
the eyes of the Soviet leadership, the definition of the super-power status that it sought.  In 
the long term, however, the Soviet Union had but one over-arching goal: the world-wide 
triumph of socialism, or less euphemistically, world domination.315 
With this final assertion, the neoconservatives submitted one of the most 
significant—and grim—assessments of the Cold War world since NSC-68.  Like NSC-68, 
Team B’s effects on U.S. policy were not to felt right away.  The process whereby American 
security policy came to embrace, codify and plan for all aspects of nuclear war-fighting was 
to take six years.  When war-fighting did become fully institutionalized, however, the view 
of the Soviet Union which had informed Team B was much in evidence.   
In the history of neoconservatism itself, Team B and the events that preceded it are 
significant for what they tells us about the state of neoconservatism in the 1970s.  Most 
prominently, is the persistence of those characteristics that informed it as an academic 
school: the sense of crisis, the essentialism and the faith in transformation through moral 
clarity.  Having moved outside of its birthplace in academia into the nuts-and-bolts world of 
policymaking, neoconservatism had coalesced into a distinct political movement.  Yet, even 
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as it became more diverse, neoconservatism retained that set of peculiar attributes that we 
can only assume is the legacy of anti-modernism.  
Neoconservatism also seems to have retained its remarkable critique of America that 
first emerged from the anti-modernist claim that liberalism and Communism were both 
manifestations of modernity.  While the Soviet Union was, to be sure, not spared in the pages 
of Team Report from characterization as an evil and illegitimate state, bent on world 
conquest, the main focus of Team B’s cultural critique was America.  America is weak, 
Team B implied.  It is a weakness caused not by a lack of military capabilities, but a moral 
weakness.  The danger Team B perceived is only partially a consequence of growing Soviet 
military power.  In the main, it was America’s moral blindness; its refusal to seriously 
contemplate what the Soviet Union was, that invited mortal danger.  Whether America would 
survive and prevail in the contest would thus depend primarily on transformation at home.     
In its own time, Team B was significant for its influence on American politics.  Over 
the next few years, Team B would become the foundational document for a conservative-
neoconservative political narrative that would carry Ronald Reagan to the White House.  
Amplified through a Reagan-esque delivery, the droning Manichean tones of Team B—and 
Wohlstetter’s articles and NSDM 242—can be detected amid the martial melodies of the 
“decade of neglect.”  How this came to be is where we now turn.      
 
  
Chapter 7 
The Public Face of the Movement: Creating a Narrative, 1972 – 1980  
 
At a ceremonial occasion in 1984, Vice President George H.W. Bush launched into a 
“spontaneous” campaign speech that featured a triumphant recounting of the Reagan 
Administration’s efforts to rebuild U.S. military power.  America, Bush said was “back.”  
After a “decade of neglect” during which “those in charge seemed to be operating under the 
notion that a weaker America is a more secure America,” President Reagan had re-built U.S. 
military power to the point where America could once again face down the Soviet threat. 316 
Although the crowd cheered Bush, there was one disgruntled onlooker.  Former 
President Gerald Ford had not appreciated Bush’s references and later sharply reminded the 
Vice President and presidential chief of staff James A. Baker that all three of them had been 
in power during the so-called “decade of neglect.”  Bush and Baker apologized to Ford and 
promised the former president that future stump speeches would be substantially modified.  
Two days later, however, Bush delivered the same speech with only minor modifications.  
More deliveries by Bush—and a few by Reagan himself—prompted Ford to address an angry 
missive to Baker that expressed his dismay as to why the speech had not been altered.  He 
received no reply.317
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Troy attributes Baker’s apparent insensitivity to political necessity.  Ford was asking 
Baker to alter the “decade of neglect” narrative.  Narratives, which are nothing more than 
short interpretive accounts of people and events, are an integral part of politics everywhere.  
Narratives tell a story and interpret events in order to shape the public image of political 
figures.  In this particular case, the “decade of neglect” narrative told the story of how 
Reagan had appeared at a critical moment in history to re-arm and re-vitalize a weakened and 
demoralized America.  As the central foreign policy narrative of the first Reagan 
Administration, this narrative was the source of Reagan’s highly successful public image.  It 
is not surprising, therefore, that Ford’s request received short shrift.  The president’s advisors 
were, in a sense, being asked to jettison the political equivalent of a gold mine. 
Reagan, however, was not the author of this narrative.  It was the latest manifestation 
of a singular narrative that had emerged from neoconservative thought during Scoop 
Jackson’s efforts to win the 1972 Democratic presidential nomination.  America, the original 
narrative went, was facing a crisis.  America’s values were being undermined by the radical 
forces of the counterculture and the New Left.  Deeply hostile to the foundational values of 
upon which the American political system and society rested, the radicals now sought, 
through the election of George McGovern, to completely re-orient U.S. society toward their 
values and preferences.  Only a strong leader, possessed of extraordinary moral clarity, could 
prevent America’s descent into a welter of “acid, amnesty and abortion,” and restore the 
nations’ values and sense of purpose.318 
Jackson, however, was unable to translate this narrative into political success despite 
several apparent advantages.  In both 1972 and 1976, he was well-funded, nationally known 
and free of scandal.  Jackson also had a solid Congressional record in areas of traditional 
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liberal interest, such as labor, energy, and the environment.  Moreover, in both 1972 and 
1976, Jackson contested for the Democratic nomination against opponents with significant 
political liabilities.  What, then, went wrong? 
Jackson’s political failures were, in the main, attributable to his inability to answer a 
single question: What about Vietnam?  In 1972, the question was a literal one.  In 1976, the 
question was a metaphor for the direction of U.S. foreign policy in the wake of Vietnam. 
In both instances, the insufficiency of the neoconservative narrative in this instance 
reflected the state of the movement.  Jackson’s inability to answer the question of Vietnam 
was reflective of the neoconservatives’ ideological rigidity.  Accustomed to thinking in 
absolute terms and dedicated to a Manichean conception of the Cold War, they were unable 
to adapt their world-view to the rapidly changing international environment.  Indeed, for all 
their success in the world of bureaucratic politics, the neoconservatives might have remained 
in permanent opposition if not for the appearance of Ronald Reagan.  Reagan, with his 
sensitivity to the political tenor of the times, was able to answer the question of Vietnam 
and—for reasons that we will examine—do what Jackson had been unable to do: translate the 
neoconservative narrative into political success. 
 
Moral Minority: The 1972 Campaign and The Coalition for a Democratic Majority  
In September 1970, Scoop Jackson was planning to mount an intense effort for the 
Democratic presidential nomination.  At first, Jackson had been hesitant to run.  He had been 
a strong supporter of the war from the early days of the decision to intervene in Vietnam and 
was convinced that this record would disqualify him as a viable candidate.  Recent polling, 
however, showed that many voters regarded social issues such as crime, school busing and 
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the economy at least as or more important as Vietnam.  In light of this polling data, Jackson 
planned to run on a platform that emphasized his devotion to middle-class values and 
concerns.319 
In order to carry his case to the voters, Jackson quickly constructed a small but 
experienced campaign organization.  Jackson’s boyhood friend and long-time political hand 
John Salter ran the logistics of the campaign, while election strategy was the responsibility of 
former Johnson Administration officials Ben Wattenberg and Richard Scammon.  Facing an 
array of formidable candidates, such as Sen. Hubert Humphrey (D-MN), Sen. Edmund 
Muskie (D-ME), Sen. Eugene McCarthy (D-MN), Mayor John Lindsay of New York City, 
Mayor Sam Yorty of Los Angeles, Gov. George Wallace of Alabama, Rep. Shirley Chisholm 
(D-NY) and Sen. George McGovern (D-SD), Wattenberg and Scammon quickly enlisted the 
aid of number of older Democratic figures, such as Richard Schifter, Max Kampelman, 
Eugene Rostow, Peter Rosenblatt, George Ball and Paul Nitze.  As veterans of the Truman, 
Kennedy and/or Johnson administrations, these men possessed an enormous store of political 
and policy experience. 
In order to help craft the campaign’s policy positions, Wattenberg launched an effort 
to recruit academics and specialists in various fields.  He quickly found that among those 
intellectuals for whom Vietnam was the central issue, support for Jackson was almost non-
existent.  While many, such as the sociologists Nathan Glazer and Daniel Bell, the journalist 
Dwight MacDonald, and the novelists Mary McCarthy and Norman Mailer were not 
completely comfortable with McGovern, they continued to support the South Dakota senator 
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for his commitment to immediate disengagement in Vietnam.  Others, such as the sociologist 
Robert Nisbet, the socialist activist Max Shachtman and former RAND analyst Herman 
Kahn, were unenthusiastic Nixon supporters who believed the president’s “Vietnamization” 
policy to be the best of an array of bad choices.320 
Wattenberg’s recruitment efforts were more successful among those intellectuals who 
supported the war in Vietnam.  Norman Podhoretz, the editor of Commentary magazine, and 
his wife, the writer Midge Decter, regarded Vietnam as a well-intentioned, if not particularly 
well thought out consequence of containment.  Although Podhoretz had opposed large-scale 
intervention in Vietnam, he had come to support the war effort.  He believed that it was 
possible to bring the war to a successful conclusion in which the Republic of Vietnam 
remained a sovereign state, free of Communist domination.  The most likely outcome, the 
couple believed, would be for the war to end in a negotiated settlement, as had been the case 
in Korea. 
Podhoretz and Decter also believed that it was possible for the war to end in disaster.  
If it turned out that America no longer possessed the moral clarity and courage necessary to 
prosecute the war, the result would be a humiliating unilateral and unconditional withdrawal.  
Decter and Podhoretz had detected a Weimar-like breakdown of values in the national 
culture since the 1950s, and the appearance of the New Left, the counterculture, and the 
various social movements seemed to indicate that America’s moral crisis was accelerating.  
In their view, the domestic turmoil associated with Vietnam was both symptomatic of, and a 
catalyst for the destructive impulses that they perceived at work in American culture. 
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Jeane Kirkpatrick also believed that an American loss of moral clarity was a 
dangerous development.  A former Young People’s Socialist League (YPSL) member-
turned-political scientist, Kirkpatrick had come to regard the Soviet Union as the primary 
threat to Western civilization.  While Kirkpatrick regarded Vietnam as an important arena in 
the global contest with Communism, the outcome of the war would not determine the 
outcome of the larger Soviet-American contest.  A loss of nerve in the face of growing Soviet 
power, however, could be fatal.  Unlike many older Democrats, she did not believe that it 
would be possible to simply contain the Soviet Union while hoping for it to mellow.  Indeed, 
Kirkpatrick, like Podhoretz and a number of other figures associated with the Jackson 
campaign, believed that if the Soviet Union were to change at all, it would be for the worse.  
Only a stiffening of spine at home, coupled with a muscular activism abroad and a 
determined and confident leadership could attenuate the Soviet threat. 321 
The conviction shared by Podhoretz, Decter and Kirkpatrick that America was in the 
grip of a moral crisis with foreign policy implications derived from the thought of Hannah 
Arendt.  Kirkpatrick had studied political theory under Arendt at Columbia, while Podhoretz 
claims to have experienced something of an epiphany upon encountering Arendt’s 
monumental The Origins of Totalitarianism, in 1951.  Under Arendt’s influence, the young 
neoconservatives came to regard ideas and values as the agents that shaped the regime.  This 
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classical view of the integral nature of culture and politics was the basis of their conception 
of an American moral crisis.  Kirkpatrick, in particular, applied this classical, anti-modernist 
view to her diagnosis of the American crisis by characterizing the counterculture and the 
anti-war movement as products of a Nietzschean “transvaluation of American values.” 
Podhoretz and Kirkpatrick also seem to have internalized Arendt’s view of Soviet 
Communism.  Like Arendt, both Podhoretz and Kirkpatrick perceived the Soviet state as a 
political manifestation of Evil.  They also believed that the Soviet Union was incorrigibly 
committed to the conquest of the world.  In both regards, Podhoretz and Kirkpatrick saw the 
Soviet Union as an analogue to Nazi Germany.  The Soviet Union, however, appeared as 
even more dangerous than Nazi Germany.  Fascism had never garnered the loyalties of 
young intellectuals in the West, and it had never possessed strategic nuclear weapons.322 
Kirkpatrick’s and Podhoretz’s view of Soviet Communism was shared another group 
of intellectuals aligned with the Jackson campaign.  Richard Pipes, Martin Malia, Adam 
Ulam, Leopold Labedz, Leon Gouré and Robert C. Tucker were prominent historians of 
Russia and Soviet Communism associated with the totalitarian school of Russian history.  An 
anti-modernist school of thought originated by the Russian émigré Mikhail Karpovich 
(Harvard), the totalitarians believed that Communism was a radical form of modernity that 
had originated during the French Enlightenment.  According to Karpovich, the seeds of 
Communism had been planted among the Russia intelligentsia foreign revolutionaries, 
degenerate intellectuals and criminals in the early nineteenth century.  Despite the corruption 
of the intellectuals, liberalism had continued to grow and develop in Russia among the 
merchants and propertied farmers.   World War I, however, had interrupted the development 
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of liberalism, and provided an opening for Lenin and the Bolsheviks to seize power.  The 
revolution of 1917, therefore, had not been a true “bottom-up” revolution, but rather an 
illegitimate coup, carried out by the adherents of a murderous ideology.  Similarly, the 
totalitarian school regarded Stalin, not as an aberration, but as an exceptionally powerful 
manifestation of Communism.323 
The totalitarian school was also one of the strongest links to Jackson’s staff.  Over the 
years, many of the totalitarian scholars had been engaged as staff consultants by Fosdick.  
Pipes was a particular favorite of Fosdick’s, having served the staff during the national 
security machinery hearings of the 1950s.  His grim view of Soviet Communism had helped 
shape Jackson and Fosdick’s understanding of the nature of the Soviet Union and its 
intentions and now informed the campaign’s position. 
A more “grassroots” sort of political experience was represented by members such as 
Hal and Theodore Draper, Seymour Martin Lipset, Joshua Muravchik, and Penn Kemble.  
All were, or had once been members of the American Communist Party, the Young Person’s 
Socialist League (YPSL), and/or the Social Democrats USA.  Draper, a free-lance historian 
was not only a former Communist, but had also once worked at Tass.  All of the “YPISLs,” 
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as they were known were also highly versed in organizing and veterans of the ferocious 
factional struggles that seem to have been endemic to socialist political groups.324 
Thus constituted, the Jackson campaign entered the Democratic primaries.  Despite 
the crowded field, the Jackson forces, at Kemble’s recommendation, focused on McGovern 
as the primary threat.  Part of the reason for McGovern’s strength, in Kemble’s view, was 
that McGovern seemed to have an almost exclusive command of the political Left.  Social 
activists of all stripes, as well as various left-leaning independent groups, counterculture 
figures, and the majority of the party’s anti-war faction flocked to McGovern’s banner.  
Collectively known as the “New Politics,” McGovern’s supporters were generally young, 
diverse, highly motivated, and disorganized.  The policy preferences of the New Politics was 
reflected in his platform, which many regarded as one of most radical Democratic platforms 
ever assembled.  A strong anti-war stance, which called for an immediate and unconditional 
withdrawal from Vietnam, legalization of abortion, a guaranteed minimum income, 
marijuana legalization and an Equal Rights Amendment constituted the main planks of 
McGovern’s platform. 
Wattenberg and Kemble also expected McGovern to derive considerable strength 
from recent changes in the way Democratic Party delegates were selected.  The result of an 
overhaul of party processes overseen by McGovern himself in 1968, the new system reserved 
a certain number of delegate posts for traditionally under-represented groups, such as 
women, African-Americans, Native Americans and gays.  Since these groups tended to 
                                                 
324
 Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “Anti-New Politics Liberals,” Washington Post November 12, 1972, p. 
B6; “Moderates Start Democratic Group,” New York Times, November 13, 1972, p. 40; Decter, pp. 33-40. 
 270 
overwhelmingly favor McGovern, he was expected to command the support of all of these 
delegates.325 
In the spring of 1971, the Jackson forces launched an assault on McGovern that 
focused on his “radical vision” for America.  Jackson, for instance, repeatedly observed that 
McGovern was supported by radical activists Jerry Rubin and Abbie Hoffman and other 
authors of the counterculture.  These people, Jackson maintained, were “intolerant extremists 
who have come to despise America.”  A McGovern victory would mean entrusting the 
country to “an absolute radical left-fringe” that would seek to legalize marijuana and on-
demand abortion, while granting amnesty to draftees that had fled to Canada to avoid service 
in Vietnam.  Encapsulated in the alliterative and exaggerated slogan, “acid, amnesty and 
abortion,” Jackson’s attacks foreshadowed the Republican attacks on McGovern and the New 
Politics in the coming general election.326 
The Jackson campaign’s claims that McGovern and the New Politics represented a 
threat to American values and society were echoed in neoconservative writings, with 
Podhoretz’s Commentary magazine in the lead.  Crime, drugs and the radicalization of youth 
were the most prominent themes.  Podhoretz himself conflated the “revolutionists” of the 
New Left with the Sabbateans, a heretical seventeenth century Jewish sect that denied the 
authority of Talmudic law and declared their rabbi, Sabbatai Zevi (who later converted to 
Islam) to be the Messiah.  In a forceful 1971 article entitled “The Tribe of the Wicked Son,” 
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Podhoretz warned his Jewish readers that their flirtations with the New Left might one day 
lead an anti-Semitic backlash.327 
Wattenberg and Kemble also attempted to formulate a Democratic version of Nixon’s 
“Southern strategy” to draw support from Wallace.  In February, Jackson introduced a bill in 
the Senate introducing a constitutional amendment guaranteeing “school choice.”  The 
practical consequence of this amendment would be to effectively roll back the federal court 
order that allowed school districts to use busing to achieve desegregation.  Podhoretz 
supported the Jackson bill with an article in which he argued that based on his own 
experience, integrated schools “bore not the slightest resemblance to the rosy fantasies being 
scattered about in those days by the prevailing winds of liberal opinion . . . in my own 
experience it had led to violence and greater animosity.”  This attempt at a southern strategy 
was, however a failure.  Jackson had a long record of support for civil rights and Southern 
segregationists had a long memory.328   
There also seems to have been a conscious decision early on by the Jackson campaign 
to avoid discussion of foreign and military affairs in order to avoid becoming entangled in 
any lengthy debates about Vietnam.  Although the polls had shown Vietnam to be a 
secondary issue among some voters, the recent lowering of the voting age meant that during 
the 1972 election there would be 25 million new youth voters.  “Anybody who thinks the 
youth vote doesn’t matter,” Wattenberg told the New York Times, “is an idiot.” 
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7.1  The 1972 Election 
 
1972 Jackson campaign ephemera.  Note that despite the appellation “troops” to describe his supporters, the  
image of Jackson is dressed as a baseball player.  The original drawing was of the senator in a military uniform, but 
was changed when campaign manager John Salter concluded that it would conjure up images of Vietnam in voters’ 
minds.  
 
 
 
          
    
                  Scoop and Helen Jackson greet delegates at the 1972 Democratic National Convention in Miami. 
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Wattenberg also realized that Vietnam would be the primary issue among these young voters.  
Although a few carefully-worded articles did appear that discussed Vietnam and foreign 
policy, the pages of journals and newspapers remained undisturbed. While Jackson was not 
averse to telling residents of towns with nearby military bases that McGovern planned to turn 
their towns into “ghost towns,” for the most part he avoided any substantive discussion of 
foreign affairs.  This strategy severely limited Jackson’s effectiveness insofar as foreign 
affairs and military issues were his areas of expertise.  The strategy also prevented Jackson 
from making inroads among Republicans and independents disenchanted with Nixon.  A 
definite opportunity to glean unaffiliated and disaffected independent voters existed, for 
instance, in the critical early state of New Hampshire.  Many independent conservatives—as 
well as a number of prominent Republicans—agreed with Jackson’s narrative of an 
American moral crisis.  Jackson, however, was unable to capitalize.329  
The Jackson campaign was also hamstrung by the McGovern campaign’s insistence 
on talking about Vietnam.  While much of his rhetoric focused on the immorality and human 
costs of the war, in the spring of 1972 McGovern began to link the costs of Vietnam to the 
inflationary pressures on the economy.  In a period of “stagflation,” this bit of message 
refinement was quite effective and by the summer, McGovern had gained a distinct 
advantage over his fellow Democrats.  Heading into the July convention, McGovern had 
almost as many committed delegates as Jackson, Wallace and Chisholm combined.330  
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Faced with the prospect of McGovern as the Democratic nominee, many prominent 
Democrats were stirred to action.  Some, like Georgia governor Jimmy Carter, resolved to 
mount an “anybody but McGovern” floor fight at the convention in Miami.  Others, like 
Jackson supporters Irving Kristol, editor of The Public Interest, and his wife, the historian 
Gertrude Himmelfarb, simply threw their support to Nixon.  Himmelfarb, a former student of 
Strauss at Chicago, had been a long-time Democrat from a family with a long history of 
Democratic activism.  Her departure, therefore, registered as something of a shock to her 
fellow Jackson supporters.  While Kristol’s departure was more understandable—he had just 
taken a job at the Wall Street Journal—most neoconservatives felt that his intellect would be 
sorely missed by the movement.  Still others, like Glazer and Bell, decided to simply sit out 
the election.  All of these groups believed not only would McGovern lose the general election 
to Nixon, but also that his nomination would also signal a permanent turn for the party 
toward the positions of the New Left.331 
The majority of Jackson’s supporters, unwilling to accept a Democratic Party 
dominated by the New Left, decided to mount a counter-insurgent movement: the Coalition 
for a Democratic Majority.  The CDM was envisioned by Wattenberg as an American 
“ginger group,” or “an organization that inspires others with demonstrated enthusiasm and 
activeness.”  In this regard, the members chose the British Fabian Society as their model.  
They also planned to adopt the Fabian’s guerilla strategy of weakening numerically superior 
enemies through strength of argument and political harassment rather than through pitched 
battles.  They would make up for their lack of numbers through sheer tenacity. 
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The CDM’s immediate goal was to rid the Democratic Party of the influence of the 
McGovernites by lobbying for a return to the delegate selection rules that had existed prior to 
1971.  Operating under these older rules, which did not “reserve” a certain number of 
delegates for under-represented groups within the party, Wattenberg and Scammon believed, 
would move the party back toward more centrist positions and help marginalize those 
elements of the counterculture and the New Left that claimed Democratic affiliation.  The 
CDM’s longer term goal was to promote Jackson as the Democratic nominee for 1976.  To 
this end, the CDM sought to re-group and re-energize prominent Democrats, while attracting 
influential figures of both parties who, for one reason or another, did not feel comfortable 
with either the New Left or the Nixon Administration’s dealings with the Soviet Union.  In 
order to achieve this objective, the CDM leadership, Wattenberg, Kemble, Decter and 
Podhoretz, resolved to continue to refine the campaign narrative of a disintegrating American 
culture.  Vietnam was omitted. 332 
The CDM’s official manifesto debuted on December 7, 1972; exactly one month after 
Nixon won the general election by the biggest landslide in history.  Written by Decter and 
Podhoretz, the manifesto appeared as a full-page ad in the New York Times and the 
Washington Post.  Entitled “Come Home, Democrats” (a reference to the McGovern 
campaign slogan “Come Home, America”), the CDM piece was both an assignation of blame 
for the disaster of the 1972 and a declaration of war on the New Left.  The CDM flatly 
asserted that the New Left, which had “sneered at the greatness of America,” was primarily 
to blame for the Nixon landslide.  Secondarily, the Republicans had “usurped” the values of 
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the “Democratic tradition.”  There was, however, no mention of Vietnam or of foreign affairs 
in general, save for an oblique reference to “past miscalculations.”333 
Between McGovern’s defeat and the 1974 mid-term party convention, the CDM 
busied itself with financing the CDM, formulating political strategy and promoting Jackson 
as the 1976 nominee.  In regard to the CDM’s organization, Wattenberg and Decter hired 
Kemble as a full time executive director.  An organizer and administrator of the first rank, 
Kemble was also a proficient fund-raiser.  In short order Kemble succeeded in forming 
alliances with two of the most prominent labor leaders in America, Albert Shanker, the 
president of the American Federation of Teachers, and Al Barkan, the director of the AFL-
CIO’s Committee on Political Education.  Both men provided the CDM with financial and 
moral support.334 
The CDM also sought to capitalize on the Nixon landslide.  The sheer scale of 
McGovern’s defeat, they hoped, would strengthen the CDM’s hand in the intra-party political 
debate at the Democratic mid-term convention in Kansas City in 1974.  A review of the 
delegate selection procedures was on the agenda and the new party chairman, Robert Strauss, 
was planning a debate and a vote on the rules.  The CDM’s position was that the rules 
favored left-of center candidates unlikely to appeal to voters in general election.335 
The CDM also began an intensive effort to position Jackson for 1976.  The main 
targets were journalists and potential campaign donors.  Labor leaders, disaffected 
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Republicans, academics and select career bureaucrats were also targeted.  Although the 
group’s promotional efforts were rather amateurish—the modus operandi being a banquet at 
which some sort of “award” to be given to a distinguished business or political figure—the 
CDM managed to raise a substantial war-chest.  Held at the Sheraton Carlton hotel in 
Washington, the main draws at these soirees were Jackson, Humphrey or some other 
prominent Democratic politician.  The CDM also launched monthly mail fund-raising 
appeals, and held discussion roundtables outside of Washington that sometimes drew the 
attention of the Washington Post, Time or Newsweek.336 
The centerpiece of the CDM’s message in speeches and fundraising appeals remained 
the moral crisis narrative that had been featured during the campaign.  Vietnam remained 
unmentioned.  The CDM’s silence on Vietnam after the election reflected Jackson’s 
continuing reticence to talk about the war.  While the CDM’s speeches and mailings, 
expressed support for a “strong national defense,” there was very little in the way of specific 
policy recommendations.  The CDM’s reticence in this regard is, of course, quire 
understandable.  The organization was simply on the wrong side of the issue politically and 
Jackson, Wattenberg and the other CDM leaders knew it.  Very little had changed on the 
political plane since the election, and barring the sudden appearance of any new strategy 
there remained only two possible positions: Nixon’s or McGovern’s. 
Thus Vietnam remained an obstacle to the emergence of a politically viable public 
narrative.  While the Soviet Union remained the primary neoconservative target of their 
bureaucratic-political efforts in Washington, calls to re-orient U.S. foreign toward the roll-
back favored by Jackson, Fosdick and Perle appeared a hard sale to make.  In the absence of 
some particularly blatant Soviet provocation, such muscular activism looked too much like 
                                                 
336
 Wattenberg, pp. 148-149. 
 280 
the crusading zeal that had landed the United States in Vietnam.  As for security policy, most 
policy discussions involved extremely esoteric strategic calculations about nuclear weaponry 
that were not easily translated into political talking-points.  Two issues, however, were about 
to arise that promised to help the neoconservatives construct a narrative capable of 
transcending Vietnam and defining a new direction for U.S. foreign policy. 
 
The Narrative Refined: Jackson-Vanik and the Yom Kippur War 
The first issue that might have served as the basis for a new neoconservative foreign 
policy narrative was human rights.  Human rights as an issue had come into focus in official 
Washington and among informed observers in 1971 as a result of Soviet restrictions on 
Jewish emigration.  The Soviet restrictions prompted Mark Talisman, a staffer in the office of 
Rep. Charles Vanik (D-OH), to come up with the idea of linking Jewish emigration to Most 
Favored Nation (MFN) trade status for the Soviet Union.  Although Vanik had gone so far as 
to codify this idea in a bill, the legislation remained in limbo until 1972, when it was lent a 
new impetus by the Soviet decision to institute an “exit tax”—sometimes up to $30,000 per 
person—on Soviet Jews who wished to emigrate.   
The main thrust of Vanik’s bill involved denying the Soviet Union MFN, then under 
negotiation, until it eased the exit restrictions on Soviet Jews.   The very idea of tying MFN 
to Jewish emigration all but guaranteed a forceful response from the administration.  The 
economic aspect of détente was, as Kissinger never tired of pointing out, was a crucial and 
integral component of détente.  Without the “carrot” of Soviet-American economic 
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cooperation, the entire edifice of détente would be at risk—which is precisely why Jackson, 
Fosdick and Perle sought to promote it.337  
Almost from the moment the amendment appeared in the House as Vanik-Mills (H.R. 
10710), the Nixon Administration began warning members of Congress and anyone else who 
would listen that Vanik-Mills was dangerous to détente.  These warnings, mainly delivered in 
private asides by Kissinger, seemed to presume that the measure would only manage to insult 
the Soviets and would never become law.  Jackson immediately placed his name on the bill 
as the primary Senate sponsor and, almost as immediately, began to negotiate with the 
administration over its particulars.  Kissinger still does not seem to have believed that the 
amendment, now called Jackson-Vanik, would ever become law.  Yet he realized that in 
Jackson’s hands, the bill could greatly complicate Soviet-American relations.  As a result, the 
White House began to tout the potential economic benefits of détente to Jackson’s corporate 
supporters in an effort to pressure him indirectly.     
Jackson, however, was not as susceptible to the White House’s strategy as Nixon and 
Kissinger had assumed.  While he did depend greatly on corporate largesse, his largest and 
most reliable corporate supporters were not likely to engage in commerce with the Soviets.  
Most were businesses that realized enormous revenue streams from U.S. military contracts, 
such Boeing, Martin Marietta and Thompson-Ramo-Woolridge.  This attachment to firms 
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doing mainly national security business with the government meant that Jackson was 
insulated from Kissinger’s argument about the economic benefits of détente.338    
The high drama that was now building around Jackson-Vanik in the Congress 
appeared to be tailor-made for the CDM to promote Jackson and his—and the CDM’s—view 
of Soviet behavior.  This, however, was not the case.  Despite the popular mythology that the 
neoconservatives have always represented a unified and cohesive front, or have always acted 
in the interests of the Jews, the majority of the CDM’s membership does not seem to have 
lent much support to Jackson-Vanik.  Indeed, there is no evidence that any of the leading 
CDM members—not Podhoretz, Decter, Lipset, Pipes, Wattenberg, Rostow, Draper, 
Kemble, Muravchik or Kirkpatrick—uttered or wrote one public word in support of Jackson-
Vanik at the time.   
There were exceptions.  Bayard Rustin, a prominent civil rights leader, led a group 
called the Black Americans Support Israel Committee (BASIC) in a demonstration in 
Washington in support of Jackson-Vanik, while Albert Shanker, president of the United 
Federation of Teachers, lobbied congressmen on behalf of the amendment.  Similarly, 
Marshall I. Goldman, a historian of Russia who had studied under Pipes at Harvard, appeared 
on a debate panel on the public television program, “The Advocates.”  The AFL-CIO was 
also a staunch supporter of the legislation, although the labor organization’s motives were 
less altruistic than those of Rustin, Shanker, and Goldman. AFL-CIO president George 
Meany simply feared that without Jackson-Vanik, American corporations, lured by the 
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prospect of ultra-low wages, would rush to transfer as many jobs as possible to the Soviet 
Union.339 
The CDM’s puzzling lack of support for Jackson-Vanik may have reflected the wider 
debate among American Jews over the merits and potential implications of the bill.  Some 
Jewish Americans feared—and rightfully so—Soviet reprisals against Jews remaining in the 
Soviet Union.  Others, meanwhile, were fearful of wrecking détente because they believed 
that increased commerce with the Soviet Union would eventually “democratize” and 
ameliorate Soviet behavior.  Given the neoconservative antipathy toward détente, however, 
as well as their usual lack of inhibitions in criticizing Soviet policy, neither of these 
objections seems to explain the CDM’s behavior. 
It is also unlikely that the CDM members were swayed by the Nixon 
Administration’s argument that only gradual, incremental improvement of Soviet-American 
relations along a broad political, economic and military front would benefit the Soviet 
Union’s Jewish citizens.  Kissinger, in his conversations with American Jewish leaders, did 
manage to sow doubt about Jackson-Vanik in the minds of some.  Max Fisher and Jacob 
Stein, the leaders of the umbrella-group, the Conference of President of Major Jewish 
Organizations, took the administration’s position to their member organizations.  At the 
group’s conference in New York, however, the member organizations not only 
overwhelmingly voted to support Jackson-Vanik, but also roundly denounced Fisher as a 
dupe of the administration.340   
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There is also the possibility that the CDM was silent about Jackson-Vanik so as not to 
anger would-be corporate supporters.  A number of multi-national U.S. corporations, Pepsi, 
IBM, and Occidental Petroleum, either had projects already underway in the Soviet Union, or 
were planning significant new investments there.  Indeed, a number of these corporations 
formed an interest group called The Emergency Committee on American Trade, headed by 
the Pepsi-Cola Corporation’s CEO, Donald Kendall.  Perceiving the Soviet Union and China 
as potential new markets, these corporations were very alarmed at the potential chilling effect 
that Jackson-Vanik could have on détente. While there is little evidence that any of the CDM 
members—other than possibly Max Kampelman—had a personal financial stake in 
American investment in the Soviet Union, they may have feared the discontinuation of 
corporate and foundation support for the various organizations with which the 
neoconservatives were affiliated.  Podhoretz’s Commentary, for instance, was certainly 
vulnerable to financial manipulation.  Despite the magazine’s ostensible position as a 
financial ward of the non-profit American Jewish Committee, Podhoretz had long solicited 
and received donations from outside corporate sources.341 
On December 11, 1972, Jackson-Vanik passed the House by a resounding 319 to 80.  
The bill now moved to the Senate where it passed into the Senate, where Fosdick and Perle 
anticipated a much steeper climb.  Even now, the majority of CDM members—save the 
handful that had supported the bill during its House passage—made no effort to support 
Jackson-Vanik.  Jackson’s staff, aware that little outside help was in the offing, began an 
intense round of senatorial arm-twisting.  By the fall, however, the administration had fought 
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the Jackson forces to a stalemate.  Détente simply remained too popular among the American 
people and in the Congress for Jackson to acquire sufficient votes.  
The second issue around which a new neoconservative narrative might have been 
organized was Israel.  This issue arose on October 6, 1973 when Egyptian and Syrian forces 
attacked Israel.  Sweeping towards Israel from the Sinai in the south and the Golan Heights 
in the north, the Arab forces advanced for the first forty-eight hours.  By October 9, however, 
the Israelis were poised to advance into Syria proper, and had begun to counterattack in the 
Sinai.  The same day, the Soviet Union began re-supplying the Egyptians, while Nixon 
authorized a massive airlift of supplies to Israel.  Over the next two weeks, the fronts shifted 
back and forth until on the night of the 23rd, the Soviets cabled Washington that they planned 
to intervene unless the Israelis ceased hostilities.  The Nixon Administration responded by 
placing U.S. strategic forces on heightened alert, and the Soviets relented on their threat.  By 
the 24th, all sides had accepted a United Nations brokered ceasefire, effectively bringing 
hostilities to a conclusion.342 
The Yom Kippur war (as it came to be known) ignited a storm of neoconservative 
criticism against détente.  Realizing that the Soviets had now supplied a rational for a public 
assault against détente, the neoconservatives became as vocal and unrelenting in their 
criticisms of détente as they had been silent about Jackson-Vanik and Vietnam.  One of the 
main lines of criticism, as put forth by Herbert Dinerstein, was that the war proved the 
ineffectualness of détente and the value of superior U.S. strategic power.  After all, many 
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neoconservatives argued, it had been the U.S. threat of nuclear retaliation that had prevented 
a Soviet-American conflict in the Middle East.  Other criticisms made claims about various 
political dangers that attended détente.  The former socialist-turned-OSS operative-turned-
anti-modernist scholar, James Burnham claimed that because the Soviets saw détente as a 
sign of U.S. weakness, they had been emboldened to threaten intervention.  Podhoretz argued 
that détente appeared to be leading to the “Taiwanization” of Israel, whereby the Jewish state 
would be “abandoned under cover of diplomatic euphemisms by the United States for the 
sake of a settlement with the Russians.”  Draper went even further, accusing Nixon of 
allowing domestic politics to drive foreign policy.  “The more the president was forced to 
wallow in the Watergate and associated ignominies,” he wrote in Commentary, “the harder 
Mr. Nixon tried to sell the blessings of détente.”  Rostow took up Draper’s line and Kissinger 
felt compelled to call a news conference to deny that détente was being oversold to mitigate 
the effects of Watergate.343 
An equally worrisome development from Nixon’s perspective was conservative 
participation in the criticism of détente.  Indeed, the zeal with which conservative 
Republicans piled on seemed to betray a certain amount of suppressed unhappiness with 
Nixon.  William F. Buckley, the editor of conservatism’s flagship weekly, National Review, 
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gave Burnham a permanent forum from which to attack détente and arms control, and 
periodically joined in the fray himself.  To add insult to injury, Nixon’s friend and former 
Defense Secretary, Melvin Laird, also began to criticize the Nixon foreign policy.  Similarly, 
an unidentified American diplomat—a Kissinger subordinate—told U.S. News that in the 
wake of the Arab-Israeli war and the subsequent criticism of détente, “Henry has been cut 
down to size . . . few on the Hill want to see him pushed out, but . . . few now consider him 
indispensable.”344    
The conservative attacks on détente represented an unexpected political windfall for 
Jackson.  The mounting criticism of the administration suggested that latent conservative 
distrust of the Soviets might be leveraged in support of Jackson-Vanik.  In the coming 
months, Fosdick and Perle indeed managed to parlay conservative unhappiness into support 
for Jackson-Vanik.  Moreover, Jackson’s staff saw possibilities to gain in future battles over 
arms control and the defense budget.345  
The incipient critique of détente also suggested the basis for a new foreign policy 
narrative for use during the 1976 presidential campaign.  The elements of this narrative, that 
negotiation with the Soviets was futile and dangerous and that only military power could 
contain Soviet expansionism, had much to recommend it from the neoconservatives’ 
perspective.  Most importantly, it offered a platform from which Jackson could talk about 
foreign policy without reference to Vietnam.  In so doing, he would also distinguish himself 
from Democratic supporters of détente and the neo-isolationists within the party.  As a 
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corollary, opposition to détente might also be a means to gain a significant number of 
Republican votes in 1976. 
Members of the CDM also recognized the makings of a foreign policy narrative that 
might help them displace the influence of the New Politics within the Democratic Party.  At 
the mid-term convention in Kansas City they made a case for abandoning the New Politics 
that hinged on characterizing McGovern’s stances on social issues as well out of the 
mainstream and narrowing foreign policy choices to dangerous isolationism, amoral détente, 
and morally-informed activism.  The Democrats in Kansas City, however, did not accept this 
argument.  Indeed, many regarded the CDM position as merely rhetorical cover for a return 
to the same sort of militarized containment that liberal mythology held to be responsible for 
Vietnam.  The feeling of many liberals was encapsulated by the New Republic’s John 
Osborne, who opined that, in spite of how Democrats might feel about Nixon personally, his 
foreign policy was infinitely preferable to a return to “the days of Berlin blockades, missile 
crises and bomb shelters.”346 
The CDM’s difficulties in Kansas City were compounded by the fact that Jackson 
himself did not attend the convention.  Whether out of a belief that the effort was futile, as 
compensation for the CDM’s failure to support Jackson-Vanik or both, Jackson’s absence 
remains a mystery.  Although in retrospect it seems unlikely that his presence would have 
had any affect on the eventual outcome, at the time many CDM members felt that he could 
have made a difference.  In his absence, however, defeat was assured.  In Decter’s words, 
“the New Politics people walked all over us.”347   
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Jackson’s snub of the CDM did not, of course, end the group’s relationship with him.  
While there were some bad feelings—Decter was particularly bitter, calling Jackson 
“foolish”—the members resolved to forge onward and prepare the ground for a Jackson 
candidacy in 1976.  In order to keep the CDM functioning, it also became an urgent matter to 
secure funding for any future activities.  Support from the AFL-CIO and its member unions 
had dropped precipitously—perhaps another sign of a quid pro quo between some 
neoconservatives and corporate America.  While there were a number of gifts from 
individual contributors, the CDM quickly concluded that it needed to cast a wider net.  In late 
1974 Kemble stepped up the fund-raising effort by forming a number of “letterhead 
organizations,” or organizations which existed only on paper.  Many of the organizations, 
such as Institute on Religion and Democracy and the Foundation for a Democratic Education 
did not trumpet their support for Jackson so as to allow appeals to traditional Republican 
donors.348 
The outcome of the intra-party struggle reflected the neoconservatives’ ideological 
rigidity.  Unable to move beyond their Manichean conception of the Cold War world, they 
had squandered two opportunities to construct a narrative that may have transcended the 
question, “What about Vietnam?”  Human rights, for instance, could have easily served as 
the basis for a new narrative, as it eventually did for Jimmy Carter, yet the neoconservatives 
did not embrace human rights for reasons that remain unclear.  
Similarly, the neoconservative narrative may have been re-organized around the idea 
of America as a global “peace broker.”  Although this direction was much more difficult 
insofar as the nuclear alert would have to be handled delicately, an America-as-peacemaker 
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narrative would not have been impossible.  Shaped along the lines of the Nixon Doctrine, the 
peacemaker narrative would have had resonance among the public.  The neoconservatives, 
however, allowed this opportunity for a new narrative to evaporate as they subsumed the 
peacemaker image beneath the harsh, militant criticisms of détente. 
 
Last Chance: The Vietnam Syndrome, and the 1976 Campaign 
“What about Vietnam?” had been a literal question in 1972.  Although the Nixon 
Administration had begun the withdrawal of U.S. troops, Americans were still fighting and 
dying and the immediacy of the war as a campaign issue was only slightly less than it had 
been in 1968.  In 1976, with the war over and South Vietnam now in Communist hands, the 
question about Vietnam had become a metaphor for the candidates’ views on the direction of 
future U.S. foreign policy.  For the neoconservatives, this question itself suggested the basis 
for a new narrative: the Vietnam Syndrome.    
When Saigon fell to the forces of the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam in April 
of 1975, the American’s public’s resigned reaction to the event caused the neoconservatives 
to wonder about the effects of the war on the national moral fabric.   In order to ascertain the 
damage by the war and its effects on future U.S. foreign policy, Podhoretz and Decter 
organized a symposium at Commentary that included such CDM luminaries as the political 
scientists Zbigniew Brzezinski, Stanley Hoffman, Richard A. Falk, Herman Kahn (formerly 
of RAND), the philosophers Sidney Hook and William Barrett; and the sociologists Norman 
Birnbaum and Peter Berger.  Irving Howe, an English professor at City University, former 
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Undersecretary of the Air Force Townsend Hoopes, former Assistant Secretary of State 
Charles Frankel, and twenty-four others completed the panel.349   
While most of the symposium participants agreed that the Vietnam had engendered a 
fear of international involvement among the American people—a “failure of nerve”—there 
was some disagreement about the degree of damage and its likely persistence.  Some, such as 
Berger, Birnbaum and Brzezinski believed the damage was minimal and that America would 
recover given steady leadership and a realistic assessment of Soviet behavior.  Others, 
however, believed the damage caused by Vietnam was deep and would be long-lived.  
Decter, in particular, put forth an extremely pessimistic view that foresaw great danger for 
America and the world arising from America’s failure in Vietnam:  
Defeat . . . is not good for people.  And it is no better for nations . . . It 
humiliates, raises doubts, heightens acrimony . . . If America, because of a 
terrible mistake made in the name of the Cold War, with all the bitterness and 
humiliation attendant thereto, ceases to continue the struggle . . . a vast 
proportion of the Earth’s surface will to one extent or another eventually be 
Bolshevised.       
 
Decter’s formulation, which came to be incorporated in the neoconservative narrative 
as the “Vietnam Syndrome,” is significant as one of the most serious neoconservative 
attempts to resolve the questions associated with Vietnam.  At the core of the argument is the 
explanation: Vietnam was a well-intentioned “mistake” that will have severe consequences 
should America withdraw from its responsibilities in the world and not “continue the 
struggle.”  In her formulation, détente is not a “continuation of the struggle,” but an 
admission of weakness.  This linkage of a flawed détente to the mistakes of the past supplies 
a rational for another aspect of her argument: forgiveness.  While we may acknowledge the 
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mistakes of the past, Decter seems to argue, the grave dangers of the present require us to 
forgive and move on.  In closing her argument, Decter acknowledges that there will be those 
who will not forgive.  Here, however, she conjectures that those unable to forgive will be the 
corrupt and morally blind “ruling elite” who have “forgotten what evil is and “would rather 
“complain about the difficulties of freedom than do anything about the sufferings of 
enslavement.”350 
Adopting this refined narrative for his 1976 campaign for the Democratic nomination, 
Jackson quickly found it insufficient.  Although he went so far as to state that it had been “a 
mistake” to become embroiled in Vietnam, Jackson would accept no personal responsibility.  
In most instances, he blamed the Nixon Administration for its “secret agreements” with 
Saigon, without explaining how these agreements may have prolonged the war.  
Subsequently, he found that the voters had neither forgotten nor forgiven.  Beginning the 
campaign in earnest in January 1976, Jackson was forced to quit the field in April when the 
governor of Georgia, Jimmy Carter, scored an impressive win in the Democratic primary in 
Pennsylvania, his sixth win in a row, and his eighth out of nine primaries.351   
As in 1972, the neoconservatives remained on the battlefield after the battle.  
Although Jackson’s second attempt at the presidency had failed, what was left of the CDM 
resolved to try and influence foreign and security policy from afar.  A chronic lack of 
funding, however, made continuing the organization difficult.  There also seems to have been 
a feeling that the neoconservative narrative had reached an intellectual dead-end.  Vietnam 
had proved to be a problem for which the neoconservatives simply had no answer.  Their 
                                                 
350
 Midge Decter, contribution to “America Now: A Failure of Nerve?,” Commentary (July 1975): 29-31. 
 
351
 Peter Goldman, “The Fastest Tortoise?” Newsweek (February 10, 1975): 18; Richard Steele, “The War in 
Indochina,” Newsweek (April 21, 1975): 20; Tom Matthews, “Dreams of Glory,” Newsweek (November 3, 
1975): 18; “Carter’s Plan To Scoop It Up,” Time (June 14, 1976): 17-23. 
 293 
commitment to the idea of the Cold War as a cosmic battle between Good and Evil simply 
allowed no room for qualifications and moral confusion. 
The CDM’s inertia, however, did not mean that the critique of détente and arms 
control had ceased.  The 1976 Team B exercise had produced a comprehensive and closely 
reasoned explication of the strategic “window of vulnerability” that Pipes and several of his 
associates set about promoting in several different fora.  As they did so, the former Team B 
members further refined the neoconservative crisis narrative by successfully translating the 
esoterica of nuclear strategy and weaponry into an understandable and politically useful 
form.   
The promotion of this aspect of the crisis narrative, what Pipes was to call the “myth 
of Team B,” began with a series of interviews that Pipes gave to his former student, New 
York Times reporter David Binder.  In his interview, Pipes claimed that the Soviet Union 
was relentlessly pursuing nuclear superiority which it fully intended to use.  Pipes’s 
interviews were followed, much to the displeasure of the Director of Central Intelligence 
George Bush, by remarks by Gen. George Keegan, the Defense Intelligence Agency chief.  
In a separate interview with Binder, Keegan, who had not served on the Team B Panel, 
claimed that Team B’s report had caused the official estimate to “shift 180 degrees” and that 
the 1976 NIE had been re-drafted three times.  This, of course, had not been the case, 
although Keegan had inserted several lengthy dissents in the NIE agreeing with Team B’s 
conclusions.  To counter Keegan, an irate Bush complained to Binder and included a cover 
letter to all NIE recipients stating that there was no truth to Keegan’s assertions.352 
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Team B members followed up their New York Times interview with various other 
interviews and appearances.  Graham and Van Cleave in particular, turned out to be quite 
loquacious.  In several public forums sponsored by the American Security Council, they 
asserted that the Soviets had achieved outright strategic superiority over the United States.  
When Keegan repeated this claim, there was a swift and public reproach from the Joint 
Chiefs.  Irritated that an active-duty officer would assert Soviet strategic superiority, the JCS 
chairman, Air Force Gen. George S. Brown, wrote to Sen. William Proxmire denouncing 
Keegan’s claims.  Brown followed up with a rebuttal of Keegan in the Washington Post and 
a private dressing-down.  No further statements from Keegan were forthcoming until his own 
retirement some six months later.353    
The Binder interviews caused the Congress to conduct two sets of hearings that 
accomplished little other than to give Team B a public forum from which to promote its 
views.  In front of both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Pipes reiterated his contention that the growing Soviet nuclear 
force represented an imminent danger to the United States.  The drama of this apocalyptic 
testimony was heightened by the vehement denunciations of Team B by former CIA deputy 
director and INR chief Ray Cline, who loudly disparaged Team B as a politicized “kangaroo 
court.”  In a rather more thoughtful—and prophetic—opinion, CIA and Pentagon veteran 
Herbert Scoville ventured that Team B "was clearly an attempt to leave a legacy for the new 
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administration—or for the Ford administration if it continued—which would be very hard to 
reverse . . . I think it is going to make life very difficult for the new administration."354 
 
The Narrative Co-Opted: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Reagan Resolution 
Scoville was right.  Two days after Carter’s election, the Committee on the Present 
Danger (CPD) introduced itself to the world at a press conference at the Metropolitan Club in 
Washington.  Promoting a summary of the Team B Report written for laymen called 
“Common Sense and the Common Danger,” the group’s “policy chairman,” Paul Nitze, put 
the incoming Carter Administration on notice that its recent intimations that it would seek to 
continue some form of détente and arms control would not be acceptable.355 
Emerging from the ruins of the old Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM), the 
Committee on the Present Danger was a much more formidable organization.  The group 
incorporated almost all of the CDM’s members, which meant that the group enjoyed a close 
relationship with to Jackson and his staff.   The CPD membership also included a sizeable 
number of conservative Republican corporate leaders.   The CPD counted representatives of 
110 major corporations among its members, including prominent Republican businessmen 
such as David Packard (Hewlett-Packard), Henry C. Fowler (Goldman Sachs), Thomas 
Nichols (Olin Corp.), and  C. Douglas Dillon (Dillon Reed Investment Bank).  The 
leadership, which consisted of expert bureaucrats like Nitze, the CPD president, Charles 
Tyroler (the former head of the Defense Department’s Manpower Supply Directorate during 
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the Johnson Administration) and John Connally (former Secretary of the Treasury and Navy 
under Kennedy and Nixon).  As a result of this array of corporate nobility, the CPD was 
better financed, better led and better connected than the CDM.356 
The CPD was also proved very adept in creating a network of allies outside of official 
Washington.  Early on, the CPD made contact with like-minded organizations, such as the 
American Conservative Union, the Hudson Institute, and the venerable American Security 
Council.  The CPD leadership also placed great emphasis on maintaining relationships with 
Commentary Magazine and the New Republic.  These publications loomed particularly large 
in CPD strategy, not only for their wide readership, but also because of their enormous 
prestige.  Articles appearing in them, Tyroler believed, gained a measure of credibility that 
could not be purchased.357 
As a result of these attributes, the CPD was, unsurprisingly, a quite effective 
organization overall.  Almost immediately after Carter assumed office, the CPD 
demonstrated its strength by organizing opposition to Paul Warnke’s appointment as chief 
SALT negotiator.  Warnke, a familiar figure within the Democratic Party, had one serious 
mark against him in the CPD’s view: he had served as an advisor to McGovern in 1972.  
According to Nitze, the group intended to use Warnke’s confirmation hearings as a forum for 
drawing a contrast between Warnke’s views on the Soviet Union and that of the CPD.  
Prevailing upon Jackson to hold hearings into Warnke’s views and record, the competing 
                                                 
356
 John L. Boies, Buying for Armageddon: Business, Society and Military Spending since the Cuban Missile 
Crisis (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1994), p. 126. 
 
357
 Ibid; Anthony Lewis, “The Brooding Hawks,” New York Times, February 10, 1977, p. 39. 
 
 297 
testimonies engendered a great deal of acrimony and controversy and very nearly derailed the 
nomination.358   
The group’s initial victory performance, however, was its campaign against the SALT 
II treaty concluded by Carter and the Soviets in June of 1979.  Beginning in the summer of 
1977, CPD members began to produce a series of speeches, mailings and articles, based on 
the Team B Report, and aimed at undercutting public support for any arms control treaty that 
the Carter Administration might conclude.  The initial salvo was fired by Pipes, with the 
publication of an article entitled, “Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a 
Nuclear War.”  This article represented a further refinement in the crisis narrative insofar as 
it was one of the first—if not the only—explication of strategic war-fighting doctrine written 
for laymen.  The ominous title of Pipes’s article was also emblematic of the tone of a 
campaign so ferocious that many in Washington believed that the treaty was dead before 
Carter left for Vienna to begin negotiations.359 
In terms of U.S. national security policy, the CPD campaign yielded almost 
immediate results.  In order to counteract CPD charges of a “decade of neglect” of U.S. 
military capabilities, the Carter Administration initiated planning for a substantial arms 
buildup, the centerpiece of which was the MX.  Capable of carrying a ten-reentry vehicle 
MIRV warhead, the MX was a counterforce weapon of the first rank.  The president’s National 
Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, a former member of the CDM himself, revealed plans for 
a buildup to Nitze, ostensibly to gain his support.  Nitze, however, was not so easily seduced.  
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Believing that the administration simply intended to use the new weapons programs as 
“bargaining chips” in the SALT process, Nitze refused to lend his support.  Although the 
budgetary and planning deployment proceeded, CPD continued its scathing criticisms of arms 
control and the Carter Administration.360 
From a historical perspective, however, the CPD is less significant for its influence and 
effects on security policy than for what it tells us about the state of neoconservatism during this 
period.  The nature of the membership, for instance, demonstrates that the neoconservatives had 
reached a rapprochement with the Republican Party, and were rapidly moving toward a 
permanent alliance.  While party affiliation had never been of utmost importance to the 
neoconservatives, they had long been uncomfortable with the realist tendencies that seemed to 
characterize the Republican Party and its leaders since Eisenhower.  Indeed, most of the more 
prominent realist figures within the party, such as Kissinger, Scowcroft, Bush and James 
Baker, were shunned by CPD.   
Several factors facilitated a neoconservative-conservative alliance.  Most obvious is the 
emerging set of common interests between the neoconservatives and the corporate wing of the 
Republican Party.  While businessmen had looked longingly at the giant untapped markets in 
China and the Soviet Union during the Nixon years, their hopes that détente would eventually 
provide an entry into those markets had waned substantially since the optimism of the early 
1970s.  The Soviet Union, in particular, had proven itself an exceedingly difficult market to tap.  
Obsessed with secrecy and control, the Soviet government seemed more interested in harnessing 
business than facilitating it.  More importantly, however, was the emerging view among 
American corporate interests that simply being “allowed” into a market was insufficient.  
American corporations soon found to their distress that the Soviets simply would not allow large-
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scale capitalist enterprises to operate in the Soviet Union in the same ways they did in America 
and Europe.  Insofar as they believed that the Soviets would continue to resist the sort of regime-
change that would make a sustained relationship possible, American corporate interests were 
willing to countenance—and in many cases, finance—an activist foreign policy aimed at the 
transformation of the Soviet regime.361    
The most important factor in the emergence of a neoconservative-conservative alliance 
was the role of neoconservative thought in filling the intellectual vacuum left by the departure of 
Nixon and Kissinger from the scene.  Once they had begun to reject détente after Yom Kippur, 
many Republicans were confronted by the fact that there were not many alternatives to it.  After 
all, détente had emerged from Nixon and Kissinger’s efforts to find a workable alternative to 
both the reflexive anti-Communism of the Eisenhower era and the idealism and adventurism of 
the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations.  The neoconservatives, however, offered a view of 
the Soviets that was at once simple, sophisticated, and comprehensive.  The Soviet state was evil, 
militant and incorrigible.  Behind this formulation was a sizable body of literature in which the 
neoconservatives claimed philosophical, sociological and historical authority for their essentialist 
views.362   
Most attractive of all to conservatives was the neoconservative narrative of crisis. The 
notion of America in crisis, weakened and demoralized by Vietnam and threatened from without 
by an evil, implacable power was attractive to many.  The political equivalent of the pregnant 
pause, its power lies in its incompleteness which seems to demand a political denouement in the 
person of a strong leader, new ideas and new policies.  Even Jimmy Carter seems to have 
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recognized the political and literary power inherent in the neoconservative narrative when he 
argued that America was, in 1979, in the midst of a “crisis of confidence.”  Unfortunately for 
Carter, his version of the neoconservative narrative suffered from the same weakness that had 
plagued Jackson: a lack of moral authority.  In Carter’s formulation he could no more account for 
Iran than Jackson could for Vietnam.363 
Ronald Reagan adopted the neoconservative narrative.  As a charter member of the CPD, 
Reagan was quite familiar with the components of the narrative.  The essentialist view of the 
Soviet Union, the moral crisis brought on by the Vietnam Syndrome, the military decline fostered 
by a decade of neglect, all were encapsulations of ideas that he had held and promoted for 
decades.  During his 1976 campaign, the critique of détente had comprised most of his rhetoric, 
although he did address Vietnam.  Reagan’s answer to the questions associated with Vietnam, 
however, were mainly limited to assertions that the war had been a “noble cause.”  While many 
factors can be assembled to account for Reagan’s defeat, it is interesting to note that he, like 
Jackson, had not accounted for Vietnam in such a way as to completely restore his moral 
authority.  
Pressing ahead in 1980, Reagan proffered a new iteration of the neoconservative 
narrative that answered the question of Vietnam in an elegant and novel way.  Reagan proceeded 
from the assertion that the decision to become involved in Southeast Asia had been correct.  
Vietnam had been a noble cause.  America had failed, Reagan argued, because of our leaders.  “If 
only,” Reagan maintained, “our government had not been afraid to win.”  The consequence of 
this failure has been the onset of the Vietnam Syndrome.  Now, however, we must put it aside 
and “re-arm morally and militarily.”  This ingenious formulation is superior to Jackson’s insofar 
as it replaces contrition with exoneration.  Thus, anyone who had believed in the anti-Communist 
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crusade stood pardoned.  In the context of electoral politics, the psychological power of the 
alleviation of guilt should not be underestimated.364  
The failure of American leaders, Reagan claimed, must be understood as a moral failure.  
The decade of neglect had been a neglect of the spirit, as well as a neglect of America’s military 
capabilities.  The moral aspect is a subtle but important characteristic Reagan’s narrative that has 
been often misunderstood, even by the people in general agreement with the president’s 
narrative.  Some, for instance, have tended toward a “stab-in-the-back” myth, arguing that the 
war was lost because political leaders, in particular Defense Secretary McNamara and President 
Johnson, enforced an unwarranted strategic “gradualism” or made tactical decisions better left to 
commanders ion the field.  Others, simply assert that “we weren’t allowed to win” by 
unidentified parties in the government.  The latter example enjoyed wide currency in the 1980s 
when it became identified with the fictional character John Rambo in the popular movie Rambo: 
First Blood.  These distortions of Reagan’s narrative obscure the “moral re-armament” facet of 
his prescription for overcoming the Vietnam Syndrome.365  
As for the neoconservatives, it is ironic Reagan’s formulation implicitly places much of 
the blame for the moral failure on them or very close to them.  Rostow, Wattenberg and Nitze, 
for example, had all served in the Kennedy and/or Johnson Administrations.  Wohlstetter and his 
coterie of acolytes within the Pentagon had formulated the bases for the Flexible Response 
doctrine that was the basic U.S. strategic approach in Vietnam, while Jackson, Fosdick, and Perle 
had been among the war’s staunchest supporters in the Congress.  The neoconservatives, 
however, did not react to Reagan at the time.  They were preparing to join him in Washington. 
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Conclusion: The (Temporary) End of Transformation 
 
 As the 1980 presidential election neared, Dorothy Fosdick was preparing, like almost 
all of the neoconservatives, to cast her vote for Ronald Reagan.  Knowing that Jackson, ever 
the dutiful Democrat would support Jimmy Carter despite a heartfelt inclination to do 
otherwise, Fosdick feared that he might expect the same sacrifice from her.  Thus, before 
voting for Reagan, she went to the senator to obtain his dispensation.  “You’re a free 
woman,” Jackson said quietly.  Fosdick thanked him and, for the first time in her life, cast 
her vote for a Republican presidential candidate. 
The neoconservative vote for Reagan in the 1980 election marks the beginning of the 
end of the first neoconservative transformational project.  Although it was not apparent at the 
time, neoconservatism was all but spent.  Almost four decades of ideological and political 
conflict had sapped neoconservatism’s intellectual energy and left it doctrinaire and ossified.  
As a result, the movement found itself unable to respond to the new challenges and rapidly 
changing events of the 1980s. 
The final phase of the neoconservatives’ evolution began with the movement’s 
definitive break with the Democrats.  Although the relationship between the 
neoconservatives and the Democrats had been strained for some time, most had made little 
effort to seek a permanent home elsewhere.  Part of the reason was that party identity had 
always been secondary to ideas and positions.  Another consideration was that there had 
simply been no place for the neoconservative view in the Republican Party.  While there had 
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long been some affinity between the academic and literary neoconservatives and many of the 
social conservatives that populated the Republican Party, the realist foreign policy view of 
Nixon, Ford, Kissinger and Rockefeller repelled the political neoconservatives.366 
In 1980, however, the situation was quite different.  Republican realism, while not 
dead, lay wounded next to the corpses of détente and arms control.  The demise of détente 
and the decline of the Nixon-Ford wing of the party cleared the way for the neoconservatives 
to assume an intellectual leadership role within the party.  The collapse of the Nixon-Ford 
wing also softened to a significant degree conservative opposition to the neoconservatives 
and their ideas.  Nixon conservatives, no longer bound by the political necessity of having to 
support negotiations with the Soviets, tended to gravitate toward the neoconservative view.  
This growing convergence between conservatives and neoconservatives over the danger 
represented by the Soviet Union was, in turn, the basis of a burgeoning conservative-
neoconservative alliance.   
The presence of Ronald Reagan at the top of the Republican ticket was, however, the 
most compelling factor in the neoconservative move.  Shrewd political calculations aside, 
there seems to have been a genuine affinity between Reagan and the neoconservatives that 
consisted of a shared belief in the power of ideas, the material reality of evil and a 
predilection for transformative action.  While these characteristics seemed to have derived 
more from a confluence of Reagan’s Midwestern evangelical heritage and classic Cold War 
anti-Communism, their origins were less important than their implications.  The most striking 
manifestations of these characteristics can be seen in Reagan’s famous “evil empire” speech 
and his startling announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative in March of 1983.   
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Politically, Reagan was a known and acceptable quantity to the neoconservatives.  He 
had a long record as a vocal and consistent critic of détente and was a founding member of 
the Committee on the Present Danger.  Indeed, many neoconservatives had hoped for a 
Reagan nomination in the wake of his shocking defeat of Ford in both the North Carolina and 
Texas primaries in 1976.  Although he did not succeed in gaining the nomination, Reagan’s 
strong showing in 1976 generated enough momentum to sustain a four-year speaking tour on 
the Republican “rubber-chicken” circuit.  While touring the country and maintaining his 
visibility, Reagan reprised the scathing attacks against arms control that had propelled his 
1976 campaign.  Once the campaign began in earnest, Reagan hired a number of 
neoconservatives as advisors.  The CPD foreign policy team was represented by Paul Nitze, 
Jeane Kirkpatrick, Robert W. Tucker and Fred Iklé, while Team B alumni William Van 
Cleave, Seymour Weiss and Richard Pipes comprised the campaign’s “Soviet section.”367 
As a result of these affinities between Reagan and the neoconservatives, in the wake 
of his electoral victory he looked to the neoconservatives to guide the new administration’s 
foreign and security policy.  As the new Reagan Administration began to take shape, the 
neoconservatives for the first time assumed important policymaking and executive positions 
within the foreign and security policy bureaucracy.  On the eve of his inauguration, Reagan 
named Jackson as chair of his bipartisan Foreign Policy Advisory Committee.  Richard Pipes 
was appointed head of the Soviet section of the National Security Council.  Pipes’s former 
student, Douglas J. Feith, along with Michael Ledeen and China expert Aaron Friedberg, 
were also assigned to the NSC.  At the State Department, the neoconservative presence was 
even greater.  Former Jackson staffers, Elliot Abrams (who was also Midge Decter’s son-in-
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law), became Director of the Office for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Robert 
Kagan was appointed Deputy for Policy of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, and 
Charles Horner was made Associate Director of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA).  
Wohlstetter protégés Paul Wolfowitz and Zalmay Khalilzad secured positions as Ambassador 
to Indonesia and Assistant Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff, respectively.  Jeane 
Kirkpatrick was appointed as U.N. ambassador.368 
Neoconservatives were also given important positions in the Defense Department.  
Here the focus was on two broad areas; arms control and strategy.  Perle, who had been made 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, was given responsibility for 
formulating the Defense Department’s position in arms control negotiations.  Reinforced by 
the presence of his fellow Jackson staffer, Frank Gaffney, Perle’s immediate task was to 
ensure that nothing derailed the impending placement of 464 intermediate-range Pershing II 
and Tomahawk cruise missiles in Europe.  Perle was also given responsibility for securing 
the approval and deployment of the new ten-warhead ICBM, the LGM-118A “Peacekeeper,” 
popularly known as the MX.  In undertaking these missions, Perle could count on allies at 
ACDA, which was headed by Eugene Rostow, and included Max Kampelman and Paul Nitze 
as Deputy Directors. 
On the strategic side, the new Assistant Secretary of Defense, Fred Iklé was charged 
with refining U.S. strategic doctrine.  Recruiting Andrew Marshall’s Office of Net 
Assessment and Wohlstetter’s consulting firm, Pan Heuristics, Iklé’s study group the 
Committee on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, began work in February 1981.  The main 
thrust of this work was aimed at further improving the offensive aspects of nuclear war-
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fighting in U.S. strategic doctrine.  Earlier work under the Carter Administration had sought 
to append improved defensive measures (silo hardening, command-and-control survivability, 
etc.) to the offensive revisions Schlesinger had instituted with Selective Options.  In the 
aggregate, these measures comprised what had become known as the “countervailing” 
strategy, designed to prevent a Soviet victory in a nuclear conflict.  The new efforts under 
Reagan, however, were designed to formulate a true “prevailing” strategy, where the 
emphasis would now be on achieving an American victory, rather than simply preventing a 
Soviet one.369 
The first fruit of the neoconservative efforts to transform U.S. strategic doctrine 
became known in May of 1981 when excerpts from of the Defense Department’s most 
important annual planning document, the Secretary’s Defense Guidance, was leaked to the 
Washington Post.  Quoting a hitherto unknown presidential decision memorandum, National 
Security Decision Document 13 (NSDD-13), the Defense Guidance stated that “should 
deterrence fail, and strategic nuclear war with the USSR occur, the United States must 
prevail and be able to force the Soviet Union to seek earliest termination of hostilities on 
terms favorable to the United States.”  
The administration’s reaction to the leak of its defense guidance was mixed.  There 
were, of course, some attempts at “spinning” the story, but they were uncoordinated and 
unconvincing.  Haig, in a moment of linguistic artistry, ventured that “to prevail” did not 
have the same meaning as “to win.”  Simultaneously, Weinberger, in a letter to 70 newspaper 
editors, denied that the word “prevail” had ever been used in connection with U.S. strategic 
doctrine and that no consideration had been given to formulating a war-fighting doctrine.  All 
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of these protestations were undermined, however, by Pipes, who in an interview with Los 
Angeles Times columnist Robert Scheer, asserted that administration policy was aimed at 
pushing the Soviet leadership toward having “to choose between peacefully changing their 
Communist system . . . or going to war.”  A short time later, NSC staffer Gen. Robert 
Schweitzer expressed a similar sentiment, telling fellow officers, that the United States and 
the Soviet Union were on a “drift toward war” and posited the notion that “they [the Soviets] 
are going to strike.”  Although Pipes suffered only a dressing-down from Richard Allen, the 
National Security Advisor, Schweitzer was relieved of his NSC post for his comments.370       
The year 1981 also saw the birth of the so-called “Zero Options” proposal.  
Formulated by Perle, the proposal was designed to put the Soviets on the defensive by 
publicly offering them a solution that he knew they would not accept.  The U.S. offered to 
cancel the deployment of all intermediate-range weapons in exchange for removal of all 
Soviet SS-20 missiles aimed at Western Europe.  From the Soviet perspective, the United 
States was asking for something for nothing, and flatly rejected the proposal.  Secretary of 
State Alexander Haig, in an attempt to salvage the negotiations, proposed—over Perle’s 
objections—that some sort of “interim” agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces 
(INF) could be worked out, while both sides continued to explore a comprehensive 
settlement.  The president, however, quashed this idea on the grounds that such half-
measures, as the first SALT agreements had demonstrated, almost always worked to the 
Soviets’ advantage.371  
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With the promulgation of NSDD-13 and the Zero-Option proposal, it appeared that 
the neoconservatives had effected a significant transformation of U.S. foreign and security 
policy.  They had finally put in place a full-fledged strategic war-fighting doctrine, and had 
effectively killed any chances of continuing the arms control process for the foreseeable 
future.  These two achievements also had implications beyond the narrow confines of 
doctrine and arms control policy.  The first of these was the resignation of Haig.  As 
Kissinger’s former deputy, Haig had been mistrusted by the neoconservatives and had 
endured an uneasy relationship with his neoconservative subordinates in the State 
Department, as well as an intense rivalry with Perle.  His replacement, George Schultz, was a 
former Nixon Administration official who supported the Zero-Option and, as a result, was a 
much more amenable figure to the neoconservatives.   
Another implication of the policy changes concerned Congress.  The Democrat-
controlled Congress seems to have been “spooked” by the analyses, briefings and talk of 
protracted nuclear war emanating from the administration.  As a result, when the request for 
funding was made for the initial deployment of the MX in November of 1982, the 
Democrats’ objections centered, not on the missile’s expense or its war-fighting capability, 
but on the vulnerability of the “dense-pack” basing mode.  This represented an astounding 
development, insofar as many Democrats had maintained for years that the Soviets would not 
dare risk a first-strike against the U.S. ICBM force with an unproven strategy and unproven 
weapons.  The exquisite irony of this objection was not lost on Perle, who could not resist 
crowing “that liberal lawmakers should now arrive at the conviction that the Soviets will go 
out of their way to destroy our land-based deterrent is too richly ironic to let pass without 
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comment.”  The Congress, it appeared, had ceded national security policy to the 
administration for the foreseeable future.372 
Another, less welcome implication, was the emergence of a peace movement in 
Western Europe.  Although the so-called “peace movement” had existed in Europe since the 
1950s, they had fallen into disrepute and disrepair.  The INF controversy, however, seemed 
to re-energize them and, by the end of 1982, mass protests had occurred in Holland, Britain, 
Belgium, Denmark, Sweden and West Germany.  The movement was particularly strong in 
West Germany, where the Green Party managed to forge a coalition consisting of clergy, 
students, social democrats, anarchists and even military figures.  While the protests had no 
discernible effects on the U.S. negotiating position, many of the NATO governments openly 
worried that the peace movement—which was morphing into a much larger and much more 
militant anti-nuclear movement—was the beginning of an irrevocable spilt between the 
United States and its European allies.  As a result of these fears, the Dutch government 
delayed asking its parliament for permission to deploy the U.S. weapons, while the West 
German government warned Schultz sternly that “there must be a real negotiation . . . not just 
a show.”373   
More serious from the administration’s perspective, was an emerging fear of nuclear 
war among the American public.  Polls taken between 1981 and 1983 in Britain, America, 
and Australia showed an exponential increase in the number of people who not only believed 
a nuclear war was possible, but also very likely within 5 to 10 years.  This burgeoning fear 
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manifested itself several ways, some less overtly political than others.  In popular culture, 
low-budget films with post-apocalyptic plots, such as Mad Max, Red Dawn, War Games, and 
The Terminator became overnight cult hits among many young people.   
On the political plane, a “nuclear freeze” movement, which called for an immediate 
halt to the testing, production and deployment of all nuclear weapons, began to take shape in 
the United States.  As a result, many Republican leaders began to fear that the increasing 
number of resolutions passed in support of a nuclear freeze presaged electoral disaster.  
These fears mounted as hundreds of state and local governments, as well as the U.S. House 
of Representatives, passed resolutions in support of a nuclear freeze.374 
By the summer of 1982, the anti-nuclear reaction had become so intense Reagan was 
forced to confront it.  At first he adopted the neoconservative line that the freeze movement 
was the result of a Soviet propaganda campaign and its adherents were Communist dupes.  
By 1983, however, Reagan was, in Schultz’s words, “rattled.”  He was convinced that the 
Zero-Option proposal had to be withdrawn for the good of NATO as well as the Republican 
Party, and shelved the proposal in March.  The president followed up with a conciliatory 
speech for Soviet consumption and ordered Schultz to prepare new positions for 
“meaningful” negotiations.375 
As the Zero-Option strategy unraveled in the face of popular protest, other aspects of 
the neoconservatives’ transformative project began to come under pressure.  The Congress, 
which had just a short while ago seemed ready to acquiesce to the administration on national 
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security issues, suddenly acquired a collective backbone.  The administration’s basing plan 
for the MX was resoundingly rejected and total deployment limited to 100 missiles.  Debate 
began on a number of other weapon-systems as Congressional Democrats also began to push 
for $25 billion in cuts in the huge $1.3 trillion defense budget.376  
Equally detrimental to the transformative project as the nuclear freeze movement was 
the appearance of the new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev.  Assuming power in the Soviet 
Union in March of 1985, Gorbachev almost immediately suspended SS-20 deployments and 
gave orders to disband the main offensive conventional formations aimed at Western Europe, 
the Operational Maneuver Groups (OMGs) and the Independent Tank Regiments (ITRs).  
Gorbachev’s good faith efforts toward the Reagan Administration were successful and 
Reagan and the new Soviet leader met at Geneva in November.  Thirteen months later, after 
more Soviet concessions, Reagan and Gorbachev signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Forces Treaty in Washington.377 
The neoconservative transformative project was now at a temporary end.  The 
coalescence of the nuclear freeze movement had robbed the movement of its political 
impetus.  The persuasiveness of the neoconservative view of the Soviet Union had, to a large 
extent, rested on the consistency of Soviet behavior.  This consistency, the neoconservatives 
had claimed over the years, was a manifestation, not of national anxieties, perceived strategic 
needs or temporary political exigencies, but of the nature of the Soviet state itself.  
Gorbachev’s policies, however, represented a significant departure from the neoconservative 
image of the Soviet system.  While they do not appear to have been unduly troubled by this 
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incongruity, others—most notably the president and British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher—began to revise their ideas about the Soviet-American relationship.  
The collapse of neoconservative influence within the Reagan Administration had, 
however, begun before Gorbachev and was a result of both hubris and an inability to 
understand popular anxieties.  Convinced of the unassailable correctness and historical 
importance of their transformative project, most of the neoconservatives had paid scant 
attention to, and had little sympathy with the popular unrest that their ideas and policies had 
precipitated.  For figures such as Wohlstetter, Perle and Iklé, the emotional component 
underlying the nuclear freeze movement was anathema.  Accustomed to talking about 
nuclear war in RAND-esque analytical terms, they could not easily grasp the fears and 
anxieties that nuclear war-fighting scenarios engendered in the public.  Similarly, while most 
Americans realized that the Soviet Union was not by any stretch of the imagination a society 
comparable to that of the Western democracies, the stark references habitually used to 
describe the Soviet Union and its policies seemed to leave no room for politics.  The 
neoconservative vision of the 1980s seemed to foreclose almost every possibility short of 
war.  To the American public, as well as the publics of the Western European countries, there 
appeared to be no room for negotiation, for reform—for hope. 
A measure of the neoconservatives’ insensitivity to the popular will was the intensity 
of the recriminations they leveled at Reagan after 1985.  Most were, as would be expected, 
harsh polemics by the neoconservative literary cadre.  Characterizing the president’s new 
policy direction as “appeasement,” “lack of moral clarity,” and “foolishness,” the 
neoconservatives revealed a distrust of and contempt for the concept of democracy as a 
marketplace of ideas.  For them, ideas were—and are—timeless, universal entities not 
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dependent on human agency for validity.  In an earlier time, this notion may have served as a 
bulwark against the false truths and pretensions of fascism and Communism.  Over time, 
however, the belief in the absolute nature of ideas had begun to foster an intellectual rigidity 
that discounted the possibility that Communism would mellow or simply fail.  It is hard to 
imagine any attitude more contrary to the sunny optimism implicit in both liberal democracy 
and in the personality of Reagan himself.378    
The fall of the neoconservatives from the first Reagan Administration did not mean 
the end of neoconservatism.  The same intellectual cohesion and web of concerns and 
interests that had played a role in the coalescence of the movement kept neoconservatism 
intact as they remained active along the fringes of the Republican  Party.  They also remained 
somewhat active along the fringes of the Reagan Administration.  That this should be the 
case is, of course, not surprising.  They had, after all, laid the foundations for Reagan’s 
foreign and security policy and, having helped build that singular edifice, they knew their 
way through its corridors quite well.  Wohlstetter, for instance, remained at work on the 
Integrated Long-Term Strategy Project until the end of Reagan’s second term.  Although 
after 1985 the status of the project—and of Wohlstetter himself—was less than it had been, 
even the realists that now surrounded Reagan dared not cancel it.   
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Indeed, having assumed the role as the intellectuals of the Republican Party, they 
were difficult to replace.  Realists like James Baker, George H.W. Bush, and George Schultz 
might be uncomfortable with their ideas, but being realists, they faced up to what had been 
apparent for some time: the neoconservatives had brought an intellectual energy to the party 
that had been lacking since the fall of Richard Nixon.  Their ideas had filled the void left by 
the departure of Nixon and Kissinger and, even though events were being driven by other 
ideas—Gorbachev’s ideas—that fact did not automatically warrant exile.   
Therein, lies part of the historical significance of neoconservatism.  In the course of 
filling the intellectual vacuum left by the collapse of détente—a collapse that they 
facilitated—the neoconservatives transformed the Republican Party.  Their primacy in 
foreign affairs guaranteed that for some time to come the Republican Party would adhere to 
an activist and anti-realist view of foreign policy, rather than the neo-isolationism 
represented by Pat Buchanan and the so-called “paleoconservatives.”  The neoconservative 
presence within the party has also served to perpetuate the perception that the Republican 
Party is much more adept and forceful in handling foreign and security policy than their 
Democrat rivals.   
Beyond it effects on the Republican Party, neoconservatism has transformed the 
topography upon which U.S. policymakers would henceforth operate in two ways.  First, 
they have created the perception that the first Reagan Administration represents a permanent, 
workable template for U.S. policy for all time.  While the uncompromising, confrontational 
tone that characterized the early years of the Reagan Administration may indeed represent a 
workable strategy, the essentialist facet of that strategy is most troubling.  To emplace such a 
strategy solely on the basis of what one believes another nation is, rather than what it does, 
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appears to foreclose the possibility of coexistence and/or reconciliation with a number of 
states.  Moreover, it reinforces the idea that some enemies are so militant, so intractable, and 
so evil that nothing short of their utter destruction is practical or morally acceptable.   
 The idea of intervention predicated on moral obligation also represents a 
transformation precipitated by the neoconservatives.  Admittedly, there has always been an 
undercurrent of morality to American involvement abroad, but that current has most often 
manifested itself as defensive missions of last resort, aimed at destroying the threat and 
restoring self-determination to others—Wilsonianism.  In the neoconservative conception, 
however, America is morally compelled to actively seek out evil and destroy it.  Whether or 
not future policymakers agree with this formulation, it will be difficult to argue on moral 
grounds how one arrives at a decision to allow evil to flourish.  It would, for example, be 
extremely difficult for a future president to explain the jettisoning of the Jackson-Vanik 
Amendment or the prevailing doctrine without incurring some moral reprobation.  Indeed, 
neoconservatives have recently argued in this vein, asserting that it is impossible to claim 
that the world is not better off without Saddam Hussein.  To do so, they say, amounts to a 
morally relativistic “sleep of reason.”  I would argue, however, that such a “sleep of reason” 
is infinitely preferable to the knowledge that thousands of young American men lie asleep in 
their dress blues.379 
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